Strategies of engagement : a study of U.S. National Security Strategies from the end of the Cold War to the War on Terrorism and their implications for the role of NATO by Lundestad, Ingrid
 
 
 
STRATEGIES OF 
ENGAGEMENT 
 
 
 
A Study of U.S. National Security Strategies  
from the End of the Cold War to the War on Terrorism  
and their Implications for the Role of NATO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ingrid Lundestad 
 
 
Master Thesis in History 
Department of Archaeology, Conservation and History 
University of Oslo  
Spring 2008 
 ii
 
 
 
 
 
Strategies of Engagement 
 
 
 
 
A Study of U.S. National Security Strategies  
from the End of the Cold War to the War on Terrorism  
and their Implications for the Role of NATO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*** 
 
 
 
 
 
Ingrid Lundestad 
 iii
 iv
CONTENTS 
 
 
 
 
Preface vii 
Abbreviations ix 
Chapter I  Introduction 1 
The Project and its Relevance 1 
Historiography and the Need for a New Synthesis 4 
Primary Sources and their Applicability 12 
The Actors Involved – The U.S. and the Role of NATO 17 
Strategy and its Components – A Conceptual Framework 19 
Outline of Thesis 24 
Chapter II  Strategies of Containment and Deterrence  The National Security Strategies of the United 
States during the Cold War and their Implications for the Role of NATO 25 
Introduction 25 
Interests and Objectives 26 
Perception of Threats 28 
Strategic Areas, Allies and Partners 29 
Strategic Thinking and Implementation 31 
Conclusions 36 
Chapter III   From a Strategy of Containment and Deterrence towards a Fledgling Strategy of 
Engagement   The National Security Strategies of the United States during the Presidency of George H. 
W. Bush  and their Implications for the Role of NATO 37 
Introduction 37 
Interests and Objectives 38 
Perception of Threats 41 
Strategic Areas, Allies and Partners 47 
Strategic Thinking and Implementation 52 
Conclusions 62 
Chapter IV   A Restrained Strategy of Engagement   The National Security Strategies of the United States  
during the Presidency of William J. Clinton  and their Implications for the Role of NATO 63 
Introduction 63 
Interests and Objectives 64 
Perception of Threats 68 
Strategic Areas, Allies and Partners 73 
Strategic Thinking and Implementation 78 
Conclusions 92 
 v
Chapter V   Towards A Strategy of Offensive Engagement   The National Security Strategies of the United 
States  during the Presidency of George W. Bush  and their Implications for the Role of NATO 93 
Introduction 93 
Interests and Objectives 94 
Perception of Threats 98 
Strategic Areas, Allies and Partners 102 
Strategic Thinking and Implementation 106 
Conclusions 116 
Chapter VI   Strategies of Engagement   A Concluding Synthesis 118 
Adding Parts into a Whole – Seeing Order in Diversity 118 
Table 1: Overview of Periods and Components of Strategies 119 
Interests and Objectives 120 
Perception of Threats 121 
Strategic areas, allies and partners 123 
Strategic Thinking and Implementation 125 
Final Remarks 129 
Bibliography 131 
Primary Sources 131 
Literature 147 
 
 vi
PREFACE 
 
 
 
As the period of this study began, I personally was on the steps of entering the educational 
stage of my life. I was a 5 year-old when the Berlin Wall came down, and was introduced to a 
piece of the wall as a first-grader in 1991. At that time the Soviet Union disintegrated, me not 
knowing the historical dimensions of it beyond the fact that the map of Europe on the class 
room wall was now outdated. Later, I heard something terrible happened in Sarajevo as the 
1990s moved on. I recall the NATO bombings of Kosovo. At 17, on my home TV set, I saw 
two planes crash into the World Trade Center. Clearly, I do not remember much, and 
definitely not in an academic manner. I had to re-live and re-think the period of my study 
through the thoughtful and instructive guidance of others, as well as the critical examination 
of primary material, interviews and literature. To make this possible, I have become indebted 
to numerous individuals and institutions. I would like to thank them all. 
Firstly, I am utterly grateful to Professor Helge Pharo of the University of Oslo for 
supervising this project, and his persistent support and enthusiasm in doing so. Secondly, I 
want to thank the Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies for providing me a special master 
scholarship and an including and inspiring work place during my last year of master studies. 
At the institute, I am thankful for the enlightening deliberations and advises of the fellows at 
the Center for Transatlantic Studies. 
I have also become indebted to the participants of the 2007 International Ph.D. 
Summer School in St. Petersburg, arranged by the Forum for Contemporary History at the 
University of Oslo. The participants, and particularly International History Review editor 
Professor Edward Ingram, deserves a great thank you for giving relevant comments to my 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The Project and its Relevance 
With the end of the Cold War, the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, and the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union, the context and challenges to the security strategies of the 
United States (U.S.) and the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) changed. 
Even so, a complete new understanding of post-Cold War strategies did not, and still has not, 
evolved. The ambiguity of the period is indicated in the very term of the phase, post-Cold 
War, simply negatively defined from what had been, and not from what was, and is, the 
present. Not until the War on Terrorism and Iraq did the security policies of the U.S. again 
seem focused, and NATO found itself in a new continent with the engagement in 
Afghanistan. In order to understand the evolution of U.S. strategies and the transformation of 
the role of NATO within them, and to comprehend the foundation for present security 
strategies, the research question of this project is:   
 
How did U.S. national security strategies evolve from the end of the Cold War to the War on 
Terrorism, and how did the role of NATO change within that strategy?  
 
 The argument emerging from this analysis asserts that U.S. national security strategies 
evolved as strategies of engagement. From relying on containment and deterrence to secure 
U.S. and NATO interests during the Cold War, strategies of engagement gradually came to 
constitute a new type of approach. In an intermediate phase, with a new primary position, and 
without an existential, monolithic threat, the three post-Cold War presidencies’ strategic 
deliberations were largely captured by a question of where and how to engage in the now 
more fragmented international security situation. The thesis further demonstrates how the 
evolution of such U.S. strategies of engagement gradually had implications for the widening 
role of NATO in the post-Cold War world. The alliance went from a territorially defensive 
organization towards a new role engaging “out of area”. Engagements were implemented 
firstly in the broader transatlantic area, and later in a more global sphere. In 2005, NATO 
Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer concluded that in the new international security 
situation, “[a] strategy of engagement, guided by our values, is the only feasible way to 
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approach global insecurity. As an Alliance with unique political and military assets, NATO is 
bound to play a major part in any such strategy”.1 
In its broadest definition, engagement can simply be explained as the opposite of 
isolationism.2 Within this thesis, the term is applied as a term describing U.S. strategic 
decisions after the end of the Cold War, different from the previous strategies of containment 
and deterrence. It is possible to speak of economic engagement, political engagement and 
military engagement. Economic aspects are seen as outside of the scope of this thesis. In 
political terms, the engagement term refers to the forward diplomatic presence and 
international cooperation of the U.S.; engaging politically to ensure the U.S. position. But to 
form an understanding of U.S. strategic responses to threats in the post-Cold War world, the 
military aspects of engagements strategies are the essential focus of this thesis. As it is 
possible to point out that post-Cold War threats to the U.S. were increasingly handled through 
the planning and appliance of military engagement, the thesis gives emphasis to such military 
strategic responses. In this way, engagements are synonymous with foreign interventions, 
chiefly the use of military force. At the same time, the term allows for a more nuanced 
discussion of U.S. strategic policies, as it is possible to join such arguments with the political 
elements of engagement. In terms of NATO, the emphasis put on the military aspects of U.S. 
engagement strategies means that the practical role of NATO in “out of area” engagements is 
highlighted, at the expense of the more political features of U.S. engagement in Europe, as 
especially seen through NATO enlargement. 
In order to consistently answer a relatively broad research question, the thesis applies a 
strict conceptual framework that operationalizes strategy into four categories of components. 
These include interests and objectives; perception of threats; assessment of strategic areas, 
allies and partners; as well as the strategic thinking and implementation made by the U.S. 
administrations, to combined provide an understanding of strategies. The theoretical 
foundation for such terms and framework will be elaborated below.  
The actors considered in this thesis need to be reflected upon. This will also be done 
later in the introduction, but for now it is necessary to point out that the subject at study, as 
stated in the research question, is the United States. The NATO perspective is applied to give 
focus within the analysis, discussing the implications of the evolution of U.S. strategies for 
the role of NATO. Implicitly, this gives a geographical concentration on U.S. policies towards 
                                                 
1 Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, “Addressing Global Insecurity” (2005-11-03). Available at: 
http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2005/s051103b.htm [online 2008-03-28].  
2 See James A. Helis, “Unilateralism and Multilateralism”, in J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr. (ed.), U.S. Army War 
College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy, 2006 [second edition]: 15. Available at: 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB708.pdf [Online 2008-01-08]. 
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the Eurasian landmass, with only limited inclusion of other areas when seen relevant to 
understand the formation of U.S. strategies.3  
Regarding the time period covered, the research question demonstrates that this project 
is framed by the end of the Cold War at the one end, and the War on Terrorism at the other. 
Consequently, while providing background information on the Cold War, the project starts 
with the beginning of the presidency of George H. W. Bush, in January 1989, as the Cold War 
was ending. Then after covering the two Clinton terms, the thesis ends during the George W. 
Bush presidency, after the U.S. intervention in Iraq, and the NATO deployment in 
Afghanistan, tracing developments in the War on Terrorism through 2003.4  
In attempting to merge post-Cold War developments into a unified understanding of 
U.S. national security strategies and NATO transformation within them, the project represents 
an effort by the author to join the “lumpers” among international historians. While “splitters” 
attempt to see the particularities and detail of different situations, the “lumper” constructs 
order within the diverse elements of history to produce a synthesis of understanding. John 
Lewis Gaddis is a leading international history advocate of such an approach. According to 
Gaddis, “there is a certain value in stepping back at times to try to take in the larger picture”.5 
This marks a choice in the level of abstraction within this project. By focusing on tendencies 
in U.S. security strategies, the more specific details of policy making is not addressed. Rather, 
the synthesis accounts for policies at a more general, abstract level. Specific events are 
relevant as examples, but not studied thoroughly in themselves. While the “splitters” then are 
able to track the particular details of a specific decision,6 the “lumper” rather steps back to 
form a more abstract impression of broader processes. Even as the period is relatively 
contemporary, it is still possible to look at it with the historian’s distance, and identify the 
phase as a whole. The administrations themselves did not necessarily identify consistent 
strategies within the decisions they made and the policies they pursued. But the historian’s 
job, the “lumper”’s job, is to analyze and synthesize the broader aspects of security policies 
                                                 
3 Left out are more distinct areas and regions such as Oceania and the Americas (where the existence of the 
Monroe Doctrine in the latter case has made the area less relevant for studying broader U.S. strategies). Also 
more distinct conflicts, with their own dynamics and complexity, most especially the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 
are kept out of the analysis.  
4 The title of the thesis and the research question uses the term War on Terrorism, without the War in Iraq 
specifically included, both for simplicity and to use a term valid for both the U.S. and NATO. Also, in American 
rhetoric, the War on Terrorism is used as a common expression for both engagements, even if Iraq did not have a 
link to terrorism.  
5 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy 
during the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press 2005 [revised and expanded edition] ): viii; Gaddis’s 
point of reference is Jack H. Hexter, On Historians: Reappraisal of Some of the Masters of Modern History 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press 1979). 
6 The choice in focusing on overall strategy rather than specific policy processes is supported by the nature of 
available primary sources, see the section on primary sources and their applicability.  
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made, and identify an understanding of strategies within them. In this way, the project traces 
the overall tendencies found in the variety of the administrations’ individual decisions. 
However, two assumptions provide the basis to question the desirability of performing 
such an analysis as the present one. The first, often the impression of political scientists, is 
that the literature on such a theme is massive in both depth and diversity. The other, 
particularly maintained by many historians, is that the theme is too recent in time and, 
implicitly, that a lack of primary information prevents scholars from making coherent studies 
of it. Contrasted and simplified, the first approach sees the theme at study as already 
thoroughly analyzed, while the other indicates that research can not be rightfully made until 
substantial time has passed. Although the assumptions are paradoxically opposite to one 
another, the following will show why both ideas are generally mistaken. A new approach 
combining a contemporary study with accessible historical material will provide new insight, 
and thus carry out the true mission of the contemporary historian. The two succeeding 
sections give an assessment of the existing field of research and an overview of relevant 
primary sources. Concerning the first assumption, the historiographical account shows that 
there are great opportunities for making new analyses, or syntheses, of U.S. security and 
NATO policies. As for the other, the discussion of sources demonstrates the applicability of 
contemporary sources to the study of post-Cold War history.  
 
Historiography and the Need for a New Synthesis 
The analysis of contemporary U.S. security strategies is in many ways a legacy of John Lewis 
Gaddis and his appraisal of U.S. security policies during the Cold War. The literature 
covering post-Cold War international relations and American security policies is vast.  Put 
simply, we find four categories of literature dealing with the subject. These include studies of 
American foreign and security policies; literature on NATO; research done on American-
European relations; as well as broader appraisals of the international system and international 
conflicts and relations during the period of this study. The two first categories are the most 
pertinent to this study, while the other two consider relations that are relevant for the study in 
its broader international context.  
Firstly, the most relevant literature to this thesis is scholarly appraisals of post-Cold 
War American security policies and strategies. Still, even the U.S. Army War College Guide 
to Strategy does not identify a new post-Cold War strategy, and in 2001, it implicitly names 
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the post-Cold War era, or transformative periods in general, as a “strategic pause”.7 Historian 
and journalist David Halberstam investigates the foreign policy decisions of the G. H. W. 
Bush and Clinton administrations, and concludes that the U.S. was “napping” in terms of 
strategic outlook before the September 11, 2001, attacks.8 Gaddis himself has not 
communicated an understanding of the period from the end of the Cold War to the War on 
Terrorism either. In the 2005 epilogue of Strategies of Containment, the author investigates 
the remains of containment strategies in the post-Cold War international security 
environment, and only for the post-9/11 period identifies what he names a grand strategy of 
pre-emption.9 When speaking of the 1990s, Gaddis focuses on the lack of an adversary to the 
U.S., and what he from the perspective of the 9/11 attacks calls “the failure of strategic vision 
in Washington [that] lay in the inability of American leaders to look beyond their Cold War 
victory”.10 
Among those that try to articulate an understanding of post-Cold War U.S. national 
security strategies, most appraisals apply varying ideas of hegemony, that the U.S. was guided 
by its global primacy, dominance, leadership position as well as ideas of American 
exceptionalism. Several of these accounts are theoretical in nature, and many are politically 
revisionist, in that they deliberately seek to influence policy, by either criticizing existing 
security policies or suggesting alternative strategies the U.S. should rather follow. Political 
scientists Barry Posen and Andrew Ross categorize four alternative U.S. strategies as: neo-
isolationism; selective engagement; cooperative security; and primacy, and concludes that 
Clinton’s national security strategy by 1996/1997 was a strategy of selective but cooperative 
primacy.11 A related appraisal by political scientist Colin Dueck identifies four alternative 
U.S. strategies as strategic disengagement (neo-isolationism); balance of power; primacy; and 
liberal internationalism. In his analysis, the period 1992-2000 is seen as belonging within the 
                                                 
7 Robert H. Dorff, “A Primer in Strategy Development”, in Joseph H. Cerami and James F. Holcomb, Jr. (eds.), 
U.S. Army War College Guide to Strategy (2001a): 13-15. Available at: 
www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB362.pdf [online 2007-03-31]. 
8 David Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton and the Generals (London: Bloomsbury Publishing 
2003). Halberstam’s account of the period rather emphasizes the individual decision making processes within the 
U.S. administrations in their decisions on war and peace. Washington Post columnist Charles Krauthammer 
referred to the “holiday from history”. Charles Krauthammer, “Holiday from History”, Washington Post (2003-
02-14). Available at: http://www.benadorassociates.com/pf.php?id=235 [online 2008-04-25].  
9 Gaddis 2005: 383. It can also be questioned whether Gaddis’s suggested term of a strategy of pre-emption 
forms a complete new assessment of strategy, or if it is rather possible to view pre-emption as a military 
operational strategy to be applied within a more overall strategic outlook that he does not identify. Gaddis also 
states that such a strategy supplemented containment and deterrence, possibly supporting such a position, 
although not identifying a new post-Cold War strategy. John Lewis Gaddis, Surprise, Security and the American 
Experience (Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London: Harvard University Press 2004): 86. 
10 Gaddis 2004: 66 and 80.  
11 Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, ”Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy”, International Security 
(vol. 21, no. 3, 1996/1997).  
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strategy of liberal internationalism and the post-9/11 strategies of the Bush administration as 
one of primacy.12 Political scientist Stephen Walt argues that the American position in the 
post-Cold War world and the foreign policies of all three presidencies are best understood 
under a label of primacy.13  
More empirically concerned studies include that of International Relations (IR) scholar 
P. Edward Haley. His discussion of the post-Cold War presidents’ security strategies 
concludes that there has been misdirection within U.S. post-Cold War policy, as the 
presidents have been following a strategy of dominance, or rather U.S. primacy, based upon 
the U.S. position in the world.14 Haley also suggests alternative strategies the U.S. should 
follow in the future. Zbiginev Brzezinski gives an assessment of how he thinks the three post-
Cold War presidents performed in maintaining global leadership, even grading them on 
different aspects of such leadership.15 Trevor B. McCrisken argues that the U.S. belief in 
American exceptionalism has provided and continues to provide the framework for U.S. 
foreign policy making.16 Political scientist Christopher Layne places the entire period since 
1940 within the concept of a U.S. strategy of extraregional hegemony, arguing that the U.S. 
attempted to establish its hegemony in Western Europe, East Asia and the Persian Gulf.17  
Post-Cold War U.S. security policies are in this way, according to leading scholarly 
debate, in essence characterized by U.S. primacy. But while the concept of containment 
indicated how the U.S. responded to existing threats, i.e. containing the Soviet Union and 
communism, the idea of primacy does not indicate how the U.S. has acted in the post-Cold 
War world. Rather, primacy, or the dominant position of the U.S. in the world, can be seen as 
a fundamental purpose or objective of U.S. strategy.18 In this way, U.S. primacy can be 
understood as a foundation, an interest within U.S. strategy, but not as a concept describing 
                                                 
12 Colin Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press 2006): 114-171; the strategy of liberal internationalism/multilateralism has 
also been discussed by G. John Ikenberry, “American Grand Strategy in the Age of Terror”, Survival (vol. 43, 
no. 4, 2001/2002).  
13 Stephen M. Walt, Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy (New York and London: 
W. W. Norton & Company 2005).  
14 P. Edward Haley, Strategies of Dominance: The Misdirection of U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington D.C. and 
Baltimore, Maryland: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and John Hopkins University Press 2006). 
15 Zbiginev Brzezinski, Second Chance: Three Presidents and the Crisis of American Superpower (New York: 
Basic Books 2007); see also Zbiginev Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its 
Geostrategic Incentives (New York: Basic Books 1997).  
16 Trevor B. McCrisken, American Exceptionalism and the Legacy of Vietnam: U.S. Foreign Policy since 1974 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2003).  
17 Christopher Layne, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present (Ithaca, New 
York: Cornell University Press 2006).  
18 U.S. leadership and hegemony is also by historian Andrew Bacevich characterized as the purpose of U.S. 
strategy. Andrew J. Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities & Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press 2002): 6.  
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the strategic thinking and implementation embedded in U.S. strategic responses to its interests 
and objectives, threat perceptions and assessment of strategic areas, allies and partners.   
As presented, this thesis argues that such U.S. strategic responses in the post-Cold War 
world can be characterized as nuances of strategies of engagement. When investigating 
existing literature applying such an expression, different understandings of the term 
engagement are present. Often, it is applied as synonymous with diplomatic efforts, and 
contrastive to the use of force. Accordingly, Richard Haas and Meghan O’Sullivan understand 
engagement as “a foreign-policy strategy which depends to a significant degree on positive 
incentives to achieve its objectives”.19 G. John Ikenberry addresses the term with regard to 
other states’ responses to U.S. unipolar power, and also understands engagement as a strategy 
“building cooperative ties”.20 Another approach by historian Andrew Bacevich, presents an 
understanding of U.S. strategies not applying the term engagement, but rather a “strategy of 
openness”. Nonetheless, similar features are described, as he argues that the “Big idea guiding 
U.S. strategy is openness: the removal of barriers to the movement of goods, capital, people 
and ideas, thereby fostering an integrated international order conducive to American 
interests”.21 In such a way, Bacevich describes such processes that can also be understood as 
U.S. economic and political engagement, in supporting open markets and democratic values 
in the world, but under the term “openness”. By others, the term engagement has been applied 
with variations of its political or cooperative meaning in research done on U.S. engagement 
with specific countries of the world.22 
To move on to the military aspects of engagement, others do understand the term 
within a broader strategic meaning focusing on the use of military force. Even so, the 
                                                 
19 Richard N. Haas and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, “Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies”, 
Survival (vol. 42, no. 2, 2000a): 114; also Richard N. Haas and Meghan L. O’Sullivan (eds.), Honey and 
Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press 2000b).  
20 G. John Ikenberry, “Strategic Responses to American Preeminence: Great Power Politics in the Age of 
Unipolarity” (2003-06-28): . Available at: http://libweb.uoregon.edu/ec/e-asia/readb/iikenberry.pdf [online 2008-
04-18].  
21 Bacevich 2002: 88.  
22 With regard to Russia, Michael McFaul, “Realistic Engagement: A New Approach to American-Russian 
Relations”, Current History (vol. 100, no. 648, 2001); David W. Rivera, “Engagement, Containment, and the 
International Politics of Eurasia”, Political Science Quarterly (vol. 118, no. 1, 2003); with regard to China, 
Alastair I. Johnston and Robert S. Ross (eds.), Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power 
(London and New York: Routledge 1999); with regard to rogue states, Robert Litwak states that an implication 
of the great asymmetrical power relationship between the U.S. and rogue states might be that an engagement 
component might become integrated in U.S. strategy towards such states. Robert Litwak, Rogue States and U.S. 
Foreign Policy: Containment after the Cold War (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press 2000): 98-
99; Robert Litwak, Regime Change: U.S. Strategy through the Prism of 9/11 (Washington D.C. and Baltimore, 
Maryland: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and John Hopkins University Press 2007): 114-119; a 1994 anthology 
calls for a post-Cold War cooperative security perspective, having cooperation replace confrontation in overall 
U.S. strategic outlook, also applying the term engagement. Janne E. Nolan (ed.), Global Engagement: 
Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press 1994).  
 7
literature is primarily theoretically concerned or politically revisionist, and not descriptive of 
the past. The theoretically founded literature on U.S. strategies has applied the term selective 
engagement. For instance, IR theorist Robert J. Art asserts that such selective engagement, 
among several other features, is a forward-defense strategy, seeing military power as a useful 
and fungible instrument of statecraft.23 Art gives a theoretical assessment of the elements of 
such a potential strategy, and goes on to argue that this is the best strategy for the U.S.24 
Another understanding suggests that the different theoretical interpretations of primacy and 
selective engagement are just two different approaches to hegemony.25 While the theoretical 
literature discusses a similar term, it does not account for the content of this thesis; an 
understanding of the empirical evolution of U.S. strategies.26    
In terms of more empirically concerned literature, Walt in assessing the foreign policy 
record of Clinton, suggests that one of four main strategic goals of the administration was to 
remain militarily engaged in central regions such as Europe and Asia. But his appraisal does 
not cover the entire period of this study, nor does it argue that such a term as strategies of 
engagement embedded the other aspects of Clinton’s policies.27 A study on the transatlantic 
relationship after the 9/11 attacks, also writes about “terms of engagement”, how the U.S. 
cooperates with Europe, implying the above diplomatic meaning, in addition to a vaguely 
articulated variety, stating that the U.S. “engaged” in different conflicts, thus implicitly 
involving military engagement.28 But the author refers to the 1990s as a time when the U.S., 
and Europe, were strategically “out to lunch” and on “vacation”.29 In addition, he centers on 
dilemmas within the transatlantic relationship rather than articulating engagement as a 
concept that can be applied to understand the evolution of strategies and NATO’s role. 
Bacevich in his account of the “strategy of openness”, underlines that U.S. foreign policy 
                                                 
23 Robert J. Art, “Geopolitics Updated: The Strategy of Selective Engagement”, International Security (vol. 23, 
no. 3, 1998/1999).  
24 See also Robert J. Art, A Grand Strategy for America (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press 2003). 
25 Barry Posen, “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation or American Hegemony”, International 
Security (vol. 28, no. 1, 2003).  
26 Accordingly, the thesis acknowledges that the term is applied in a theoretical debate, but the thesis is not part 
of such a debate. It only applies a similar term to describe empirical developments. Another forward-looking 
account by Anthony Blinken argues that containment should be replaced by a comprehensive strategy of 
engagement, rather than the Bush administration’s strategy of pre-emption. But accordingly, Blinken does not 
understand the term as descriptive of the past. Anthony J. Blinken, “From Pre-Emption to Engagement”, 
Survival (vol. 45, no. 4, 2003).  
27 Stephen M. Walt, “Two Cheers for Clinton’s Foreign Policy”, Foreign Affairs (vol. 79, 2000).  
28 Julian Lindley-French, “Terms of Engagement: The Paradox of American Power and the Transatlantic 
Dilemma Post-11 September”, Chaillot Papers, no. 52, 2002. 
29 Lindley-French 2002: 24-25. This is in line with the assessments made by for instance Halberstam and Gaddis, 
as presented above.  
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became increasingly militarized in the post-Cold War era.30 But still, he does not place such 
military engagement within his strategy of openness. In discussing military aspects of U.S. 
strategy, also Bacevich applies the interpretation of hegemony.31 In this way, it is necessary to 
move beyond the existing debate of primacy in U.S. post-Cold War strategy. Especially with 
regard to the military aspects of such a strategy, it is necessary to form an understanding of 
how the U.S. acted strategically, beyond the idea that the U.S. possessed a hegemonic 
position or was guided by its interests in primacy. In doing so, the term engagement can be 
applied, to form an integrated understanding of the empirical evolution of U.S. strategy in the 
post-Cold War world.  
The second category of literature covers appraisals of NATO. Some of the literature 
focuses on the enlargement of NATO in terms of member countries.32 As this study 
concentrates on the evolution in the “out of area” role of NATO, how it functioned within 
U.S. strategies, literature covering the particular process of enlargement is not directly 
relevant, unless discussed as part of U.S. strategy. A Survival article by Gaddis discusses the 
1999 NATO enlargement in such terms, and argues that it violated basic strategic principles 
and is a mistake, as it is only a partial enlargement.33 But consequently, he criticizes existing 
policy, and does not analyze the transformation of NATO’s role.  
Appraisals that deal with the post-Cold War position of NATO includes political 
scientist Celeste Wallander, who discusses how the institutional assets of NATO formed the 
foundation for alliance adaptation after the end of the Cold War.34 Wallander explains 
NATO’s post-Cold War adaptation within a theory of institutional models, rather than 
focusing on the empirical evolution of NATO’s role. IR scholar Galia Press-Barnathan 
theoretically investigates the nature of relations within NATO in the light of U.S. 
hegemony,35 but accordingly does not center on the international role of NATO. 
Contributions explicitly analyzing the role of NATO include a 1998 account by IR 
scholar David Yost. Yost accounts for NATO’s changed relationships with former adversaries 
and non-NATO members, and investigates a transformation in NATO’s role towards crisis 
                                                 
30 Bacevich 2002: 49 and 142-143; see also Andrew J. Bacevich, The American Militarism: How Americans Are 
Seduced by War (New York: Oxford University Press 2005).  
31 See Bacevich 2002: 218-223.  
32 Two central accounts of the 1990s’ NATO enlargement process are: James M. Goldgeier, Not Whether but 
When: The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press 1999); and Ronald D. 
Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door: How the Alliance Remade itself for a New Era (New York: Columbia 
University Press 2002). 
33John Lewis Gaddis, ”History, Grand Strategy and NATO Enlargement”, Survival (vol. 40, no. 1, 1998).  
34 Celeste A. Wallander, “Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War”, International 
Organization (vol. 54, no. 4, 2000).  
35 Galia Press-Barnathan, “Managing the Hegemon: NATO under Unipolarity”, Security Studies (vol. 15, no. 2, 
2006).  
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management and peace operations.36 NATO’s role in peace support operations has also been 
analyzed by others.37 In terms of a geographically broader role for NATO, political scientist 
Sten Rynning has accounted for allied encounters in the broader Middle East since 1949, but 
ignores the period from 1989-2001.38 Renée de Nevers accounts for NATO’s role in the War 
on Terrorism.39 These contributions accentuate different types of post-Cold War roles, but 
accordingly do not analyze the alliance’s overall role as it functioned within U.S. strategy.  
Then concerning NATO’s overall strategic role, a recent report by the Danish Institute 
for International Studies addresses the possible global nature of NATO, discussing both 
global membership or partnership and a global strategy. Relevant to this thesis it formulates 
the strategy of the alliance as interventionist.40 Such an understanding of role is consistent 
with the military understanding of NATO’s role within a strategy of engagement. Even 
though the formulation used support the argument of this thesis, the report does not pursue the 
argument extensively, and does not focus on U.S. strategy. A recent article by Ellen Williams, 
investigates NATO’s role in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, and assesses U.S. 
perceptions of the strengths and weaknesses of acting through NATO.41 U.S. policies towards 
NATO are accordingly implicitly addressed within these cases, but the article does not discuss 
NATO within the overall U.S. strategic framework. In sum, the scholarly literature on post-
Cold War NATO is manifold, but surprisingly, an account of the post-Cold War role of 
NATO seen within the evolution of U.S. strategy is missing. 
Thirdly, a related, but broader category of literature is research on American-European 
relations. This category analyzes the transatlantic context, but has a broader focus than U.S. 
strategy and the role of NATO. Contributions are among others made by historian Geir 
Lundestad, addressing the U.S.-European relationship since 1945; former U.S. ambassador to 
NATO, Robert Hunter, reviewing the European security and defense policy (ESDP) in light 
of NATO; analyst Stanley Sloan, who in a chapter specifically addresses the post-Cold War 
military role of NATO, but without placing it within the evolution of U.S. strategy; as well as 
                                                 
36 David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International Security (Washington D.C.: 
The United States Institute of Peace Press 1998).  
37 Henning Frantzen, NATO and Peace Support Operations, 1991-1999: Policies and Doctrines (Oxon and New 
York: Frank Cass 2005); Espen Barth Eide, “Peacekeeping Past and Present”, NATO Review (vol. 49, no. 2, 
2001); Kori Schake, “Adapting NATO after the Cold War”, in Gustav Schmidt (ed.), A History of NATO: The 
First Fifty Years (New York: Palgrave 2001 [volume 2] ).  
38 Sten Rynning, ”NATO and the Broader Middle East, 1949-2007: The History and Lessons of Controversial 
Encounters”, The Journal of Strategic Studies (vol. 30, no. 6, 2007).  
39 Renée de Nevers, “NATO’s International Security Role in the Terrorist Era”, International Security (vol. 31, 
no. 4, 2007). 
40 Trine Flockhart and Kristian Søby Kristensen, ”NATO and Global Partnerships: To Be Global or Act 
Globally?”, DIIS Report (no. 7, 2008).  
41 Ellen Williams, “Out of Area and Very Much in Business? NATO, the U.S., and the Post-9/11 International 
Security Environment”, Comparative Strategy (vol. 27, no. 1, 2008).  
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an anthology with contributions from both sides of the Atlantic, evaluating different aspects 
of the transatlantic relationship and prospects for the future.42  
Lastly, scholarly contributions on the international system as a whole and on different 
conflicts and events are relevant to the thesis within its broader international context. At the 
system level, the status of American unipolarity in the post-Cold War world has been the 
object of substantial scholarly enquiry.43 Such literature relates to the broader context of the 
international system after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. By confirming the U.S. 
position as unrivalled, the context of, and the major influence of, U.S. strategies to be 
investigated are assured. More specifically considering various conflicts during the 1990s, in 
light of U.S. policies, for example Robert DiPrizio reviews so-called humanitarian 
interventions by the G. H. W. Bush and Clinton presidencies.44 
The literature on U.S. strategies is fundamentally made by U.S. scholars, and are to a 
large extent either theoretically based or politically revisionist, attempting to outline future 
U.S. strategy. The literature on NATO and U.S.-European relations is generally more 
empirically concerned and has major contributions from both sides of the Atlantic. The last 
category with literature on the international system and international conflicts is manifold, 
and some examples of relevance have been outlined. In total, this historiographical account 
has identified the need for an understanding of U.S. strategies to be made on an empirical 
basis. Also, a non-American account of U.S. strategies can potentially to a larger extent avoid 
the political context, and rather aim to understand the evolution of past strategies, in stead of 
influencing policies for the future. Furthermore, the U.S. strategic context will elucidate the 
scholarly understanding of the transformation of NATO’s role, and thus add a central aspect 
to the existing, more alliance-oriented, accounts. Together, the project will provide an 
integration of the two first categories, within the context of the two following categories, the 
transatlantic dimension and the international or global dimension as a whole.  
                                                 
42 Geir Lundestad, The United States and Western Europe: From ‘Empire’ by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift 
(New York: Oxford University Press 2003); Robert E. Hunter, The European Security and Defense Policy: 
NATO’s Companion – or Competitor? (Santa Monica, California, Arlington, Virginia, and Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania: RAND 2002); Stanley R. Sloan, NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic Community: The 
Transatlantic Bargain Challenged (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield 2005 [second edition] ); Simon 
Serfaty (ed.), Visions of the Atlantic Alliance: The United States, the European Union, and NATO (Washington 
D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies 2005). Another account of the U.S. position in Europe, 
although from 1984, is Josef Joffe, “Europe’s American Pacifier”, Foreign Policy (no. 54, 1984).   
43 See for instance G. John Ikenberry (ed.), America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2002); William Wohlforth “The Stability of a Unipolar World”, International Security 
(vol. 24, no. 1, 1999).  
44 Robert DiPrizio, Armed Humanitarians: U.S. Interventions from Northern Iraq to Kosovo (Baltimore, 
Maryland: John Hopkins University Press 2002).   
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Primary Sources and their Applicability 
To supplement the international field of literature, the thesis is built on the analyses of 
primary material. In this way, new insight into the study of U.S. security and NATO policies 
in the post-Cold War period is based upon the traditional historian’s handwork – the critical 
examination of primary sources. The following account of sources will discuss the magnitude 
and relevance of the material available for the study.  
First of all, the mandatory annual report of the President to Congress on the National 
Security Strategy of the United States, the NSS, is the foremost relevant primary source, and 
“an excellent starting point for [an] analysis of current United States strategy”.45 The NSS 
report was introduced through the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization 
Act of 1986. It amended the National Security Act of 1947, and required that “[t]he President 
shall transmit to Congress each year a comprehensive report on the national security strategy 
of the United States”.46 During the period of this study, an NSS was submitted in 1990, 1991, 
1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2002.47 The primary purpose of the 
reports is to have the executive give Congress a clearly articulated basis for its foreign affairs 
budget decisions. It states the overall agenda of the President.48 But important additional 
functions of the report are that it communicates the administration’s strategic visions to other 
                                                 
45 Dorff 2001a: 16.  
46 Don M. Snider and John A. Nagl, “The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision”, in Joseph 
H. Cerami and James F. Holcomb, Jr. (eds.), U.S. Army War College Guide to Strategy (2001): 127-128; 
Congress, “Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986”, SEC. 603, sec. 104(a)(1). 
Available at http://www.ndu.edu/library/goldnich/99824pt2.pdf [online 2008-02-26]. 
47 Despite being public documents, previous NSSs are not all easily accessed. To retrieve documents, see: The 
White House, National Security Strategy of the United States [NSS] (1990). Available at: 
http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/pdfs/national_security_strategy_90.pdf [online 2007-06-22]; National 
Security Strategy of the United States [NSS] (1991). Available at: http://www.fas.org/man/docs/918015-nss.htm 
[online 2006-08-30]; National Security Strategy of the United States [NSS] (1993). Available at: 
http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA344612&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf [online 2008-02-
13]; A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement [NSS] (1994). Made available to author by 
Petter Næss, the American Embassy in Oslo, Norway; A National Security Strategy of Engagement and 
Enlargement. [NSS] (1995). Available at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/national/nss-
9502.pdf [online 2007-06-07]; A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement [NSS] (1996). 
Available at: http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/national/1996stra.htm [online 2006-08-30]; A National 
Security Strategy for a New Century [NSS] (1997). Available at: http://www.fas.org/man/docs/strategy97.htm 
[online 2006-08-30]; A National Security Strategy for a New Century [NSS] (1998). Available at: 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/national/nss-9810.pdf [online 2007-07-09]; A National 
Security Strategy for a New Century [NSS] (1999). Available at: 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/other_pubs/nssr99.pdf [online 2006-08-30]; A National Security Strategy for a 
Global Age [NSS] (2000). Available at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/national/nss-
0012.pdf [online 2007-07-09]; The National Security Strategy of the United States of America [NSS] (2002). 
Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf [online 2006-07-25]. Reports were also published in 1987, 
1988 and 2006. This means that only the Clinton administration fulfilled its obligation of presenting the NSS 
annually. With the G. H. W. Bush administration, there existed drafts for a 1992 NSS, but these remain classified 
at the Bush Presidential Library. The G. W. Bush administration has until now only presented two reports, one in 
each of its two-term presidency. 
48 Snider and Nagl 2001: 131.  
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constituencies, including foreign nations; a broader domestic audience; and internally, as it 
produces internal consensus and coordination within the executive through the process of 
making the report.49 This means that the report is the outcome of possible differences of 
substance on security issues within the bureaucracy. Accordingly, the document reflects the 
consensus arrived at, and to be followed, after different formulations have been drafted and 
discussed within the administration.     
The NSSs are publicly available, even though they concern national strategic matters. 
Their public nature obviously makes the documents rhetorical, and controversial elements 
may be intentionally excluded. At the same time, as the reports are the foundation for 
Congressional decisions, statements need to reflect the administrations’ view of how the U.S. 
should act on security issues, even though formulations may be made in a rhetorical and 
selective manner. Secondly, as the reports have many indirect recipients outside of Congress, 
it is possible to identify statements intended for very different receivers. For instance, by 
affirming the administration’s appreciation of the work of U.S. soldiers, the document states 
its special consideration of the domestic audience, and by affirming a positive perception of 
international cooperation, foreign governments may be appeased. This is of course most likely 
the factual policy of the administrations, but also illustrates the stated challenge of the 
rhetorical nature of the reports. A third challenge when handling the document is that it is 
submitted under provisions of law. With requirements of when reports should be submitted, 
new administrations may not yet have a strategic approach to present or new reports by 
continuous administrations may only repeat the contents of previous issues. Still, the 
documents are the foremost available description of the full strategic assessments of each of 
the administrations. Particularly, the preface and introduction state the primary elements of 
U.S. strategies.50 In terms of NATO, the reports do not specifically address the transatlantic 
relationship, but the alliance, when mentioned, is seen within the broader context of U.S. 
strategy, as is the intention of this thesis. The NSS documents represent the central primary 
source of the project’s analysis, and are frequently referred to throughout the main chapters of 
the thesis.51 
But to ensure validity, readings of such documents are coupled with interpretations of 
other primary materials. Information provided through interviews and conversations with 
                                                 
49 Snider and Nagl 2001: 128-131. Snider and Nagl also discuss the process in which the document was initiated.  
50 John Lewis Gaddis, ”A Grand Strategy of Transformation”, in Foreign Policy (no. 133, 2002): 50.  
51 Page numbers in these documents that are not automatically set in an electronic pdf version is referred to in 
terms of the pages’ numbers when on customary print. Concerning the last main chapter on the G. W. Bush 
presidency, alternative primary sources are applied to a greater extent than in previous chapter, to be able to 
address the period before the 2002 NSS was published, and particularly before the September 11, 2001, attacks.  
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representatives of the U.S. government and NATO are pertinent here.52 By means of 
interviews, assumptions or unclear elements about the theme at issue can be questioned, 
confirmed or modified. The interviews provide specific information on elements seen as 
central to the analysis. Also other institutions’ or researchers’ interviews or oral history 
roundtables, for instance made by the Brookings Institution, may add information, even if 
questions specific to this study have not been asked.53 To transcend the general 
methodological problems of possible bias or subjectivity in the interviewee’s statements, as 
well as possible lack or distortion of memory, the information provided needs to be evaluated 
critically.54 It is also necessary to remember that the more recent the events discussed, the 
more politically controversial it is for the interviewee to speak freely. These personal accounts 
need to be seen in relation to other primary material, and one person’s answers can be 
compared with another’s, to reasonably ensure the validity of the material. 
Similarly, speech transcripts, policy papers and other types of accounts by actors 
involved, for instance biographies and articles, can supplement the analysis, as can 
information provided through relevant U.S. newspapers.55 These are written sources, but also 
here questions of reliability occur, and it is necessary to contextualize the document, and 
understand the selectivity in what is presented.56 Two important databases to public papers of 
the President and the Department of State are The American Presidency Project and the U.S. 
Department of State Dispatch.57 The Dispatch provides transcripts of major speeches and 
Congressional testimonies, and these have been systematically searched for relevant material 
                                                 
52 Interviews and conversations made with academics are rather a supplement to literature, as second hand 
material. For a broader discussion of the methodological aspects of interviews with political actors, see Anthony 
Seldon, “Elite Interviews”, in Brian Brivati, Julia Buxton and Anthony Seldon (eds.), The Contemporary History 
Handbook (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press 1996).  
53 See the Brookings Institution, NSC Oral History Roundtables. Available at: 
http://www.brookings.edu/projects/archive/nsc/oralhistories.aspx [online 2008-03-17]; the Library of Congress 
also holds transcripts of interviews made with American diplomats, but these focus on the period before the end 
of the Cold War, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training/Library of Congress, Frontline Diplomacy: 
The Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training. Available 
at:  http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/collections/diplomacy/ and http://www.adst.org/ [online 2008-03-17]. 
54 See Michael Roper, “Oral History”, in Brian Brivati, Julia Buxton and Anthony Seldon (eds.), The 
Contemporary History Handbook (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press 1996). Roper 
juxtaposes the accuracy of oral historical testimonies with the reliability of written accounts.  
55 News paper articles written at the time of events are considered primary sources, while articles commenting on 
the past are treated as secondary literature.  
56 See Brian Brivati, “Using Contemporary Written Sources: Three Case Studies”, in Brian Brivati, Julia Buxton 
and Anthony Seldon (eds.), The Contemporary History Handbook (Manchester and New York: Manchester 
University Press 1996): 290-292.  
57 Databases available online: The American Presidency Project. Available at:  
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/ [online 2008-03-28]; The U.S. Department of State Dispatch. Available at: 
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dispatch/index.html [online 2008-03-28]. The Dispatch was the successor 
of the U.S. Department of State Bulletin, the official record of U.S. foreign policy from 1939-1989, and was 
published between January 1990 and December 1999.   
 14
to this project. The Presidency Project has been useful to find specific remarks or statements 
made by the President.  
In addition to the information directly stemming from the U.S. executive and its 
representatives, the analysis also benefits from additional documentation from Congressional 
sessions, some material available at the Library of Congress in Washington D.C. and other 
online. As the thesis analyzes the policies of the administration, general Congress material is 
not relevant. But Congressional material becomes interesting when representatives of the 
administration deliver messages, testimonies, reports and other statements to Congress. The 
NSS reports are of course one example of such material, but other, and more specific, 
statements contain useful further information. The material here provided is also more 
extensive than the Congressional statements made available through the Dispatch magazine, 
which includes a selection of Congressional testimonies by Department of State officials.58 
As the NSSs discuss the overall security strategies of the U.S., this type of documentation, in 
addition to the other material stemming from actors involved discussed above, are especially 
useful concerning U.S. deliberations on the role of NATO.59 When dealing with this kind of 
material, the domestic context, and the relationship between the government branches need to 
be taken into account.60  
As all the sources mentioned are public, the question of classified U.S. information 
remains. General declassification processes of material from the period is decades away,61 but 
some information has been made available through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 
an act opening for early declassification upon request. Processing FOIA requests are time 
consuming, so it is not possible to obtain material within the confined two years duration of a 
master project.62 But information gained through other researchers’ FOIA requests are 
relevant to the extent that it deals with the field at study. Such material is available in print 
and in digital databases, at the National Security Archive (NSA) of the George Washington 
University; the Digital National Security Archive (DNSA) subscription service; the electronic 
                                                 
58 In addition to speeches and messages delivered outside of Congress.  
59 According to Snider and Nagl (2001: 129), the administrations’ consider it better to depend on current, 
personal testimonies in Congress by administration officials, supported by President and cabinet-level media 
interventions, rather than the NSSs, to agitate the more specific contents of strategy. 
60 For a review of the relationship between the executive and Congress on security issues, see Amos A. Jordan, 
William J. Taylor, Jr., and Michael Mazarr, American National Security (Baltimore, Maryland: John Hopkins 
University Press 1999 [fifth edition] ): 93-142.  
61 Generally, declassified material is not made accessible until the passing of a substantial period of time. For 
instance, the latest volumes of the Foreign Relations of the United States, the official documentary historical 
record of U.S. foreign policy, cover the Nixon and Ford administrations, 1969-1976. The general provision of 
declassification on the other hand, is that material should be declassified after 25 years. For more detail on 
declassification procedures and problems, see James David, “Progress and Problems in Declassifying U.S. 
Government Records”, Journal of Government Information (vol. 30, no. 4, 2004).  
62 Conferred with G. H. W. Bush and W. J. Clinton presidential libraries.  
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reading room of the Department of State; and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) FOIA 
reading room. The unpublished collection “The End of the Cold War” at the NSA has been 
manually investigated by the author. The DNSA, the Department of State and CIA FOIA 
reading rooms have been explored through systematic searches. Still, material declassified 
within the FOIA system is not truly effective for this study, as material related to national 
security is generally exempted.63 And if released, many documents are excised. The material 
that is available and applicable mostly covers the early period of this study.  
A complete study of internal documents on this field needs to wait until regular 
declassification processes are completed, implying several decades of delay. But by including 
relevant material stemming from previously submitted FOIA requests, the thesis applies the 
most extensive set of sources available for any present analysis. When declassification has 
been completed, a detailed study of the formation of specific political decisions can be put 
under scholarly attention. But now, the declassified material supports the more general and 
public strategic documents and assessments in addressing the overall strategic outlook of the 
post-Cold War administrations. Furthermore, actual U.S. actions are taken into consideration 
within the analysis. These are of course at the overall level well known at the present point, 
without the access of classified material. 
To supplement the analysis, official material from the transatlantic alliance provides 
insight into the evolution of NATO’s role within U.S. strategies. Also here, NATO actions 
constitute information for interpretation. When considering documents, NATO produced 
strategic documents, the Alliance’s Strategic Concept (ASC), in 1991 and 1999, comparable 
to the NSSs.64 Other official NATO policy statements can add information, especially as no 
ASC has been published since G. W. Bush’s inauguration.65 The documents in themselves are 
not the object of scrutiny for this project, but they are useful to show how far the NATO 
                                                 
63 See Congress, “Freedom of Information Act of 1966 [amended 2002]”, Section 552, (b)(1). Available at: 
http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiastat.htm [online 2008-02-28].  
64 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The Alliance’s Strategic Concept (1991). Available at: 
http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b911108a.htm [online 2006-11-20]; The Alliance’s Strategic Concept (1999). 
Available at: http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm [online 2006-11-20]. 
65 A future revised ASC document has been suggested among the allies. For the purpose of this thesis, to account 
for NATO’s perceptions during the G. W. Bush presidency, other NATO documents, from 2002 and 2006, are 
mentioned, as documentation of the final changes within NATO’s role. Even though the year of publication of 
the latter falls outside the scope of this thesis, it is mentioned as it refers to the changes within the period at 
study, notably the changes made after 9/11 and in the War on Terrorism. A European Security Strategy 
document was published in 2003. But as the document is made by another entity than is the focus of this thesis, 
the document is not applied in the analysis. NATO, “Prague Summit Declaration” (2002-11-21). Available at: 
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm [online 2008-04-09]; NATO, “Comprehensive Political 
Guidance” (2006-11-29). Available at: http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b061129e.htm [online 2008-02-28]; 
European Union (EU), “A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy” (2003-12-12). 
Available at: http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf [online 2008-02-28].  
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member states have agreed to transform the role of the alliance.66 NATO documents, like 
U.S. material, need to be understood within their context and their public nature.  
                                                
Combined, this review of primary sources has identified the magnitude of material 
available and its relevance to this study. The lack of substantial internal archival material is a 
present challenge, but with so much other primary material available, which is not only 
substantial in quantity, but also highly relevant for the core of this research, there are 
sufficient grounds for a new source-based synthesis, to add a new perspective to the 
historiography of the post-Cold War period. The public documents of the period specifically 
deal with security issues. With the new security situation, security policies were expressed 
more openly than during the period of Cold War rivalry. For instance, the NSS and ASC 
documents address strategy publicly, contrastive to previous Cold War secrecy.67 Also, when 
using critical reflection when working with the different contemporary sources, the historian 
attempts to transcend the methodological challenges of possible bias and subjectivity. 
 
The Actors Involved – The U.S. and the Role of NATO  
After assessing that it is both necessary and possible to write a thesis on U.S. national security 
strategies and their implications for the role of NATO, the question of how such an analysis is 
to be performed remains. The conceptual framework of the thesis is formed by the different 
components necessary to understand the concept of strategy, as will be discussed below. But 
firstly, the nature of the actors involved needs to be determined.  
In an analysis of U.S. national security strategy the executive branch of government is 
the object of study. More precisely, the President, his National Security Advisor and Council 
(NSC) are involved, and at different levels, the Department of State and of Defense.68 At the 
same time that all these different persons and units are involved, the nation, the United States, 
is traditionally seen as a unitary actor in its international relations.69 But this unity has also 
been questioned. Two other models of decision-making highlight the diversity of government. 
The first alternative model understands policy formulations as an organizational process 
where policies are identified as outputs of large organizations functioning according to 
 
66 Stanley Sloan, “The New NATO: Has It Outplayed its Role?”, lecture at the Faculty of Social Sciences, 
University of Oslo (2008-02-25).  
67 The NSS procedure was implemented during the late Cold War, but earlier statements of strategy were not as 
publicly available.  
68 See Jordan et al 1999: 98-114. Here is also the influence of the CIA and the Office of Management and 
Budget discussed.  
69 This implies that the state forms its policies according to a coherent and rational estimate of possible courses 
of action. Such a model can be characterized as the rational policy model of the rational, unitary decision-maker. 
See Graham Allison, “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis”, American Political Science Review: 
Quarterly Journal of American Political Science Association (vol. 63, no. 3, 1969): 693-694.   
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standard patterns of behavior.70 The second alternative model sees decision-making within a 
bureaucratic politics paradigm, where the actor is a number of individual players having 
positions within the administration.71 And in addition to such different understandings of the 
nature of the executive, diplomatic relations are also understood as a two-level game, where 
the formation of foreign policy is not only an aspect of the international sphere, but also the 
domestic.72 In such a perspective, also Congress, and to some extent the American public, 
influence the formation of U.S. strategies.73  
Although the thesis does not aim to provide a theoretical understanding of decision-
makers, it is necessary to be aware of the diversity within the actor under study. As stated 
above, the strategic decision-maker of the United States is in this thesis seen represented by 
several individuals and institutions, a diversity also supported by the two alternative models.74 
But for simplicity, the singular terms the U.S. and the administration are also applied, 
implying unity. A pragmatic approach then sees diversity when necessary, but overall unity 
when possible. Firstly then, the thesis basically understands the formation of security 
strategies as coherent within the administration. But secondly, it accounts for variations and 
differences among the individuals of the administration when relevant for the formation of 
strategies. Otherwise, the consensus line within the administrations is considered as the 
administrations’ policies. And as for the domestic context of Congress and the domestic 
audience, these are not the subjects at study, and will only be mentioned if specifically 
influential as to the formation of strategies. Such a delimitation is necessary in order to 
perform the analysis within the number of pages allotted to the project. 
The final actor concerned is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The organization 
is an inter-governmental structure even less unitary than a single state’s government. And as it 
is consensus-based, its policies reflect the “least common denominator” of all member states. 
But the aim of this thesis is not to account for NATO’s strategic post-Cold War development 
                                                 
70 See Allison 1969: 698.  
71 See Allison 1969: 708-709.  
72 See Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games”, International 
Organization (vol. 42, no. 3, 1988). See also Jordan et al (1999: 93-234) for a broader discussion of the actors 
involved and the processes of U.S. decision-making on national security issues.  
73 Interests groups, past policies and programs, lack of bureaucratic responsiveness, as well as the views of 
foreign governments may also influence the executive’s decision-making, see Jordan et al 1999: 116-121. 
74 For intra-administrative discussions of the formation of national security policies see the Brookings 
Institution’s oral history roundtables of the G. H. W. Bush and Clinton’s National Security Councils. Ivo H. 
Daalder and I. M. Dresler (moderators), National Security Council Project: Oral History Roundtables: The Bush 
Administration National Security Council (1999-04-29). Available at: 
http://www.brookings.edu/fp/research/projects/nsc/transcripts/19990429.pdf [online 2008-03-15]; Ivo H. 
Daalder and I. M. Dresler (moderators), National Security Council Project: Oral History Roundtables: The 
Clinton Administration National Security Council (2000-09-27). Available at: 
http://www.brookings.edu/fp/research/projects/nsc/transcripts/20000927.pdf [online 2008-03-15].  
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in itself, but rather to place such developments within the context of broader U.S. security 
strategies in the period. As such, the U.S. administration is the subject to be studied, and it is 
the influence of American strategies on NATO transformation that is seen as the implications 
of U.S. strategies to be discussed. As the security guarantor and the most powerful nation in 
the alliance, the influence of American security policies on NATO is extensive.  
According to definition, an alliance is a confederation of nations by treaty to further 
the common interests of the members.75 In addition to such a general role, the specific nature 
of NATO is often described as: “a political-military alliance that combines the key political 
function of guiding members’ foreign and security policy and providing a forum for alliance 
consultation with the operational function of ensuring that members can train and develop the 
capabilities to cooperate militarily”.76 Accordingly, the alliance’s role is seen as a function of 
strategies. In addition, the alliance has a more delimited role in being a forum for consultation 
and operational coordination. With the influence of the United States on NATO strategies, the 
thesis then traces transformation within NATO’s role in the post-Cold period within the 
evolution of U.S. strategies.77  
 
Strategy and its Components – A Conceptual Framework 
After identifying the subject at study, an understanding of strategy and a conceptual 
framework for the thesis needs to be outlined. The term “national security strategy” and its 
components will be addressed in the following, and they form the framework of the thesis.  
The research question and the presentation of the U.S. National Security Strategy 
reports have introduced the term of national security strategy. The NSSs form a public 
statement of strategies, but an academic and empirical analysis that addresses the research 
question needs to go beyond the content of these documents in its assessment of strategies.78 
In addition to such statements of strategic thinking, strategies mirror general ideas and 
perceptions of the administrations, its outlook, its policy implementation and actions. In the 
words of John Lewis Gaddis, “strategy” is “quite simply the process by which ends are related 
                                                 
75 Merriam-Webster Dictionary, “alliance”. Available at: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/alliance 
[online 2008-03-07].  
76 Nevers 2007: 36.  
77 In this way the analysis centers on the practical functioning of NATO within U.S. strategies, i.e. what NATO 
does. 
78 More specific and delimited appraisals of some specific NSSs have been made by for instance Snider and Nagl 
2001: 131-138; Arnold A. Offner, “Liberation or Dominance? The Ideology of U.S. National Security Policy”, 
in Andrew J. Bacevich (ed.), The Long War: A New History of U.S. national Security Policy Since World War II 
(New York: Columbia University Press 2007); Svein Melby, Johannes Rø, Olof Kronvall and Anders 
Romarheim, “Supermaktens begrensning: Perspektiver på Bush-doktrinens utvikling” [“Limitations of the 
Superpower: Perspectives on the development of the Bush doctrine”], IFS Info (no. 6, 2006).  
 19
to means, intentions to capabilities, objectives to resources”.79 In this way, many aspects are 
part of the same term.80 To make a constructive appraisal of strategy, the term needs to be 
operationalized.  
Based on the work of political scientist and IR theorist Alexander George, Gaddis 
suggests that “there exist for presidential administrations certain ‘strategic’ or ‘geopolitical’ 
codes, assumptions about American interest in the world, potential threats to them, and 
feasible responses” that form strategies.81 With such an assessment in mind, Gaddis basically 
evaluates four different aspects of U.S. Cold War strategies. These are conceptions of 
interests, perceptions of threats to these interests, responses to interests and threats, and the 
justification of responses. Gaddis states that he does not want to use the categories obtrusively 
throughout his text.82 But within the scope of this thesis, categories are applied more 
explicitly, to focus the discussion of strategies. Gaddis’s concepts are adapted to fit with the 
research made in this thesis. It is necessary to add a dimension on U.S. views of the strategic 
importance of different areas, allies and partners to elucidate the strategic context of the 
NATO perspective. Also, Gaddis’s final aspect of justification, i.e. of the presentation of 
responses to the American public and Congress, is excluded. The reason is that it is deals with 
the presentation of strategy to these actors, and not the formation of strategy within the 
executive, which is the subject of this study.83 Still, all the aspects of the above quote on 
strategic assumptions are included, in addition to the aspect on cooperation, applied to 
accentuate the NATO perspective. Also, the dimension of responses is renamed “strategic 
thinking and implementation”, in line with Gaddis’s actual treatment of this element. In sum, 
strategies are operationalized as: interests and objectives; perception of threats; assessments 
of strategic areas, allies and partners; and strategic thinking and implementation. These 
operationalized components of U.S. national security strategy can be reformulated into four 
sub-questions to the overall research question presented earlier:  
                                                 
79 Gaddis 2005: viii.  
80 Also, other terms than national security strategy are used on similar structures, such as grand strategy, security 
policy and foreign policy. In the thesis, national security strategy is primarily used, as this is the term used by the 
U.S. administrations in their appraisals of strategy. When grand strategy is applied, it is used synonymously, or 
in paraphrasing others applying that term in stead of national security strategies. As for policy, it accounts for 
more case specific decisions than strategies that include all the aspects mentioned in the above text. Security 
policies more explicitly deal with issues of war and peace, or issues dealing with the security of the state. 
Foreign policies on the other hand cover a wider array of policies, including security policies, but also such 
issues as international economy, etc.  
81 Gaddis 2005: ix; Alexander L. George, “The ‘Operational Code’: A Neglected Approach to the Study of 
Political Decision-making”, International Studies Quarterly (no. XII, 1969).  
82 Outline presented in footnote in Gaddis 2005: ix.  
83 See the above paragraph on the actors of the thesis, which state that Congressional and public influence on the 
formation of strategy will only be mentioned when highly relevant to the actual formation of strategy within the 
executive.  
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- What interests and objectives did the U.S. have? 
- What threats did the U.S. perceive against these interests and objectives? 
- What areas did the U.S. view as strategically important areas, and how did it 
value allies and partners within these?  
- How did the U.S. think about strategy, and how was it implemented? 
These four questions, or the components of strategy, form the conceptual framework 
within which U.S. strategies and the role of NATO are to be discussed. The implications for 
the role of NATO are especially relevant when it comes to the last two components, where the 
first of the two addresses Europe and NATO’s position in U.S. strategy, and the last the actual 
role of NATO, as envisaged and performed within U.S. strategic thinking and 
implementation. Also, the categories of the conceptual framework implicitly provide some 
explanation of strategies, i.e. why strategies evolved as they did. Accordingly, strategies 
changed as a result of differences within U.S. interests and objectives; threat perceptions; the 
strategic importance of areas, allies and partners; as well as U.S. strategic thinking and 
implementation. But within the scope of this project, these explanatory aspects are 
subordinate to descriptive elements. Accordingly, the thesis’s research question asks how 
strategies developed, not why.84   
Now, it is necessary to account for the content of each component; how each 
component will be treated within each following chapter. Firstly, U.S. interests and objectives 
are addressed.85 Generally, a nation’s national security interests and objectives are quite 
stable and continuous. The most fundamental objective of a state is found in its own survival; 
the maintenance of its sovereignty, territory and people.86 But for the sake of this thesis, more 
concrete U.S. security interests need to be discussed, to understand the foundation of strategy. 
Within such a study, interests are seen in political-military terms.87 This includes interests 
                                                 
84 The “why” question is both important and interesting. But without firstly discussing the characteristics of a 
period, it is impossible to explain why features evolved. Also, a full explanatory approach needs to take in the 
particularities of each situation, the coincidences, structural aspects, individuals, etc. that formed each decision. 
Within this thesis, the limited, and implicitly rationalistic, explanation found in the conceptual framework only 
adds to the descriptive aspects, and does not form a full explanation of the formation of strategies.  
85 Gaddis largely speaks of interests, and not objectives. They generally imply the same, namely what elements 
an administration view as favorable, but to be clear about the full spectrum of such aspects, both formulations 
are applied. Even if terms differ, this corresponds to Gaddis’s actual treatment of this component. Also necessary 
to be aware of, the concept of national interest is a fundamental part of political realism, see Michal G. Roskin, 
“National Interest: From Abstraction to Strategy”, in Joseph H. Cerami and James F. Holcomb, Jr. (eds.), U.S. 
Army War College Guide to Strategy (2001): 13-15. Available at: 
www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB362.pdf [online 2007-03-31]. 
86 Robert H. Dorff, “Some Basic Concepts and Approaches to the Study of International Politics”, in Joseph H. 
Cerami and James F. Holcomb, Jr. (eds.), U.S. Army War College Guide to Strategy (2001b): 13-15. Available 
at: www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB362.pdf [online 2007-03-31]. 
87 This means that the thesis does not elaborate on for instance economic interests. If mentioned, it is only when 
specifically important to the formation of national security strategy. The U.S. interest in access to oil is in a 
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such as what position the U.S. sees an interest in having and obtaining; what values it sees 
beneficiary in the world; and what subjects U.S. interests are focused on. Also more indirect 
interests can be present, opposite to the more direct interests of the U.S., for instance the 
interests of allies or partners. By applying such a concrete conception of interests and 
objectives in the thesis, its clear basis for overall U.S. national security strategies are 
elucidated.  
Secondly, perceptions of threats are treated. A state’s threat perceptions can comprise 
as different aspects as the threat posed by natural catastrophes to the threat of war. In the 
context of U.S. national security strategies, the thesis emphasizes political-military threats, or 
threats having implications in the form of strategic responses. To pose such a security threat, a 
subject needs to have both hostile intentions as well as the capabilities to realize these 
intentions.88 The strategic component of threats is modified with the word perception of 
threats, as it is the administrations’ views that are at focus, and not some objective estimate of 
what threats the U.S. counter in each period.89 It is the perceptions of threats that form the 
foundation of strategies, not the somehow objective nature of a situation or subject. By 
comparison, interests and objectives, as well as the other components of strategy, are by 
definition more subjective terms, implicitly referring to the administrations’ opinions. Threats 
can be perceived as having different intensities. For instance, a threat can be seen as 
existential, in other words threatening the very foundation of the state’s survival. Other types 
of threats include potential threats and indirect threats. Furthermore, threats can be posed by 
states or be asymmetrical, posed by non-state actors.90 Threat perceptions can be monolithic, 
threats being seen as interrelated or as one, or fragmented, thus posed by a variety of threats.  
Thirdly, the component of U.S. assessments of strategic areas, allies and partners is 
evaluated. The terms are not as abstract as the others, and address what priority is given to 
different geographical areas, allies and partners within strategies. Fundamental to the 
                                                                                                                                                        
special position. Access is in the economic interest of the U.S., at the same time that it is a resource with 
strategic-military dimensions. The thesis does not elaborate on oil as a foundation for U.S. national security 
strategy, but recognizes the stable U.S. interest in access to oil, especially important when considering relations 
with the oil-rich Persian Gulf region. An integrated study of oil and U.S. strategy is under construction by 
historian David Painter. A present point of reference is Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money 
and Power (London: Simon & Schuster 1991).  
88 Interview Flournoy 2007. A state possessing just one of those two aspects would not represent a threat. 
89 Still, the administrations’ threat perceptions were also based on threat estimates, for instance by the CIA, and 
thus also reflected an external, perhaps more technically objective state of affairs, in addition to the priorities of 
the administration. 
90 An ongoing theoretical discussion of threats also introduces the term “risk”. See for instance Mikkel Vedby 
Rasmussen, The Risk Society at War: Terror, Technology and Strategy in the Twenty-First Century (New York: 
Cambridge University Press 2006). The thesis addresses different types of challenges to U.S. and allied security 
within the concept of threat perceptions, and includes the varying nature of threats within this term, as both risks 
and more traditional threats are perceived as dangers to somebody’s interests.  
 22
perspective on allies and partners is the more theoretically founded terms of multilateralism 
versus unilateralism. Within analyses of national security strategies, a strategy is unilateral if 
policies are formed by and responses made only by one state, here the United States. A more 
multilateral strategy would involve consultation with other nations in the formations of 
common strategies and the implementation of such responses. Generally, strategies are not 
simply multilateral or unilateral, but degrees of one or the other. Concerning the aspect of 
geographical areas of strategic importance, there is relative continuity, although focus on 
different regions within these areas may change more rapidly according to international 
events. In the thesis, this component will be covered by an estimate of the degree of 
multilateralism or unilateralism present in strategies, what geographical areas are valued, and 
allies and partners within them.  
Lastly, the component of strategic thinking and implementation fulfills the analysis of 
U.S. national security strategies. This final element of the analysis, as the terms indicate, 
refers to the strategic argumentation made by the administrations, and an understanding of the 
implications of actions made. Accordingly, this component reviews the strategic ideas and 
actual actions; the responses to interests and objectives; perceptions of threats; and the 
assessments of strategic areas, allies and partners. The component of strategic thinking and 
implementation then integrates the previous components, and adds the means considered and 
actually used in U.S. national security strategies. Implied is a subordinate discussion of 
strategic thinking and implementation on the military instruments or operational aspects of 
strategies. This will be commented on, but the main aspect of this component is the higher 
level of overall strategic thinking and implementation.  
Such a componential view of analyzing the different administrations’ strategy opens 
up for easily accessed comparison between the periods of time covered. Alexander George 
calls for systematic comparison, which can be made possible by such a componential 
outline.91 The components of strategy of the successive administrations’ can be contrasted or 
linked to one another. Through comparison, the historian may identify features not otherwise 
seen, describe or profile the individual periods, and acquire insight into the factual 
relationships between periods or the causes of change.92 Combined, a conclusive chapter may 
culminate into a synthesized understanding of the complete period at study. When contrasted 
with the strategic components of the Cold War, a more holistic understanding of the period 
                                                 
91 See Gaddis 2005: ix. 
92 See Jürgen Kocka, “The Uses of Comparative History”, in Ragnar Björk and Karl Molin (eds.), Societies 
Made Up of History (Edsbruk, Sweeden: Akademitryck 1996): 199-201.  
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from the end of the Cold War to the War on Terrorism can be outlined. By viewing strategies 
through the different components, the operationalized parts, the whole is elucidated. 
 
Outline of Thesis 
The main chapters of the thesis analyze the three successive post-Cold War American 
presidencies, and accordingly their approach to security interests and objectives; perception of 
threats; strategic areas, allies and partners; and strategic thinking and implementation. 
Hereunder, the implications of strategies for the role of NATO are addressed. One chapter 
cover the George Herbert Walker Bush administration from 1989-1993, the next chapter 
evaluates the presidency of William Jefferson Clinton from 1993-2001. This chapter is 
followed by another on the George Walker Bush administration from 2001-2003. Each 
chapter will commence with a brief outline of the key international events of the period in 
question. The U.S. responses to these events will be used to illustrate U.S. strategy. The 
concluding chapter synthesizes arguments, putting the different treatments of the components 
of strategy presented in each chapter together to make a complex whole of the entire period at 
study. Such an outline gives room for both inter-administrative comparison, as well as 
synthesis.93  But firstly, a chapter on the Cold War provides the point of departure; the 
historical context on which the post-Cold War period is based, and when seen together as a 
whole, compared with.  
 
93 Implicitly, by dividing chapters by presidential periods, the main chapters contrast each administration. 
Another possible outline would be to use formative international events as the point of departure for the 
discussion. But as the subject at study is the strategic perceptions of the U.S. administrations, and as the 
formative international events of the end of the Cold War and the War on Terrorism form the frames of the 
period at study, the implemented outline serves the purpose of the analysis.  
CHAPTER II 
 
STRATEGIES OF CONTAINMENT AND DETERRENCE 
 
THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIES OF THE UNITED STATES 
DURING THE COLD WAR 
AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ROLE OF NATO 
 
 
 
At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of 
life. […] One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, 
representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and 
religion, and freedom from political oppression. The second way of life is based upon the will of a 
minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and 
radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms.1  
 
Introduction 
The Cold War represented both an ideological and a geopolitical rivalry. The above quote, 
from the speech announcing the U.S. Truman Doctrine, exemplified this. Ideological 
differences were underlined, at the same time as the geopolitical context was perceived as 
opening up for a possible Soviet influence in Greece and Turkey. The Cold War evolved after 
the end of World War II. Great power relations became fixed in tension between the two 
superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, and with them, their respective Western 
and Eastern bloc of supporter and satellite states.2 Within the Western bloc, the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization was set up in 1949 between Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, 
Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the 
United States. In 1952, Greece and Turkey joined NATO, in 1955, The Federal Republic of 
Germany (FRG), and in 1982, Spain. In 1955, the Eastern bloc formally came together in the 
Warsaw Pact. While the so-called Iron Curtain divided Europe, other nations, primarily in the 
Third World, stayed non-aligned.  
                                                 
1 Harry S. Truman, “Special Message to the Congress on Greece and Turkey: The Truman Doctrine” (1947-03-
12), in John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters (eds.), The American Presidency Project. Santa Barbara, California: 
University of California. Available at: 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=12846&st=truman+doctrine&st1= [online 2008-03-03].  
2 The word “bloc” is in used on both the Eastern and Western side of the Cold War, without prejudice as to the 
differences in uniformity within the two sides. Also, the terms “Western” and “Eastern” are applied, even though 
the terms are not completely geographically consistent. But they are used to identify the U.S. and the states that 
supported the American position in the Cold War, and the opposite side, the Soviet Union and its satellite states, 
and the states supporting communism. 
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In Europe, the Cold War remained cold, but in the Third World, U.S. or Soviet 
military intervention happened intermittently, most notably in the Korean War, the Vietnam 
War, and in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Generally, the Cold War was marked both by 
periods of tension and détente between the superpowers. Simplified, the first period of tension 
ended in 1962, with the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis. From then on, a period of 
détente, of less tension between the Cold War rivals, reigned. Tensions rose again in what 
became known as the Second Cold War, from roughly 1979 onwards. Here, President Ronald 
Reagan increased U.S. military spending and the rhetorical confrontation with the adversary 
superpower. In the Soviet Union, defense spending served to erode the communist system, 
and Mikhail Gorbachev initiated internal reforms in the 1980s. The Cold War gradually came 
to and end, as the Berlin Wall fell in 1989 and the Soviet Union dissolved in late 1991.3  
 With such a general history of the Cold War period, this chapter is to form a point of 
departure for the analysis of U.S. post-Cold War national security strategies and their 
implications for the role of NATO. To do so, the text emphasizes general or stable elements 
of U.S. Cold War strategies and NATO’s role. The chapter asserts, on the basis of central 
literature, that the period was marked by variations of U.S. strategies of containment and 
deterrence.4 NATO was an integral part of overall U.S. strategies. Its primary role was to be a 
territorially defensive alliance holding back the Soviet Union.  
The chapter follows the same conceptual framework to be applied throughout the 
thesis, and addresses U.S. interests and objectives; perceptions of threats: assessments of 
strategic areas, allies and partners; as well as U.S. strategic thinking and implementation. 
  
Interests and Objectives 
U.S. interests and objectives during the Cold War were firstly concerned with containing the 
Soviet Union and communism. Interrelated with such an interest were favorable views of 
democracy and economic liberalism. Also, the U.S. administrations were interested in 
building alliances and support within a Western bloc. In view of that, the U.S. had an interest 
in providing Western leadership, and strengthening its position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.   
                                                 
3 There is an extensive historiographical discussion concerning the Cold War, its origins, nature and end.  
Interpretations have been categorized as falling into an orthodox approach, seeing the Soviet Union as hostile to 
the West; a revisionist perspective, seeing the United States as the driving force of the Cold War; and a post-
revisionist assessment, attempting to avoid the question of guilt, and balancing perspectives. After the end of the 
Cold War, elements of the orthodox side gained new force, most determinedly expressed in views of American 
“triumphalism”. The following chapter attempts to present, in a short and simple manner, a “neutral” approach. 
Accordingly, the author basically adheres to the post-revisionists. Another aspect necessary to point out is that 
this chapter covers the Cold War period up until the inauguration of President G. H. W. Bush in January 1989.  
4 More precisely, the term containment refers to the more theoretically founded overall national security strategy, 
while deterrence indicates how it was fundamentally and practically seen implemented.  
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First and foremost, the central interest of the U.S. in the Cold War was to contain its 
adversary superpower, the Soviet Union. Such an interest was expressed both in terms of 
preventing Soviet domination in areas of central importance to the United States, and more 
widely, assumed that any further gains of Soviet domination would pose a threat to the 
interest of the United States.5 In a NATO perspective, the organization’s role in defending the 
territorial integrity of the Western European states against the Soviet Union supported this 
interest of the United States, and was shared among the allies.  
 Furthermore, the U.S. saw political and economic freedom around the world as 
favorable to its position. This was interrelated with the interest in containing the Soviet 
Union, now as an ideological dimension of containing communist ideology. Such an interest 
was expressed in denunciations of the system of the Eastern bloc. For instance, after the 
Soviet suppression of the uprising in Hungary in 1956, the U.S. argued in favor of pluralism 
and freedom.6 Also in the preamble of the North Atlantic Treaty democratic ideas were 
embraced.7 
The interest in containing the Soviet Union was in addition evident in the U.S. effort 
to build alliances and support for the Western bloc. The formation of regional defense 
arrangements underlined the interest in gaining support for the American position in the Cold 
War.8 NATO was the first and most central, but similar arrangements were formed in 
different regions of the world, for instance with the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 
(SEATO) and the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS). 
Likewise, U.S. attempts at gaining support among the so-called non-aligned nations outside 
the Western and Eastern bloc supported this general objective.   
Through these relationships, the U.S. had an interest in strengthening its leadership 
within the Western and non-aligned world. In terms of NATO, the alliance supported the U.S. 
interest in institutionalizing American leadership in Europe. European integration was seen 
within the broader U.S. objectives of Western cooperation, as long as such cooperation also 
                                                 
5 See Gaddis 2005: 89.  
6 For instance in Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Statement by the President Concerning the Admission of Refugees 
from Hungary” (1956-11-089), in John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters (eds.), The American Presidency Project. 
Santa Barbara, California: University of California. Available at: 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=10700&st=&st1 [online 2008-02-29]; David Ryan, The 
United States and Europe in the Twentieth Century (London: Pearson Longman 2003): 70-71.  
7 NATO, “North Atlantic Treaty” (1949). Available at: http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm [online 
2008-04-18].  
8 The observation that it was in the national security interests of the U.S. to build alliances and partnerships is not 
to say that relationships were not also formed as responses to allies’ interests, as they wanted U.S. guarantees. 
See also the “Empire” by Invitation thesis on U.S.-European relations. Lundestad 2003. 
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supported the transatlantic framework, and thus, the overall U.S. position in Europe.9 
Through building alliances and winning supporters, the U.S. saw an interest in gaining 
position in the world vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. This was particularly evident in areas central 
to the United States, but also more generally, within a more global perspective.  
                                                
Combined, U.S. interests in the Cold War were centered on containing the Soviet 
Union; supporting ideas of political and economic freedom; and building alliances and 
support. Within these concerns, objectives of U.S. leadership and position vis-à-vis the Soviet 
Union crystallized.  
 
Perception of Threats 
As the section on interests and objectives has anticipated, U.S. and NATO Cold War 
strategies focused on the Soviet threat. Also, the People’s Republic of China was to some 
extent perceived as an interrelated threat. On the whole, communism was seen as hostile to 
the interests of the U.S.10 
 U.S. Cold War threat perceptions were fundamentally centered on the Soviet Union. 
“The gravest threat to the security of the United States within the foreseeable future stems 
from the hostile designs and formidable power of the USSR [Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics], and from the nature of the Soviet system.”11 Soviet antipathies against the West 
were seen as a result of Soviet historical and ideological circumstances.12 Such perceived 
hostile intentions were coupled with major conventional and unconventional capabilities. 
Conventionally, the Red Army’s position in Eastern Europe and parts of East Asia, within 
striking distance of U.S. allies, was perceived threatening.13 And from 1949 onwards, the 
Soviet threat was coupled with unconventional capabilities, as the Soviet Union acquired the 
atomic bomb. In such a way, with perceived inherently hostile purposes, and weapon of mass 
destruction (WMD) capabilities, the Soviet Union was seen to represent a direct and 
existential threat to the U.S. Such perceptions also formed the basis of NATO cohesion, 
countering a common threat. 
 
9 Ryan 2003: 74; Lundestad 2003: 38. 
10 Threat perceptions stemming from the two world wars saw it to some extent also necessary to ensure that 
Germany did not reemerge as a threat. In such a perspective, Western influence in what became West Germany, 
and the country’s participation in European integration and NATO, formed the foundation for containing a 
possible German threat. Comparably, the U.S. also stayed committed to Japan. 
11 National Security Council (NSC), “NSC-68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security” 
(1950-04-14): Conclusions. Available at: http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68.htm [online 2008-03-
03]. 
12 See Gaddis (2005: 32) for more detail.  
13 Gaddis 2005: 32.  
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 After the takeover of Mao Zedong, and the creation of the People’s Republic of China 
in 1949, also China was perceived a Cold War threat. With China, threat perceptions were 
less stable.14 In the early period from 1949, perceptions of China were consistently negative. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, U.S. attitudes became less negative, through what has been called an 
American-Chinese rapprochement. Still, the U.S. continued to view China as communist and 
undemocratic,15 consistent with original threat perceptions. From the first nuclear testing in 
1964, the Chinese threat was also coupled with nuclear capabilities.   
Consistently, communism in itself was perceived a threat. Seen within the discussion 
of communism as a monolithic or diverse threat, President Harry Truman feared that all 
communists got their orders from Moscow.16 The first proponent of U.S. containment 
strategies, George Kennan, on the other hand acknowledged possible tensions between the 
Kremlin leadership and the international communist movement.17 But the general U.S. 
perspective was that all communism represented a threat.18 The Soviet Union, China and 
other communist countries and movements were seen as threatening, while the existential 
threat of nuclear capabilities was confined to the Soviet Union and China. Communist parties 
within Western Europe were to some extent also seen as threatening to the stability of the 
West. 
Simplified, the U.S. saw communism and the Soviet Union as an interrelated, 
monolithic and existential threat, even if diversity existed. Hereunder, China represented a 
threat, but in this case, threat perceptions were less consistent throughout the Cold War.  
 
Strategic Areas, Allies and Partners 
By building alliances and support focused against this communist threat, American strategies 
of containment and deterrence were inherently multilateral inside the Western bloc. Within 
this Cold War alliance structure, NATO and other regional defense arrangements were 
central. The Iron Curtain through Europe made the transatlantic relationship fundamental 
within U.S. strategies, and made it interlinked with the overall U.S. Cold War perspective in 
other strategically important areas as well.  
During the Cold War, the strategies of containment and deterrence made U.S. policies 
predominantly multilateral, although its outreach was confined to the Western bloc. U.S. 
                                                 
14 Matthew S. Hirshberg, “Consistency and Change in American perceptions of China”, Political Behavior (vol. 
15, no. 3, 1993): 247. 
15 Hirshberg 1993: 247.  
16 Ryan 2003: 58.  
17 Gaddis 2005: 41. 
18 Gaddis 2005: 64.  
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strategies saw relations within the Western bloc as central to contain and deter the position of 
communism and the Soviet Union.19 In this way, multilateralism was inherent within the 
Western sphere.  In a global realm, possible cooperation within the United Nations (UN) was 
mostly paralyzed as a consequence of the East-West rivalry, with the exception of the period 
when the Soviet Union boycotted the Security Council as a response to the non-inclusion of 
Mao’s China.  
Although cooperation was ascertained, different regions and relationships were 
prioritized differently. In general, it is possible to claim that the Cold War made all places 
strategically important, as all gains of communism could worsen the position of the U.S.20 
Selectivity in where the U.S. had its vital interests was not easily decided, as it was difficult to 
draw demarcation lines in the world, singling out what countries it would defend against 
communism and which it would not.21 At the same time, the initial strategy formed by 
Kennan argued in favor of prioritized regions, and to put it simply, Western Europe and Japan 
had first priority.22 Europe was the initial theater of the Cold War,23 and was the location of 
the Iron Curtain. After the communist party gained power in China and the Korean War broke 
out, the Cold War and U.S. strategies of containment were also extended to Asia.24 In 
Western Europe and critical areas of Asia, the U.S. primarily built its regional defense 
arrangements, where NATO was the first, broadest and most sustained of the multilateral 
alliances set up.25 
Still, other areas than those of Western cooperation became the battlefield of U.S. 
Cold War strategies. Eastern Europe was recognized as an interest sphere of the Soviet 
Union.26 But the so-called Third World countries became battlegrounds of superpower 
                                                 
19 Ryan 2003: 53.  
20 John Mueller, ”Quiet Cataclysm: Afterthoughts on World War III”, in Michael J. Hogan (ed.), The End of the 
Cold War: Its Meanings and Implications (New York: Cambridge University Press 1992): 47. The balance of 
American universalism and particularism, in an overall global outlook and prioritizing, is a returning aspect of 
Gaddis’s (2005) Cold War appraisal. See also historian Melvyn P. Leffler’s discussion of the diffusion of the 
periphery and core during the Cold War. Melvyn P. Leffler, “Bringing it Together: The Parts and the Whole”, in 
Odd Arne Westad (ed.), Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory (London: Frank Cass 
2000): 54-55. 
21 Michael Cox, “International History since 1989”, in John Baylis and Steve Smith (eds.), The Globalization of 
World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations (New York: Oxford University Press 2001 [second 
edition] ): 123. 
22 Gaddis 2005: 29 and 40.  
23 Antonio Varsori, ”Reflections on the Origins of the Cold War”, in Odd Arne Westad (ed.), Reviewing the Cold 
War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory (London: Frank Cass 2000): 285. 
24 Phil Williams, ”The United States’ Commitment to Western Europe: Strategic Ambiguity and Political 
Disintegration?”, International Affairs (vol. 59, no. 2, 1983): 203. 
25 While it has been suggested that the idea that American Cold War policies were Eurocentric is exaggerated, 
the preceding period to the time of my study, the 1980s were to a large extent focused on Europe. Interview 
Dobbins 2007. 
26 Gaddis 2005: 291. 
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rivalry, on the U.S. side most notably in the Korean and Vietnam War. But even if U.S. Cold 
War policies were implemented outside Europe, in these cases in Asia, but also in other 
continents such as Africa, operations were all seen within the same Cold War framework. As 
such, the focus on non-European areas did not diverge from the U.S.-European focus. NATO 
was an integral part of the overall Cold War outlook of the U.S., where NATO was one of 
several interlinked alliances in the Western bloc. NATO in this way had global relevance, as 
part of U.S. global strategy, while its practical role was confined to the territorial defense of 
its own region.  
Even if the transatlantic allies were part of the same Cold War outlook, there existed 
instances of disagreement among the allies. Particularly, the Suez crisis in 1956 signified 
allied divergence. But even though the allies disagreed, and NATO experienced internal crises 
from time to time, U.S. policies were generally formed within the Cold War strategies of 
containment and deterrence.27 In this way, the general common objective of containing the 
Soviet threat produced overall coherence.28  
In sum, by being the location of the Iron Curtain, Europe was automatically central to 
global U.S. strategies. The U.S. had allies in and intervened in other areas as well. But the 
Cold War produced a U.S. framework where different regions became interlinked through its 
strategies of containment and deterrence. In this way, Europe and NATO was by position and 
nature of overriding interest to the U.S., within the U.S. strategic outlook based on 
multilateralism within the Western bloc. As such, the U.S. and allied Cold War framework 
contributed to allied coherence.    
 
Strategic Thinking and Implementation 
The preceding sections have pointed out that U.S. Cold War strategies were based on interests 
in containing and deterring the Soviet and communist threat. Strategic decisions were formed 
within a framework of alliances and supporters, which made policies inherently multilateral. 
Strategies of containment and deterrence developed and became implemented throughout the 
Cold War period, in which NATO functioned as a territorially defensive alliance. 
The initial formulation of U.S. strategies of containment and deterrence was devised 
by George Kennan. In the so-called “Long Telegram” of 1946 and his “Mr. X” article in 
Foreign Affairs in 1947, Kennan outlined the strategy that by 1948 aimed to: restore the 
                                                 
27 For a more detailed discussion of the application of U.S. Cold War strategies in the Suez Crisis, see Ingrid 
Lundestad, ”USA og Suez-krisa i 1956: Den kalde krigens betydning for amerikansk politikk” [”The U.S. and 
the 1956 Suez Crisis: The Importance of the Cold War for American Policies”], Fortid, (no. 4, 2007).  
28 Ryan 2003: 53. 
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balance of power through the encouragement of self-confidence in the nations threatened by 
Soviet expansionism; reduce the Soviet Union’s ability to project influence beyond its borders 
through exploiting tensions between Moscow and the international communist movement; 
and to modify the Soviet concept of international relations, with an objective of forming a 
negotiated settlement of out-standing differences.29 These were basically the intended 
instruments of the strategy of containment and deterrence. The statement of the NSC-68 of 
1950 called for a policy of containment that:  
seeks by all means short of war to (1) block further expansion of Soviet power, (2) expose the falsities 
of Soviet pretensions, (3) induce a retraction of the Kremlin's control and influence, and (4) in general, 
so foster the seeds of destruction within the Soviet system that the Kremlin is brought at least to the 
point of modifying its behavior to conform to generally accepted international standards.30 
 
Implemented, the initial Truman Doctrine of 1947 stated that the U.S. would support 
those threatened by Soviet subversion or expansion.31 The same year, the U.S. granted 
substantial economic support through the formulation of the Marshall Plan, designed to revive 
and integrate the economies of Western Europe.32 In 1954, President Dwight D. Eisenhower 
proclaimed that the U.S. saw the spread of communism in the world as a possible domino 
effect expansion. The context was the idea that the presence of communism in one nation in 
Southeast Asia could spill over into communist expansion in other countries in the same 
region. The theory thus legitimized U.S. action to stop communist expansion, for instance in 
the Vietnam War.33   
The Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957, a reaction to the 1956 Suez Crisis, provided 
foundation for the transfer of military and economic aid to the Middle East, and guarantees 
against possible Soviet invasion or subversion in this region.34 Later, the 1969 Nixon 
Doctrine, as a consequence of the troubles in the Vietnam War, declared that the U.S. could 
not undertake all responsibility for the defense of the “free world”.35 But even if this meant 
that restraints made U.S. strategies less committed to more peripheral allies and clients, it was 
less relevant for its transatlantic relations. Here, the American nuclear guarantee and troop 
presence stayed firm, and NATO’s primary relevance to the U.S. was affirmed.36 Later, the 
                                                 
29 Gaddis 2005: 35-36.  
30 NSC-68 1950: (VI)(A).  
31 Len Scott. “International history 1945-1990”, in John Baylis and Steve Smith (eds.), The Globalization of 
World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations (New York: Oxford University Press 2001 [second 
edition] ): 80. The Truman Doctrine was practically directed towards Greece and Turkey, but had general 
implications for the execution of U.S. Cold War strategies. 
32 See Ryan 2003: 59-62. 
33 For a brief account of the domino theory, see Jan Palmowski, Oxford Dictionary of Contemporary World 
History: From 1900 to the Present Day (New York: Oxford University Press 2004): 182-183.  
34 Palmowski 2004: 195. 
35 Gaddis 2005: 296.  
36 Lundestad 2003: 193-194.  
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Carter doctrine in 1980 announced that the U.S. would use any means necessary to prevent 
Soviet control in the Persian Gulf.37 The 1984 Reagan Doctrine aimed at turning nationalistic 
forces in the Third World, and eventually also Eastern Europe, against the Soviet Union.38 
These doctrines and policies sought to contain communist expansion and deter Soviet 
aggression. In such a way, the negotiations with the Soviet Union, intended by Kennan, 
generally did not become the focus of strategy. Rather, the process of containment became the 
central focus.39 
U.S. strategies were actively pursued throughout the Cold War, but at the same time 
containment and deterrence are by definition defensive terms. The U.S. administrations 
perceived that they responded to what happened in the international sphere.40 Such defensive 
arguments were for instance made about the Truman doctrine, accordingly supposed to 
protect against Soviet expansion.41 But even if the U.S. did not confront the Soviet Union 
militarily, strategies of containment and deterrence did not prevent the U.S. from intervening 
militarily in the Third World. In accordance with containment and deterrence, this was 
perceived as rolling back the provocations of the Soviet Union. But in a post-revisionist view, 
both sides escalated the conflict as seen by the other, and implemented policies to limit the 
influence of the adversary.42  According to Kennan, the United States should not interfere in 
other nations’ internal affairs, unless evidence suggested that U.S. national interests were 
sufficiently at stake, and that the U.S. possessed and afforded the means to do so.43 But as the 
expansion of communism and the influence of the Soviet Union was seen directly threatening 
to the U.S., interventions were seen as legitimate.44  In this way, the strategies of containment 
and deterrence were directed towards the Soviet Union and communism, but also became 
implemented through military interventions in the Third World, within the same framework 
of Cold War strategies.45  
Militarily, U.S. Cold War strategies relied on both conventional and unconventional 
weapons, and embedded attitudes towards the use of military force. As part of the strategies 
of containment and deterrence, the U.S. sought qualitative superiority in military technology 
                                                 
37 Gaddis 2005: 344. 
38 Gaddis 2005: 369. U.S. Cold War doctrines by J. F. Kennedy and L. B. Johnson are excluded from the 
presentation, as they referred to communism in Latin America, outside the realm of this thesis.  
39 Gaddis 2005: 81.  
40 See note by Gaddis 2005: viii.  
41 Scott 2001: 80. 
42 Contrastively, the American perceptions of purely defensive strategies were thus much in line with the so-
called orthodox approach.  
43 Gaddis 2005: 30.  
44 See also the above presentation of the domino theory and its rationale for the Vietnam War.  
45 Also see the section of strategic areas, allies and partners of how different regions were prioritized, its note on 
the theoretical discussion of U.S. universalism and particularism, and the Cold War framework of strategies. 
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to achieve and maintain an advantage over the Soviet Union.46 This was particularly present 
in the unconventional arms race. But also conventionally, the U.S. implemented its strategies 
with troop deployments in critical areas.47 Also the military interventions mentioned were 
executed through conventional means. But the role of unconventional weapons was important 
as it built a balance of terror with the Soviet Union. During the Eisenhower presidency, U.S. 
and allied strategy came to rely heavily on U.S. nuclear capabilities, to deter, and if necessary, 
resist conventional aggression in Western Europe.48 The initial Reagan approach emphasized 
defense spending as the means to contain the Soviet Union. When it came to the use of 
military force, the Vietnam War had special influence on U.S. policies. In line with the Nixon 
Doctrine, the Vietnam experience made the U.S. wary of unfocused appliance of U.S. military 
force. Such an attitude was also consistent with Kennan’s initial statement of U.S. Cold War 
strategies; that the U.S. should not intervene unless clear national interests were threatened, 
and resources to do so were present and applicable.49 U.S. strategies relied on military means, 
not only through actual deployment and appliance to contain the Soviet position, but also 
through the deterrence represented by their very existence.  
In addition to these military aspects of the Cold War, U.S. strategies of containment 
and deterrence were also rhetorical. This reflected the ideological nature of the Cold War, in 
addition to the geopolitical aspects outlined. According to Kennan, the Cold War was 
primarily psychological, and U.S. strategies therefore had to focus on psychological aspects.50 
In this way, arguments made within the framework of U.S. strategies of containment and 
deterrence were also part of a propaganda war between the two superpowers. For example, 
The NSC-68 condemned the Kremlin in harsh wording.51  The quote at the beginning of the 
chapter expresses U.S. criticism of the Soviet system. Reagan also applied hardened rhetoric, 
as the Soviet Union in 1983 was denounced as the “focus of evil in the modern world”.52 The 
psychological nature of the Cold War was also manifest within periods of lesser tension 
between the superpowers. For instance, Nixon and his Secretary of State Henry Kissinger saw 
                                                 
46 Aaron L. Friedberg, ”The United States and the Cold War Arms Race”, in Odd Arne Westad (ed.), Reviewing 
the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory (London and New York: Frank Cass 2000): 207. 
47 The presence of U.S. troops in Western Europe will be elaborated on below.  
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52 Ronald Reagan quoted in John Lewis Gaddis, “On Starting All Over Again: A Naïve Approach to the Study of 
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détente as part and parcel of the long series of attempts to contain the power and influence of 
the Soviet Union through pressure and inducements to change Soviet perceptions.53 But still, 
harsh language was not applied to the same extent as during periods of major East-West 
confrontation.  
 The role of NATO within U.S. Cold War strategies was the territorial defense of its 
member states within allied strategies to contain and deter the Soviet position in Europe.54 In 
addition, in line with the general definition of the alliance presented in the introduction, 
NATO performed as a forum for consultation on security issues for the member states. NATO 
relied on a system of collective defense, where Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty provided 
guarantees for allied support in case a member of the alliance was attacked.55 The clause was 
formed within international law, seeing individual or collective self-defense as an inherent 
right of nations as explicitly stated in the UN Charter, article 51.56 Although the alliance was 
mutual, it centered on the U.S. commitment to defend Western Europe. In practice, this came 
to rely on the stated U.S. willingness to use nuclear weapons to deter Soviet aggression, as 
discussed above.57 With Europe’s reliance on U.S. security guarantees, it was more or less 
inevitable that U.S. security strategies also became NATO’s strategies.58 
Initially, NATO centered on building European defense, and was not intended as the 
foundation for a permanent stationing of U.S. ground troops in Western Europe.59 But both 
the U.S. and Europe came to rely on permanent U.S. bases within Western Europe. This was 
particularly important in Germany, where what became the FRG was home to the majority of 
U.S. troops.60 These contained the Soviet Union, but also influenced the foundation of 
German rearmament, within NATO structures and the context of European integration. In this 
way, the alliance, in addition to containing the Soviet position, anchored U.S. security in 
Europe, and formed a structure that would also prevent Germany from reappearing as a 
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possible threat.61 But the Soviet threat was the most important factor for the close cooperation 
between the U.S. and Western Europe.62  
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, the alliance was also enlarged to include 
new members, and thus broadened the base of support and the area of the transatlantic defense 
arrangement. Still, the inclusion of Greece, Turkey, West Germany and Spain did not change 
the role of the alliance and the transatlantic perception of common security. In this way, the 
primary role of NATO in the Cold War was the territorial defense of its member states, 
especially containing and deterring the Soviet Union in Western Europe. NATO functioned as 
a central element of U.S. global security strategies. As the above section also illustrated, 
NATO had global relevance as the most central of several alliances within the Western bloc. 
The practical role of NATO however, was confined to the territory of its member states.  
To sum up, George Kennan formed the initial strategic thinking that U.S. Cold War 
presidents came to rely on and adjust throughout the Cold War. U.S. strategies were 
implemented in both geopolitical and ideological terms, and were the foundation for U.S. 
interventions in the Third World. Also the reliance on military power, both conventional and 
particularly unconventional, was central to U.S. strategies. In a NATO perspective, the 
alliance formed an organization defending the member states against outside aggression. 
 
Conclusions 
All together, the Cold War was characterized by a geopolitical and ideological rivalry 
between the United States and the Soviet Union. U.S. strategies were formed as containment 
and deterrence, based on U.S. interests in containing the Soviet and communist threat. These 
strategies were inherently multilateral, relying on regional defense arrangements and 
supporters within a Western bloc. NATO was central to U.S. Cold War strategies. It deterred 
aggression in the transatlantic territory and was part of the overall common transatlantic 
intention of containing the position of the Soviet Union. U.S. strategies embedded a globally 
coherent outlook, based on the Soviet threat, shared among the allies.  
 
61 The alliance’s first secretary general, Lord Ismay, famously stated that NATO was formed to: “keep the 
Russians out, the Germans down, and the Americans in”. Ismay quoted in Lundestad 2003: 7-8.  
62 Lundestad 2003: 8. 
CHAPTER III  
 
FROM A STRATEGY OF CONTAINMENT AND DETERRENCE TOWARDS A 
FLEDGLING STRATEGY OF ENGAGEMENT  
 
THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIES OF THE UNITED STATES 
DURING THE PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE H. W. BUSH  
AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ROLE OF NATO  
 
 
 “The collapse of the Soviet domination in Eastern Europe means that the Cold War is over, 
its core issue resolved. […] In the emerging post-Cold War world, international relations 
promise to be more complicated, more volatile and less predictable.”1 
 
Introduction 
When George Herbert Walker Bush was inaugurated in January 1989, the power of the Soviet 
adversary was being drained away. The Berlin Wall was torn down in November 1989. In 
1990, Germany re-unified within the framework of NATO membership. The Soviet Union 
disintegrated in December 1991, and the U.S. remained the only superpower. As the above 
quote indicates, these changes gave way to a new strategic environment. In the post-Cold War 
context, the 1990-1991 Gulf War, responding to the regional conflict of Iraqi aggression 
towards Kuwait, represented the primary event. But also internal conflicts in Africa and 
Europe confronted the Bush administration. In Somalia, the administration provided support 
for food supplies from 1992 onwards. Yugoslavia started to disintegrate in 1991. But the 
administration stayed out of the rising tensions occurring as the Serbs tried to hold back on 
Bosnian independence. 
 The Bush administration’s policies were influenced by Cold War strategies of 
containment and deterrence, as they had been the major national security strategy for the last 
four decades. This meant that the U.S. remained skeptical as to the intentions of the Soviet 
Union and other potential great power rivals. But the administration gradually recognized the 
major shifts taking place in the international system, and tried to initiate elements of a new 
strategy. The phrase “the new world order” indicated that the administration saw prospects for 
U.S. engagement in a new era, even though confined to traditional state-to-state international 
                                                 
1 NSS 1991: 1-2. 
37 
relations. With limited time and continuing Cold War elements, only the Gulf War 
substantially implemented elements of a fledgling new engagement strategy of the U.S. In 
terms of NATO, American strategic tensions between an established and new security 
concept, contributed to allied coherence on its original foundation, at the same time that the 
organization saw prospects and planned for a new broader post-Cold War role. In terms of 
implementation, NATO was not an integral part of U.S. engagements in the “new world 
order”, and accordingly, the practical role of NATO changed little during the course of the 
Bush presidency.  
The following chapter discusses the evolution of U.S. security strategy in the changing 
international security environment from 1989 to 1993, and their implications for the role of 
NATO. In line with the conceptual framework already implemented in the chapter on the 
Cold War, the discussion covers American interests and objectives; perception of threats; 
approach to strategic areas, allies and partners; in addition to the strategic thinking and 
implementation of the Bush administration. 
 
Interests and Objectives  
As explained in the introduction, a nation’s security interests and objectives relate to the 
maintenance of its sovereignty, territory and people. For the United States under the first Bush 
presidency, this was stated as “an understanding of our basic interests and objectives, […] that 
even in a new era [includes] the survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, 
with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure”.2 More concretely, 
the administration perceived U.S. interests and objectives in the sustained containment of the 
Soviet and emerging Russian state; the broadening influence of American values; a U.S. role 
of international and transatlantic leadership; as well as the maintenance of the new supreme 
position of the U.S.   
When Bush was inaugurated the Cold War was still the prime strategic concern 
forming American interests and objectives. Accordingly, American and NATO’s relations 
with the Soviet Union were at the center of attention. United States interest in this case dealt 
firstly with limiting Soviet and communist influence in the world, and secondly, to ultimately 
win the Cold War through the termination of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union itself. 
During the Bush presidency this was formulated as an intention to make the Soviets “take 
positive steps, such as reducing their conventional forces, permitting self-determination for all 
Eastern Europe […], [and] achieving lasting political pluralism and respect for human 
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rights”.3 American interests in Soviet reforms that would lead the Soviet Union towards 
“multiparty democracy, national self-determination and market economic reform”, as well as 
a reduced role of ideology in Soviet foreign relations, might also make cooperation between 
the two superpower adversaries more likely, the Bush NSS of 1991 stated.4 But the 
administration remained skeptical of the Soviet and new Russian state throughout its 
presidency, as antagonism lingered on through the period of Soviet decline and the 
establishment of the successor states.5 
 Related to, but also independent of the American interest in limiting the influence of 
communism, the Bush administration saw a general interest in promoting ideas of political 
and economic freedom around the world. As a relatively stable aspect of American national 
objectives, the administration affirmed that American interests were “best served in a world in 
which democracy and its ideals are widespread and secure”.6 The objective was “[a] stable 
and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights and democratic 
institutions [would] flourish”.7 Also, emphasis put on trade negotiations indicated a general 
interest in promoting the basic ideas of the post-World War II American economic system.8 
Tendencies of systemic change in the world, as the global influence of the communist system 
was lessened, also made the broadening influence of the American system seem more 
attainable.  
The administration saw a continuous U.S. interest in maintaining U.S. international 
leadership. As the Cold War was ending, the administration thought it necessary to commit 
and engage internationally based on a fear of a recurrence of problems analogous to those of 
the interwar years.9 At the end of the presidency, this was stated as the need to stay engaged 
to prevent “the emergence either of a new global threat or a vacuum in a region critical to our 
interests”.10 In this perspective, it was decisive that the United States seized international 
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leadership to avoid international crises and conflicts. Accordingly, the administration rejected 
a return to American isolationism, as practiced in the interwar years.11  
The interest in leadership also represented a U.S. commitment to providing 
transatlantic leadership. Bush felt that “the United States bears a disproportionate 
responsibility for peace in Europe and an obligation to lead NATO”.12 The administration 
thought that it should “[s]upport Western Europe’s historic march toward greater economic 
and political unity, including a European security identity within the Atlantic Alliance, and 
nurture a closer relationship between the United States and the European Community”.13 The 
administration was in this way positive to security initiatives within Europe. This would 
potentially ease the burden on the U.S. in providing for European security.14 At the same 
time, the administration underlined the necessity of such security arrangements to be linked to 
the transatlantic community, to avoid initiatives that might promote rivaling policies to those 
of the United States and potentially challenge its leading position in Europe.  
Even though the burdens of providing international security could be shared in the 
post-Cold War world, the U.S. saw an interest in having an unrivalled global position. 
Despite the emergence of new power centers, the United States remains the only state with true global 
strength, reach and influence in every dimension – political, economic and military. In these 
circumstances, our natural desire to share burdens more equitably with our newly-strong friends does 
not relieve us of our own responsibilities.15 
Accordingly, the emerging international system of unipolarity, with the U.S. as the sole 
superpower, was seen beneficial to American security interests. This interest in global U.S. 
supremacy was determinedly expressed among factions of the Bush administration, in what 
was seen as the necessity to prevent more actively the emergence of rivals to such a position. 
In 1992, The New York Times referred to drafts of a new post-Cold War strategy in the 
Department of Defense (DoD), a report supervised by Paul D. Wolfowitz, at the time 
Pentagon’s Under Secretary for Policy.16 The draft has now been declassified with excised 
parts.17 According to the DoD faction, the United States “must sufficiently account for the 
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interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our 
leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order”.18 Also in 
terms of the transatlantic dimension, the report specifically called for the preservation of 
NATO to make sure no rivals developed in Europe, especially as Germany now was re-
united.19 American transatlantic leadership through NATO could then specifically ensure a 
sustained American position in Europe. Controversial aspects of the report were disputed, but 
the overall primary position of the U.S. in the world, as the power of the Soviet Union was 
retreating, was seen favorable by the whole administration. This was also consistent with the 
U.S. interest in “winning” the Cold War.   
In sum, American interests reflected elements of Cold War thinking, as the 
administration saw continuous interests in containing the Soviet Union and preventing other 
potential rivals from challenging the U.S. At the same time, the administration asserted that in 
the “new world order”, the U.S. had interests in remaining engaged and providing 
international and transatlantic leadership. European security initiatives could shoulder more of 
the burden for maintaining European security. But the overall supreme position of the U.S. in 
the post-Cold War world, both in transatlantic and international affairs, was affirmed as a 
general objective of the U.S.  
 
Perception of Threats  
Interests and objectives were coupled with perceptions of threats. The maintained interest in 
containing the Soviet Union and upholding the primary position of the U.S. meant that fears 
of the Soviet Union and of potential future challenges to the U.S. were present within the 
administration. Separately, a threat to U.S. leadership and position in the “new world order” 
was more concretely posed by the Iraqi aggression towards Kuwait. In addition to this 
regional conflict, internal crises in Somalia and in the Balkans represented threats the 
administration needed to respond to.  
During the first half of the Bush presidency, the Soviet Union was still perceived as a 
preeminent threat, even with Gorbachev’s opening reforms. Soviet initiatives were viewed 
with skepticism, and as a threat to the United States and its international reputation. For 
example the U.S. looked upon the Soviet call for nuclear force reductions in Europe as its 
“propaganda efforts”, and the administration feared it was losing what it called the “public 
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relations war” with its adversary superpower.20 Also, when Gorbachev announced the Soviet 
intention of non-interference in the Eastern bloc, i.e. a retreat from the Brezhnev Doctrine, the 
Bush administration saw potential problems with Soviet policies. By criticizing other 
elements of the Soviet leader’s speech that indicated that socialism might still outlive the fall 
of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Eastern Europe,21 the Bush administration upheld an ambivalent 
approach to the intentions of the Soviet Union. In addition, the military capabilities of the 
Soviet Union were still perceived as a major threat to the U.S. and its allies: “The Soviet 
Union remains the only state possessing the physical military capability to destroy American 
society with a single, cataclysmic attack and, in spite of severe economic strains, the 
modernization of Soviet strategic forces continues virtually across the board”, the 
administration uttered in 1991.22 In this way, elements of Cold War antagonism lingered on 
through a period of lessening tensions. 
Gradually, the Bush team considered that the Soviet threat and the state’s military 
capabilities were becoming more of a potential risk, rather than the imminent threat it had 
been perceived as in the Cold War. In 1991, the administration further stated that “the Soviet 
Union is far more inwardly focused as it wrestles with its internal crises” and that “a return to 
the same superpower adversary we have faced for over 40 years is unlikely”.23 The NATO 
heads of state in 1991 agreed that the “threat of a simultaneous, full-scale attack on all of 
NATO’s European fronts has effectively been removed”.24 Indicatively, American and 
European perceptions were ambivalently optimistic, but also too cautious to view the Soviet 
threat as finally terminated. According to the U.S., “elements of the U.S.-Soviet relationship 
will remain competitive, and there is always the danger that confrontations will re-emerge.”25 
To ensure a positive evolution within areas of former confrontation,26 the administration, by 
the end of the Bush presidency, saw economic and political reform in Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union as its number one foreign policy priority.27  
As the administration was hesitant about ascertaining the future of the Soviet or 
Russian threat, the uncertainty regarding what other threats would evolve, was greater. 
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Elements of an extended concept of threats were put forward by the administration, dubbed 
“new kinds of security issues”.28 These included threats against the fiscal strength of the 
American economy, illegal drugs, environmental depredations (although explicitly related to 
Saddam Hussein) and human migrations.29 But these threats to American security were only 
listed, and not elaborated on at length, an indication that they were the least important to the 
strategic formulations of the administration, and that threat perceptions on a state-to-state 
basis lingered throughout the presidency.  
Within the range of such threats, and as introduced in the section on interests and 
objectives, the administration, particularly DoD feared that other major powers would evolve 
after the fall of the Cold War bipolar structure. Such potential threats to U.S. supremacy were 
thought to be represented by any power dominating the territory of the former Soviet Union, 
Europe, East Asia, the Middle East or Southwest Asia.30 Perceptions of the emerging Russian 
state have been outlined above. Elsewhere, re-united Germany and China were perceived as 
potential threats. For NATO, the most dramatic scenario was of course U.S. fears of rivals in 
Western Europe. The administration had supported the development that lead to the re-
unification of Germany.31 But the administration underlined the need for anchoring the new 
state in both the European Community (EC) and NATO.32 In consequence, it may be possible 
to talk of an American strategy that contained Europe through integration in the transatlantic 
dimension.33 Regarding the EC itself, the U.S. approved of European initiatives within the 
security and defense field, and was positive to such developments as long as European 
arrangements were secured within the transatlantic framework. Independent European 
security initiatives, such as plans to strengthen and expand the West European Union (WEU), 
were viewed critically.34 Especially the DoD saw initiatives outside NATO as threatening the 
position of the U.S., and thought that arrangements that implied a “Europe only”, would 
undermine NATO unity.35  
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As regards China, the administration was uncertain of the progress of the reform 
process, especially keeping in mind the suppression of the Tiananmen Square demonstrators 
in spring 1989, which Bush thought “seriously damaged [the American Chinese 
relationship’s] hard-won gains”.36 In this way, policies reflected the diverse U.S.-Chinese 
relationship of the Cold War. More generally though, the potential Chinese challenge was 
commented on in the NSS of 1991, which stated that China posed a “complex challenge”, but 
that “[c]hange is inevitable in China, and our links with China must endure”.37 As opposed to 
the Wolfowitz team’s deliberations on the Chinese threat to American supremacy, this also 
took into account the actual interaction with China, especially in economic terms, that made 
policies similar to the American Soviet containment policies less realistic to implement, a 
modification that had been present since the Cold War rapprochement.  
The overall threat perceptions of the Department of Defense was re-evaluated, and a 
new “Defense Strategy for the 1990s: The Regional Defense Strategy” was published in 
January 1993. Here, the general intentions of “preclud[ing] any hostile power from 
dominating a region critical to our interests” were upheld, but the conceivable concrete threats 
to this objective were thought less imminent than in the 1992 draft.38 In this way, the 
emergence of great power threats to the U.S. was merely potential. Partly, such fears were in 
line with general Cold War sentiments, meaning that Pentagon now was looking for a 
possible new direct, monolithic threat to the United States.39 At the same time, these threats 
were not fully part of the Cold War monolithic threat perspective, as the evolution of such 
threats could also potentially be formed outside the Cold War framework of communist 
threats. 
Other more limited, but more concrete threats to American interests were firstly 
represented by the Iraqi aggression and occupation of Kuwait in August 1990. In 1989, the 
United States had perceived, along the lines of the Carter Doctrine, that “[a]ccess to Persian 
Gulf oil and the security of key friendly states in the area are vital to U.S. national security. 
The United States remains committed to defend its vital interests in the region, if necessary 
and appropriate through the use of U.S. military force, against the Soviet Union or any other 
regional power with interests inimical to our own”.40 Accordingly, the U.S. saw its national 
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interests threatened by the 1990 Iraqi invasion.41 Within the administration’s ideas of a “new 
world order”, and under UN mandate of supporting Kuwaiti self-defense, the Bush 
administration moved to counter the moves by Saddam Hussein. More generally, the Bush 
administration feared what they called “the nascent threats of power vacuums and regional 
instabilities”.42 Before leaving office, the administration asserted that in the post-Cold War 
era “global security is threatened by regional instabilities that we may have to confront”.43 
This meant that regional crises had evolved into centrally perceived threats for the 
administration, as part of a fledging new strategic outlook separate from the Cold War.  
In addition to such regional conflicts, the Bush administration faced internal crises and 
conflicts that more indirectly represented threats to the U.S. and its allies. One example was 
the humanitarian crisis in Somalia. Here, Bush gave U.S. troops a limited mandate of securing 
food transportations to the Somali people at a specific time, while further missions were 
considered the responsibility of UN peacekeeping forces.44 This indicated that the crisis was 
recognized as a threat in the post-Cold War world. Nonetheless, as the UN was identified as 
the proper organization for handling the crisis, the administration did not perceive the crisis a 
direct threat to the U.S., one that the U.S. needed to substantially engage in. 
Also, the internal instabilities as the state of Yugoslavia broke up after the end of the 
Cold War posed a similar challenge to the U.S., and especially because of the proximity, also 
to its European allies. NATO in 1991 endorsed that:  
Risks to Allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of Allies, 
but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, 
social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by 
many countries in central and eastern Europe [sic]. The tensions which may result, as long as they 
remain limited, should not directly threaten the security and territorial integrity of members of the 
Alliance. They could, however, lead to crises inimical to European stability and even to armed conflicts, 
which could involve outside powers or spill over into NATO countries, having a direct effect on the 
security of the Alliance.45 
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Thus, the allies felt that internal or regional instabilities and conflicts were relevant to their 
own security as the Soviet threat was retreating. By underlining the possible spill-over effects 
of such instabilities into broader European stability, the Balkan conflict was perceived as an 
indirect threat. As the conflict in the Balkans arose as the state of Yugoslavia broke up, it was 
also an internal conflict, rather than the state-to-state conflict seen in the Gulf War. The fact 
that the U.S. did not consider the conflict in Yugoslavia a direct threat to U.S. interest is 
supported by Steven Hurst.46 Hurst also underlines the administration’s insistence on having 
the European’s handle the conflict, as it was a conflict within Europe. But members of the 
administration after leaving office admitted that the possibility of European action in 
Yugoslavia was an excuse for American inaction, and did not mean that the U.S. could not 
have engaged if it wanted to.47 According to NSC staffer Philip Zelikow: “There was not 
much confusion in the government about whether we had a vital interest to defend the 
Balkans. There was a consensus on the top of the government […] that we did not”.48 As the 
administration did not respond to the Balkan conflict, and only to a limited degree took steps 
towards the Somalia crisis, the administration did not substantially include internal conflicts 
into its fledgling new strategic outlook.      
 In sum, American threat perceptions included remains from the Cold War and 
fledgling elements of new post-Cold War threats. The Soviet and Warsaw Pact threat had 
been perceived monolithically, and Cold War antagonism lingered on during the first half of 
the Bush presidency. But new threats, such as potential new great power threats; regional 
conflicts; and internal crises, were fragmented from one another. Principally, this meant that 
the U.S. administration did not perceive new threats within an interconnected framework as in 
the Cold War. Also, the conflicts arising were perceived as of different importance to the 
U.S., as they did not all relate to the same, monolithically perceived Soviet and communist 
threat.  
The observation of post-Cold War threats being fragmented from one another has also 
been made in a preface by David Halberstam.49 For Halberstam, it is a simple descriptive 
term. But within the discussion of this thesis, such fragmentation of U.S. threat perceptions 
can be built on to form an understanding of U.S. post-Cold War perceptions of strategic areas, 
allies and partners, as well as help place NATO’s role in overall U.S. strategy.  
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Strategic Areas, Allies and Partners  
With the inherently multilateral outlook of U.S. Cold War strategies, continuous elements 
made for a consistent interest in the West-European countries on a traditional basis. At the 
same time, the termination of the Warsaw Pact meant that Eastern European countries were 
now released from Soviet dominance. And new challenges around the world, separate from 
the Cold War, opened up to both regional partnerships and broader multilateralism through ad 
hoc coalitions and the UN, implying a fragmentation from the system of alliances within U.S. 
Cold War strategy.  
Generally, the Bush administration viewed international cooperation as a basis for 
foreign policy. The NSS of 1990 reflected this attitude unambiguously: “Our first priority in 
foreign policy remains solidarity with our allies and friends. […]. [To attempt to ‘go it alone’] 
would alter our way of life and national institutions and would jeopardize the very values we 
are seeking to protect.”50 But U.S. strategy is not stated as multilateral by strict principle, but 
only by choice and if suitable. The NSS reports state that the U.S. should act on its interests 
and objectives “whenever possible in concert with its allies”.51 This might be taken in defense 
of acting unilaterally if thought necessary, although preferably multilaterally. Still, the 
interests of international partners would be taken into account, as the strategies called for 
American decisions to be made on “terms favorable to the United States, its interests and its 
allies” and that the United States should “deter any aggression that could threaten the security 
of the United States and its allies”.52 In addition, the administration declared that the 
American commitment to a strategy of alliances would endure beyond the perception of a 
common Soviet threat,53 and accordingly declared more firmly an intent or more general 
interest in supporting, and having the support of, allies.54 
The interest in having allied support firstly relates to the American approach to its 
Cold War founded transatlantic relationship, and the position of Europe in American strategic 
thinking going into a new era. The continued American interest in diminishing Soviet, 
communist and Russian influence, and skepticism regarding Soviet/Russian intentions, at a 
time when the power of the Kremlin was reduced, proved that remains of a conventional Cold 
War interest and threat perspective facilitated continued NATO cohesion. But with the break-
up of the Soviet domination in Eastern Europe in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
itself in 1991, the original foundation for such cohesion was retreating. The Bush 
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administration admitted that the reduced intensity of the Soviet threat would have 
implications for the allies’ security concerns and ultimately the alliance’s strategy. The NSS 
of 1991 commented on this, as “differences among allies are likely to become more evident as 
the traditional concern for security that first brought them together diminishes in intensity”,55 
and that, “a key issue is how America’s role of alliance leader – and indeed our alliances 
themselves – will be affected, especially in Europe, by a reduced Soviet threat.”56 In this 
perspective, the administration saw challenges to a continued transatlantic relationship 
emerging with the Soviet threat reduced. None the less, the administration still believed in 
maintaining the American position in Europe, and thought that the U.S. shared moral values 
with its allies,57 values that could be built on to continue the transatlantic relationship.  
The administration assessed that “[w]hile Europe remains a central strategic arena, the 
Gulf Crisis reminded us how much our interests can be affected in other regions as well”.58 
Implicitly, while Europe and NATO remained central within the European dimension, the 
administration perceived that the U.S. had global interests that did not automatically include 
European interests in the same way as seen during the Cold War. The notion that Europe 
could take a greater share of the responsibility for securing Europe, also meant that American 
engagements might not include Europe, as illustrated by the lack of action by the Bush 
administration regarding the rising tensions after the break-up of Yugoslavia.  
American relations with Eastern Europe might change once the Cold War rivalry 
ended. Specifically, German re-unification within NATO structures was seen as pertinent, and 
as enhancing the stability of Europe.59 National Security Advisor Scowcroft underlined that it 
was important that the re-unified Germany did not become a neutral state.60 But even as re-
unification broadened the base of cooperation, the necessity of preventing German neutrality 
also underlined the presence of Cold War bloc thinking.61 The administration’s perception of 
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the necessity for transition in Eastern Europe also indicated that sentiments based on the Cold 
War experience persisted. 
To ensure such transition, the administration saw the possibility of building greater 
partnerships with Central and Eastern Europe. The Conference for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (CSCE) was seen as an instrument that would facilitate expanding American 
security interests eastwards. The NSS of 1991 called for the CSCE to “bring about 
reconciliation, security and democracy in a Europe whole and free”.62 In 1993, the 
administration stated CSCE before NATO in addressing institutions to confront new 
challenges, and underlined the Conference’s new role.63 NATO also declared that it was 
interested in building partnerships and friendships in Eastern Europe.64 A North Atlantic 
Cooperation Council (NACC) with former adversaries was set up in December 1991.  
Parts of the Bush administration also saw prospects for including Eastern European 
states in European economic and political cooperation,65 facilitating the gradual inclusion of 
Eastern Europe into Western cooperation, possibly even into NATO, and as a result expand 
the American strategic areas eastwards.66 American economic assistance to the newly 
independent states in the East of Europe would ease the progress of American influence in 
previously Soviet controlled areas. But it has also been argued that the U.S. economic 
response to the liberation of Eastern European was meager, and it did not in any way reach 
post-World War II Marshall Plan proportion.67 This indicates that the U.S. was only partially 
expanding American interest areas eastwards in Europe. The administration thought that the 
probability of formalizing a geographically broadened area of Western influence, at a moment 
when Eastern Europe was only just loosening its ties with its former Soviet suzerain, was 
hardly likely.68 The administration informally opened up for dialogue and limited cooperation 
eastwards,69 but did not engage in any formal relationships equaling the relationship the U.S. 
had with Western Europe.  
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 But other areas were seen interesting to the administration too. The memoir of Bush 
and Scowcroft focuses on the collapse of the Soviet Union, German re-unification, the 
protests in Tiananmen Square and the Gulf War.70 This thematic or geographic focus should 
be read as an indication of what the administration viewed as strategically important events, 
and areas of importance for their policy formulation. Consequently, other partners, institutions 
and associations were included in the Bush administration’s strategic approach, in addition to 
the transatlantic dimension.  
As in the Cold War, Asia was seen as strategically important to the Bush 
administration. The administration saw it as necessary to uphold partnerships in Asia in a 
changing security environment.71 Especially with regard to Japan, South Korea and the 
Philippines, the administration feared and wanted to prevent a transformation of policies in 
the region that would go from viewing the Soviet Union as a threat to becoming more of a 
partner.72 In such a perspective, remains of the Cold War pattern of thinking of alliances as 
confronting the Soviet Union were still present in a time of transformation.  
Even so, the “new world order” concept made different regions important on a more 
individual basis, rather than through the generic Cold War framework. For instance, in the 
NSS of 1991 the administration quoted King Fahd of Saudi Arabia when elaborating on the 
international commitments of the United States.73 Seemingly, this statement had no specific 
relationship with the preceding Cold War approach to alliances, but rather embedded 
elements of a new appraisal of allied relationships, inspired by the Gulf War. President Bush 
in this way commented that the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait was “wholly unrelated to the 
earlier patterns of the U.S.-Soviet relationship”.74 The U.S. saw it as necessary to sustain 
sound ties with central countries in Europe and Asia, allies and partners stemming from the 
period since 1945, as this was perceived “crucial to regional and even global stability.75 But 
as the Soviet threat diminished, and elements of a fledgling new strategy was articulated, 
allies in Asia were not automatically interlinked with the transatlantic dimension in the same 
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way that it had been during the Cold War. This meant that allies and partners were still 
considered important to the U.S., but now though a more fragmented, rather than generic 
approach. 
In terms of the strategic importance of areas outside the Eurasian landmass, a 
continent such as Africa had been the locality of superpower rivalry in the Cold War. But as 
the Cold War was retreating, the administration came to view Sub-Saharan Africa as of 
reduced military significance.76 The reason was thought to be the new international realities 
after the Gulf War, and the lessened influence of socialist ideologies in this region,77 which 
underlined elements of a new post-Cold War approach to different geographical areas, where 
the decline of global communism meant that all areas was not perceived as of automatic 
strategic interest to the U.S. Indicatively, the Somalia engagement at the end of the Bush 
presidency was perceived as a humanitarian effort, and not as a matter of war and peace.  
On a global scale, the decline of the Cold War meant that the “new world order” might 
also include large multilateral coalitions, resembling ad hoc assemblies as in the Gulf War. 
The DoD draft of 1992 asserted that: “Like [the Gulf War] coalition, we should expect future 
coalitions to be ad hoc assemblies in many cases carrying only general agreement over the 
objectives to be accomplished”.78 Cooperation in this case was broad and included former 
adversaries, i.e. the Soviet Union, a remarkable break with the Cold War alliance structure. 
Still, such cooperation did not make all contributing countries in the coalition permanent 
allies or partners to the U.S. Overall, UN missions were limited to humanitarian engagements 
during the Bush presidency, and the coalition assembled in the Gulf War did not repeat 
itself.79 This implied that the U.S. approach to cooperation did not become fully global, but 
that new patterns of international cooperation were present.   
Put together, more or less the same regions of the world were considered of primary 
strategic interest to the United States immediately after, as during, the Cold War. Elements of 
Cold War thinking provided for continuity in American approaches to its allies and partners. 
Particularly Western Europe, and to a limited degree also Eastern Europe, as well as Asia 
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were perceived important. Still, as new strategic thinking appeared within the administration, 
the overall Cold War structure of alliances started to fragment. The administration perceived 
that the retreat of Cold War rivalry meant that areas more peripheral to the U.S. would not 
necessarily be as interesting as before. In this way, U.S. strategic interests in different regions 
of the world were increasingly made on the region’s individual merit, and not as part of the 
complete global outlook of the U.S.  
David Lake and Patrick Morgan have edited a book discussing the increasingly 
regional nature of the international environment after the end of the Cold War, exploring the 
theoretical and tentative nature of such a system.80 For the sake of this thesis, such an 
observation of regionalism supports the argument of fragmented threat perceptions, which 
imply a more fragmented U.S. outlook when it came to strategic areas, allies and partners. In 
such a way, by seeing threats and areas increasingly fragmented from one another, the U.S. 
preoccupation with regions other than Europe, as in the Gulf War, was not automatically part 
of the overall security concept that included the transatlantic allies. With the disappearance of 
the Iron Curtain, events in Europe affected U.S. interests there, but it did not necessarily 
affect the global strategic outlook of the U.S.81 Thus, the transatlantic relationship seemed to 
decline in global relevance in the new era, while NATO was continued into the post-Cold 
War American security strategies, along with, but more or less separate from other regional 
partners of the United States. 
 
Strategic Thinking and Implementation  
In relation to these interests, perception of threats, and assessment of strategic areas, allies and 
partners, the administration formed a strategic outlook on global security and appraisals of the 
role of NATO in it. During the Bush presidency, the Cold War strategy of containment and 
deterrence was to some extent upheld through policies aimed at limiting the influence of the 
Cold War adversary. This made for a continuation of elements of NATO’s Cold War role. 
Gradually, the idea of a “new world order” also formed elements of a new U.S. strategic 
outlook in the post-Cold War world. Even though such a strategic idea was only to a limited 
degree implemented, it embedded elements of a fledgling strategy of engagement, on a state-
to-state basis. For NATO, there existed parallel deliberations on a new role. 
Overall, the Bush administration’s strategic thinking and implementation reflected a 
cautious approach to a strategic environment that was rapidly changing. Concretely, in terms 
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of strategies towards the Soviet and emerging Russian state, this meant that the strategy of 
containment and deterrence, practiced in various forms during the Cold War, now was 
transformed to try to fit the new realities of Soviet perestroika and glasnost. Bush and his 
foreign policy team supported the hard line policies of its Reagan predecessors, and saw the 
1980s arms race as the reason for Soviet demise.82 Even though Gorbachev’s “new thinking” 
by an objective stance had eased the Soviet threat, the actual reaction to steps taken by the 
Kremlin embodied great skepticism, and American responses to the Soviets resembled to a 
substantial degree Cold War reaction patterns.  
A practical example of such a variation and transformation of the strategies of 
containment and deterrence was American attempts at gaining the initiative on force 
reductions, to make the West win what was thought of as the “propaganda war”, and  make 
sure that reductions on the European continent were made to the strategic advantage of the 
U.S. and NATO. National Security Advisor Scowcroft initiated plans to withdraw both Soviet 
and U.S. ground forces in Central Europe. The intended result was to reduce the presence of 
Soviet forces in this area, and also improve the balance in favor of the West, as NATO 
without its U.S. troops was thought better off than the Warsaw pact without Soviet troops.83 
Such a continuation and adaptation of Cold War strategies had a potentially conserving effect 
in terms of NATO, as the sustained East-West strategic framework meant that the alliance 
might be cohered on its traditional foundation.  
On the other hand, there was also divergence between the allies on how to implement 
policies towards the Soviet Union. For example, when it came to the U.S. position on having 
conventional force reductions precede potential nuclear reductions, the position of the West 
German Chancellor Helmut Kohl was opposed to that of the U.S. and Britain.84 While the 
Americans saw the nuclear balance in Europe as favorable to the Western allies, and 
supportive of the primary interests of the U.S., Kohl wanted to reduce the alliance’s 
dependency on a nuclear strategy. Still, disagreement within the alliance on the 
implementation of strategy did not necessarily depart from Cold War alliance realities. 
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The administration and NATO proceeded with the negotiations on conventional forces 
in Europe (CFE), where they initiated cuts of 5-10 percent for the transatlantic community, 
and over 50 per cent of the Warsaw Pact totals, to equalize the forces of the alliances.85 As 
the Warsaw Pact agreed to the proposal, and even suggested deeper cuts, the Bush 
administration was criticized for having maintained too much of a Cold War approach to the 
Soviet Union and for being on the defensive, rather than the intended offensive. In sum, this 
was thought of as a manifestation of an alliance that lacked a new strategic vision.86  
                                                
But the administration also stated that its strategic outlook needed to move “beyond 
containment”.87 The administration indicated that the U.S. would seek to integrate the Soviet 
Union, and would be committed to match the Soviet moves towards greater openness.88 In 
this way, the administration attempted to cooperate with the former adversary, as in the 
examples of the Gulf War and the cooperation seen in Europe through CSCE and NACC. 
Such political engagement across the former lines of the Iron Curtain implied the fledgling 
appearance of new strategic elements. At the same time, skepticism lingered on, and threat 
perceptions of the Soviet and Russian state remained present in parallel to such new features. 
In this way, the strategy of the Bush presidency towards its former adversary became more of 
a new variety of the strategies of containment and deterrence, than a true strategy “beyond 
containment”.  
This meant that the Cold War role of NATO to some degree persisted. At a London 
summit in 1990, the NATO members joined hands in agreeing to carry the organization 
beyond the fall of Soviet domination in Eastern Europe, although such a new strategic 
concept would perhaps not have a focal point equivalent to the Cold War threat of the Soviet 
Union.89 While acknowledging the need for transformation, the Cold War foundation of the 
alliance was still visible. The Bush administration was apparently interested in revising 
NATO’s mission for two reasons. Firstly, it was necessary to revise the alliance mandate to 
convince the American people that it was still in United States national interests to continue 
sizeable expenditures and military deployment in Europe. And secondly, it was thought 
relevant to “demonstrate to Moscow that the alliance was no longer the menace they had 
preached to their people for forty years”.90 In this way, both stated motivations were 
compatible with a transformed Cold War approach; the first as NATO would continue to 
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provide a framework for U.S. deployments in Europe; and the second, that NATO, although 
adapting, remained somewhat skeptical of Soviet perceptions of the West. Bush would lead 
the alliance, and the prime concern of the Bush administration, as well as of the allies, was to 
preserve the American link to European security.91 Furthermore, in the actual declaration of a 
new post-Cold War NATO strategy, the NATO members still feared “the fact that the 
conventional forces [of the Soviet Union] and its large nuclear arsenal [is] comparably only 
with that of the United States.” They thought that “[t]hese capabilities have to be taken into 
account if stability and security in Europe are to be preserved”.92 Indicatively, the allies still 
perceived a need for American security guaranties against the reformed Soviet Union, and 
they remained skeptical with regard to Soviet intentions and potentials. In this way, the 
continuation of elements of the East-West framework had as consequence that the alliance’s 
founding role could be sustained.  
But as the superpower rivalry was diminishing, and new types of threats appeared on 
the administration’s agenda, new strategic elements also formed within the administration. 
The concept of the “new world order” was publicly presented by President Bush on 
September 11, 1990.93 Ideas included multilateral decision making, the stated possibilities of 
U.S.-Soviet cooperation, and a bolstering of the UN, made possible by the end of the Cold 
War and its decades of a divided Security Council.94  American objectives for such an order 
were intended to contribute to international security and stability after the fall of the bipolar 
structure of the Cold War.  
As central aspects of the administration’s strategy, the 1991 NSS outlined strategic 
deterrence; forward presence in key areas; crisis response; and retaining the national capacity 
to reconstitute forces if needed.95  Here, deterrence and the need to maintain capacity to 
reconstitute forces, continued to underline Bush’s variation of previous strategies of 
countering a clear adversary as in the Cold War. The retained forward presence in critical 
areas was also based on the U.S. stationing of troops in the Cold War. But it also meant that 
the administration emphasized forward engagement in military terms, as well as the political 
maintenance of allies and partners, as part of strategies for the future. And especially, as the 
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administration came to recognize the presence of regional conflicts as “the predominant 
military threat we will face in the future”,96 the need to respond to appearing crises meant that 
the administration saw military engagement as a strategic response to new threats. Such 
perceived new elements of strategy were fundamentally linked to the Gulf War experience, 
and thus also mirrored aspects from the idea of conflict resolution in a “new world order”.  
By the time the administration was leaving office in January 1993, the NSS stated that 
the administration formed policies through “a strategy of engagement and leadership”. In this 
way, the administration suggested a label in some ways similar to the argument made here 
about the administration; that the Bush team at the end of its presidency included possible 
new responses into its strategic outlook. Simultaneously, the administration continued to see 
deterrence as the point of departure for its strategy. But the administration opened up for 
engagement in the form of crisis response if deterrence failed. In such cases, if military 
engagement was to be implemented, the response was to be dependent “on the interests at 
stake, our commitments to the nations involved, the level of sophistication of the threat, and 
on the capabilities of U.S. and allied forces”.97  
While such strategic thinking might have opened up for U.S. and allied engagements 
as response to humanitarian crises, the administration was wary of such a development. 
Especially the DoD and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell rejected potential 
strategies that “had a humanitarian role that might be poorly thought out, too open-ended and 
might somehow draw the country into an unwanted combat commitment”.98 This was 
consistent with general mission guidelines known as the Powell Doctrine, that implied 
engagement only upon threats to vital American national interests, where a clear-cut exit 
strategy was to be in place before engaging, and the operation itself was to be performed 
efficiently, taking advantage of massive American military power. The doctrine also reflected 
the Vietnam experience, which explained the military’s reluctance to force commitments.99 
The Vietnam experience also influenced the administration in the decision not to topple the 
Iraqi regime in the Gulf War, and thus deterred the administration from engaging in what was 
perceived as possibly a long and bloody civil war.100 Interrelated, the fear of casualties in the 
post-Cold War era was increasing subsequently to extensive media coverage.101  
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Accordingly, American engagements in the “new world order” did not substantially 
include internal conflicts and crises. Such indirect threats to U.S. security did not come within 
the confines of the Powell Doctrine’s emphasis on threats to vital U.S. interests. The Somalia 
engagement was by the Bush administration perceived as purely providing humanitarian aid, 
and not as an engagement aiming at conflict resolution. Bush commented that the escalation 
of the engagement under Clinton, which led to the American defeat and loss of life and 
equipment, was a mistake, a so-called “mission creep”.102 Closer to the transatlantic 
dimension, in the former Yugoslavia, the administration also chose not to engage. Secretary 
of State Baker pronounced it as: “We don’t have a dog in that fight”.103 The internal 
perception was that “[s]tarting with the President himself, there was no support at the top of 
any [government] agency for using force in Yugoslavia.104 The Bush administration did not 
see it likely that the U.S. should get involved.105   
In this way, only the Gulf crisis substantially conformed to the ideas presented in the 
“new world order”, and in the planning for crisis response as seen in the NSSs. Consequently, 
the administration’s prospects for military engagement were confined to state-to-state regional 
conflicts. The (non-)responses to new threats represented by internal conflicts and crises 
showed that the administration did not implement a fully new concept of national security 
strategy engaging against all new types of threats. According to Scowcroft,   
the new world order was intended as a framework for dealing with international conflicts. It was not 
seen as a completely new and comprehensive strategy. To the administration, it did not seem necessary 
to develop a new strategy as the Cold War threat dissolved. The new world order was rather a 
framework for dealing with state-to-state conflicts, through the UN Security Council, as the Cold War 
deadlock in the UN was overcome.106  
 
According to Andrew J. Bacevich, the Bush administration “made little effort even to 
try [to articulate a new rationale for U.S. strategy]”.107 Others have pointed out that Bush was 
uncomfortable with “the vision thing”.108 Contrastively, Earl Ravenal states that the Bush 
administration instituted real and far reaching changes to U.S. national security; that the “new 
world order” represented a new strategy of collective security, transcending Cold War 
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strategies.109 The argument presented here asserts that the strategies of the Bush 
administration included variations of previous strategies, at the same time that fledgling 
elements of engaging against new types of threats were present. The persistent skepticism 
when it came to the Soviet and Russian state, and the limited response to internal crises meant 
that the strategy of the administration was not fully worked out, and did not represent an all-
out new strategy of collective security, as in Ravenal’s term. Some ideas of containment were 
still present, deterrence continued to be a basis of strategy, but fledgling elements of a 
strategy of engagement were visible.  
In terms of NATO, the Bush administration’s focus on the Soviet Union and Russia, as 
well as the integration of re-unified Germany into allied structures and the maintenance of the 
American role of international and transatlantic leadership, implied that the organization had 
cohesive prospects based on its Cold War role, as commented above. At the same time Bush 
also wanted to expand the role of NATO.110 The administration believed that the U.S. and its 
allies needed to reflect on how they should respond to a new security agenda within the 
framework of the moral and political values they asserted they continued to share.111 “NATO 
confined to its traditional role – defense against a massive Soviet attack on Western Europe [- 
…] was precisely what we did not want”.112 Bush deemed that NATO “will be guaranteeing 
against instability, […] [i]ts role will be different, [and] [t]he organization must be 
flexible”.113  
The NATO strategic concept of 1991, while discussing the remains of the Soviet 
threat, had also commented on broader threats to NATO’s security, as seen in the section on 
the perceptions of threats. Hence, the transatlantic allies declared a general intention to 
broaden its traditional outlook in countering new threats to their national security, especially 
the prospects for regional instability in Europe. Furthermore, the ASC stated that it needed to 
be aware of the global context, and that:   
The stability and peace of the countries on the southern periphery of Europe are important for the 
security of the Alliance, as the 1991 Gulf war has shown. This is all the more so because of the build-up 
of military power and the proliferation of weapons technologies in the area, including weapons of mass 
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destruction and ballistic missiles capable of reaching the territory of some member states of the 
Alliance.114  
 
This implied that the alliance also recognized possible new threats from outside Europe, but 
that the basis for such concern was how this would affect the territorial security of the NATO 
member states.  
Before the completion of the ASC, Secretary of State Baker also elaborated on 
NATO’s post-Cold War role:  
NATO will continue to play an important role in ensuring strategic stability and predictability in Europe 
– West and East – but NATO must also evolve to assume new missions.  As a political alliance, NATO 
offers a cohesive structure that can help address old and new European animosities and fears – outside 
and inside NATO. As a security alliance among 16 like-minded democracies, NATO should consider 
how it might facilitate collective action against non-traditional threats – such as proliferation and 
regional conflicts.  As a political and a security alliance, NATO can assist in the verification of arms 
control and security agreements to the benefit of all Europeans.115 
 
In retrospect, this seems like a more determined and broad statement of a new NATO role, 
made as early as February 1990. The statement opened up for possible allied action, in 
countering proliferation and regional conflicts. While the alliance recognized such possible 
threats to the alliance, Baker also dealt with allied responses, how NATO should consider 
how it could possibly act in new missions. Still, around the same time, President Bush spoke 
of priorities for the future NATO role in more moderate terms. He underlined NATO’s 
political role; conventional arms control; negotiations on nuclear weapons in an East-West 
dimension; and a strengthening of the CSCE.116 Baker also later commented on NATO in 
such terms, underlining the alliance’s present and future role as a traditional military alliance 
and as a forum for political consultation on Europe.117 NATO revisions being on the drawing 
board, U.S. ambassador to NATO Taft internally proposed that the U.S. approach should be 
flexible, “less with the goal of a single grand strategy paper than a series of conclusions and 
milestones towards the ‘new’ strategy NATO is evolving”.118  
                                                 
114 ASC 1991: paragraph 11.   
115 James Baker, “From Revolution to Democracy: Central and Eastern Europe in the New Europe”, prepared 
address at Charles University, Prague, Czechoslovakia (1990-02-07), U.S. Department of State Dispatch (vol. 1, 
no. 1, 1990). Available at: http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dispatch/1990/html/Dispatchv1no01.html 
[online 2008-03-27].  
116 George H. W. Bush, ”NATO and the U.S. Commitment to Europe”, address at the Oklahoma State University 
commencement (1990-05-04), U.S. Department of State Dispatch, vol. 1, no. 1, 1990. Available at: 
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dispatch/1990/html/Dispatchv1no01.html [online 2008-03-27].  
117 James Baker, ”The Common European Interest: America and the New Politics Among Nations”, address 
before the National Committee on American Foreign Policy (1990-05-14), U.S. Department of State Dispatch, 
(vol. 1, no. 1, 1990). Available at: 
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dispatch/1990/html/Dispatchv1no01.html [online 2008-03-27].  
118 U.S. mission NATO, “The London Summit and Next Steps” (1990-05-00b), personal from Ambassador Taft, 
to State for Bartholomew, Seitz, Zoellick and Ross; Defense for Wolfowitz and Hadley; NSC for Scowcroft and 
Blackwill, declassified 1997-05-29. Available at: http://foia.state.gov/documents/FOIADocs/000053E8.pdf 
[online 2008-04-05].  
59 
In terms of the possible implementation of a new role, the above discussion has argued 
that the Gulf War represented the only substantial implementation of fledgling new U.S. 
strategies. Concerning NATO, the position of Philip Zelikow, serving at the NSC in 1989-
1991, is that it is possible to argue that the Gulf War had implications for the future role of 
NATO, as a beginning of the “out of area” discussion, even though it was improvised in 
practical terms, and implemented by a U.S. led ad hoc coalition. As members of the alliance 
engaged against new types of threats in the Persian Gulf, it influenced their security outlook, 
and could potentially result in a new approach also within NATO.119 In line with such a 
perspective, the ASC also commented on the Gulf War, and how it affected the security of the 
southern periphery of Europe.   
 On the other hand, fledgling new engagement strategies of the U.S. were implemented 
through other forums than NATO. The Gulf War was implemented through a U.S.-led ad hoc 
coalition under UN mandate. While the individual contributions of NATO member countries 
were underlined by the administration, the actual organization was not the active player in the 
engagement.120 NATO was not developed as an adequate organization for such a mission.121 
NATO was thus at the overall level separate from the U.S. military engagement in a new era. 
NATO did function as a forum of consultation between the allies, and provided support to 
Turkey, as a neighboring state to the region. This implied that the alliance recognized a new 
conflict different from the Cold War, but that it did not alter the practical role of the alliance. 
It still centered on defending the territory of its member states, in this case Turkey, and 
continued to provide a consultative forum for its member states on security issues.  
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120 View supported by the North Atlantic Council, “North Atlantic Council Texts”, texts released at the NAC 
ministerial meeting (1991-06-07),U.S. Department of State Dispatch (vol. 2., no. 24, 1991). Available at: 
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dispatch/1991/html/Dispatchv2no24.html [online 2008-03-28].  
121 Hermann-Josef Rupieper, ”After the Cold War: The United States, Germany, and European Security”, in 
Michael J. Hogan, The End of the Cold War: Its Meanings and Implications (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1992): 183. Also confirmed as the administration’s view, in interview Scowcroft 2007.  
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The European states felt that their roles had been marginalized next to the Americans 
in the Gulf War.122 Scowcroft stated that the implementation of policies through the UN in 
the Gulf War implied a reduced practical importance of NATO at the time.123 In this way, 
NATO’s role seemed partially fragmented from the new U.S. strategic elements represented 
by the Gulf War engagement, as new strategic responses were formed outside the Cold War 
structure of alliances.  
In terms of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, NATO could potentially have 
obtained a new engagement role here. But the Bush administration’s reluctance to engage 
implied that the possible role for NATO in countering conflicts in Europe did not become 
realized during the Bush presidency. Also in this conflict, the allies could consult through 
NATO. But actual policies to counter the crisis were formed elsewhere, with the Europeans 
and the UN.124 Consequently, NATO, starting in 1992, backed the UN mission.125 In internal 
documents the Bush administration stated that it wanted the UN to have the leading role in the 
conflict, and that NATO was only to consider how it should support the UN.126 In this way, 
the Bush administration considered that “NATO's infrastructure, resources, and operational 
experience are well suited to support peace-keeping efforts that may be sanctioned by CSCE 
or the United Nations in the future” in Europe.127 Still, peacekeeping was not specifically 
seen as related to NATO’s role, but rather within a broader CSCE or UN perspective. U.S. 
and allied policies towards the former Yugoslavia did not implement a new role for NATO, 
but made the allies deliberate on how new threats affected the security of the alliance, and 
more principally or theoretically review how it could participate and engage in handling post-
Cold War challenges to the alliance.  
                                                
NATO’s practical role in the period was fundamentally built on its Cold war 
foundation. Brent Scowcroft in retrospect has concluded that NATO was still seen within its 
Cold War role during the Bush presidency.128 But the administration also asserted that it 
 
122 Halberstam 2003: 87. 
123 Interview Scowcroft 2007.  
124 See for instance James Baker, ”NAAC Intervention”, intervention at the North Atlantic Cooperation Council 
(NACC) ministerial meeting (1992-03-10), U.S. Department of State Dispatch (vol. 3, no. 11, 1992). Available 
at: http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dispatch/1992/html/Dispatchv3no11.html [online 2008-03-28].  
125 For detail see Frantzen 2005: 66.  
126 Department of State, ”August 25 NAC: Guidance on ‘Yugoslavia’” (1992-08-00), from Secretary of State, to 
all NATO post, American Embassy in Belgrade, American Consul in Zagreb, U.S. UN Mission, confidential, 
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127 James Baker 1992-03-10, U.S. Department of State Dispatch. See also James Baker, ”US-Russian Summit: 
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wanted the alliance to transform. In principle, the allies recognized the existence of new types 
of threats the alliance might have to deal with, vaguely opening for broader assignments than 
its previous concentration on deterring state-to-state aggression towards its territory. But as 
the U.S. implemented fledgling engagement strategies in the Gulf War, it did not substantially 
include NATO. In addition, NATO did not obtain a role in handling the conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia. For the future, the allies had agreed to commence transformation, in which 
engagements to respond to new conflicts was one possible way ahead. But the exact content 
of a future role remained on the drawing board.  
 
Conclusions 
The Bush administration’s strategies reflected the maintenance of previous skepticism 
towards the Cold War adversary, at the same time that the administration identified the need 
for responding to a new threat of regional conflict through military engagement, representing 
fledgling elements of a new U.S. strategy. The tensions between old and new security 
conceptions underlined the administration’s fundamental inclination to ensuring stability in a 
time of major international transformation, all happening within the four year period of its 
presidency. Instability in areas geographically close to the transatlantic community seemed to 
represent a new potential threat for the U.S. and the NATO alliance. But the U.S. only 
substantially engaged against the Iraqi aggression in Kuwait, and chose to stay out of broader 
missions in for instance Somalia and the former Yugoslavia. Accordingly, the 
administration’s engagement strategy was implemented in a fledgling manner, an seen within 
a regional state-to-state perspective.  
NATO followed the course of the American strategy, as its traditional position was 
sustained to some degree, while it also opened up for a new broader role. As the Gulf War 
was fought through a multilateral ad hoc collation, NATO did not have an integral role in the 
elements representing the Bush administration’s fledgling post-Cold War strategy, but did so 
in the strategic elements that represented continuity from the Cold War past. Consequently, 
the practical role of NATO beyond the Cold War was limited to its political aspects and the 
continued defense of the member states’ territory. Nonetheless, the Bush administration’s 
strategic deliberations provided a foundation for a new post-Cold War American strategy and 
NATO role, in what would become the succeeding Clinton presidency’s restrained strategy of 
engagement, and a NATO “out of area”.  
CHAPTER IV  
 
A RESTRAINED STRATEGY OF ENGAGEMENT  
 
THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIES OF THE UNITED STATES  
DURING THE PRESIDENCY OF WILLIAM J. CLINTON  
AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ROLE OF NATO 
 
 
“[W]e have an unprecedented opportunity to make our nation safer and more prosperous. […] 
At the same time, the dangers we face are unprecedented in their complexity.”1 
 
Introduction 
During the period of the presidency of William Jefferson Clinton, from January 1993 to 
January 2001, the United States was confronted with a broad set of post-Cold War 
transformations and challenges. The above quote underlines the novelty and complexity of 
these concerns, at a time where the U.S. was in an unrivalled superpower position. The 
internal conflict in the former Yugoslavia escalated. In 1995, NATO, acting on behalf of the 
UN, intervened in the Bosnia crisis. In 1999, NATO forces intervened in Kosovo. NATO also 
started an enlargement process from 1994 onwards. The alliance was expanded eastwards, as 
Poland, Hungary and the Check Republic formally became members in 1999. The 
transatlantic community also set up a Partnership for Peace program in 1994 with the former 
members of the Warsaw Pact, including Russia, as well as Sweden and Finland. The U.S. was 
also confronted by security issues in other regions than Europe. The Somalia mission was 
inherited from the former administration, and the U.S. withdrew in 1994. A massive ethnic 
conflict in Rwanda continued without international interference. The U.S. was also concerned 
with nations as Iraq, Iran and North Korea, so-called rogue states, especially in terms of 
possible proliferation on weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Lastly, limited instances of 
international terrorism hit U.S. targets during the 1990s. 
 The previous chapter argued that the G. H. W. Bush administration partly retained in a 
Cold War perspective, but that elements of an engagement strategy in a state-to-state regional 
conflict did form a fledgling new outlook. Still, NATO was not an integrated part of the Gulf 
War mission, and NATO’s practical role to a large extent remained based on its Cold War 
                                                 
1 NSS 1997: 1-2.  
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foundation. The present chapter, with the broad and multiple challenges outlined above, 
argues that a post-Cold War U.S. strategy became more clearly fleshed out and implemented 
during the subsequent eight years of the Clinton presidency. Firstly, what can be characterized 
as restrained strategies of engagement were seen in the responses to the internal crises in 
Somalia and the Balkans. Also the Partnership and enlargement processes indicated that the 
administration politically engaged eastwards in Europe. U.S. strategy was also added with 
planning and limited implementation of military engagement towards rogue states and WMD 
proliferation. The U.S. remained interested in the transatlantic alliance within Europe. But as 
threats were perceived fragmented from one another, the transatlantic framework was in 
practice separated from U.S. strategy when it came to challenges outside the broader 
transatlantic area. NATO obtained a new role in engagements “out of area” through the 
Bosnia and Kosovo conflicts. The new role did not extend beyond Europe, although it is 
possible to spot elements of more global thinking at the end of the Clinton presidency. 
In accordance with the conceptual framework of the thesis, the following sections 
address U.S. interests and objectives; perception of threats; assessments of strategic areas, 
allies and partners; in addition to the strategic thinking and implementation of the Clinton 
presidency.  
 
Interests and Objectives 
Overall, the Clinton presidency identified three key national security interests. These were 
stated as the objectives of enhancing U.S. security; ensuring economic strength; and 
promoting democracy abroad.2 Concretely, these objectives became expressed as interests in 
upholding the American power and leadership position in both transatlantic and global affairs. 
Interlinked, the administration’s had a more indirect interest in preventing the escalation of 
internal conflicts. Combined, these interests supported the gradual evolution of restrained 
engagement strategies.   
The campaign and beginning of the Clinton presidency underlined a domestic focus on 
the national economy, which became the initial priority of the administration. By contrast, G. 
H. W. Bush’s political focus had been on the international sphere, on the end of the Cold War, 
the future of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War, and domestic issues had not extensively 
influenced the formation of national security policies.3 But at this point, domestic issues were 
foremost on the American public’s mind. With the Cold War resolved, Americans expected a 
                                                 
2 Recurring aspects of Clinton’s seven National Security Strategy (NSS) reports. NSS 1994; NSS 1995; NSS 
1996; NSS 1997; NSS 1998; NSS 1999; NSS 2000.  
3 See chapter III, but also Ivo H. Daalder and I. M. Dresler 1999-04-29: 20.  
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U.S. focus and resources to be directed more inwards. The stagnant economy with a large 
federal budget and foreign trade deficit caused more traditional security issues to drop on the 
political agenda. The United States no longer faced a monolithic threat such as that of the 
communist Soviet Union. This did not mean that U.S. national security became irrelevant to 
the administration or was ignored. Rather, the post-Cold War international climate, combined 
with pressing domestic issues, made for a, strategically speaking, less urgent context. Still, the 
administration acknowledged the interdependence between its interests in its economic 
position and its broader strategic position, as well as the interconnection between domestic 
and international issues:  
[Our strategy] is premised on a belief that the line between our domestic and foreign policies are 
disappearing – that we must revitalize our economy if we are to sustain our military forces, foreign 
initiatives and global influence, and that we must engage actively abroad if we are to open foreign 
markets and create jobs for our people.4 
 
Consequently, in the international sphere, the administration saw it as of U.S. national 
interest to promote open economies.5 Also the encouragement of democratic ideas was seen 
as a national security interest. In addition to enhancing the possibilities of international 
cooperation, both in trade and political arrangements, broadening such values was seen as 
likely to make the world safer.6 Interests in market economy and democracy represented a 
“constant” in American foreign policies, also prominent during the Cold War and the previous 
Bush presidency. For the Clinton administration, these values and ideas were considered to be 
of special strategic importance. Nonetheless, the intention to promote democracy and market 
economy was pragmatic rather than dogmatic. The administration intended and wanted to 
broaden its influence, but did not do so entirely globally and would not employ any means to 
do so. Such values and interests were promoted by cooperation and diplomacy, and were not 
to be forced on anyone. Democracy and market economy were not seen as issues of war and 
peace. Rather, they were perceived as basic objectives generally preferable to U.S. and allied 
safety, but in practice subordinated when faced with international emergencies that put other 
interests at stake.   
In practical matters, the interest in promoting such values were especially linked to the 
areas opened to liberal influence by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the 
                                                 
4 NSS 1995: i.  
5 An economic focus in the NSS reports indicated that both national and international economic issues were seen 
more integrated with security issues in the post-Cold War international situation. For a more theoretical 
discussion of the wider nature of the foreign policy agenda since the 1980s, see Mark Webber and Michael 
Smith, Foreign Policy in a Transformed World (Essex, United Kingdom: Pearson Education 2002): 9-28. The 
thesis acknowledges the interconnectedness between economic aspects and security policies, but highlight 
political-military aspects, particularly decisions on the use of force.  
6 NSS 1995: 2.  
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Soviet Union. Here, the administration underlined democracy as the way to ensure a “Europe 
whole and free”.7 According to political scientist James Goldgeier, reform in Russia was 
President Clinton’s primary national security objective.8 Through the Partnership for Peace 
agreement also signed by Russia, the NATO allies thus partly integrated the former adversary 
of the Cold War into cooperative arrangements. In this way, promoting democratic and 
economic cooperation with Central and Eastern Europe underlined the allied interest in 
making sure the former rivalry would not recur. Rhetorically, such objectives were anchored 
in a general idea of the positive aspects of promoting democracy and economic liberalization. 
According to second term Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, enlargement was in the 
strategic interest of the U.S. as it would make the U.S. safer by increasing the area in Europe 
where wars did not happen; the prospects for NATO membership would give aspiring 
members an incentive to ensure its democratic progress; and thirdly, that it would make 
NATO itself stronger and more cohesive.9 Implicitly, an integration of areas formerly hostile 
to the U.S. would also increase the American geopolitical leverage and leadership position in 
the region.  
Accordingly, these interests were related to a general interest in ensuring that the U.S. 
maintained the lead across the Atlantic and in the formation of Europe’s future development. 
The administration assured that “[t]he strong leadership role that the United States plays [in 
Europe] continues to promote and protect the vital national security interests of the United 
States”.10 The importance of U.S. transatlantic leadership was also important when it came to 
the evolution within Western Europeet . The evolution of EU military capabilities was viewed 
favorably, although Clinton stressed that such capabilities would be integrated with the U.S. 
through the transatlantic alliance.11 
 While broadening Western ideas and leadership to the whole of Europe, the 
administration saw U.S. interests in providing more global leadership too. As Bush, so also 
Clinton based this commitment to a fear of returning to equivalent problems of the interwar 
years of American isolationism.12 “The Cold War may be over, but the need for American 
                                                 
7 Interview Lake 2007.  
8 Goldgeier 1999: 160. See also the following section on threat perceptions concerning Russia.  
9 Madeleine Albright, “NATO Enlargement: Advancing America’s Strategic Interest”, opening statement before 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (1998-02-24), U.S. Department of State Dispatch (March 1998). 
Available at: http://www.state.gov/www/publications/dispatch/March1998.pdf [online 2008-04-10].  
10 Walter B. Slocombe [Undersecretary of Defense for Policy], in “The U.S. National Security Implications of 
the 1999 NATO Strategic Concept”, hearing before the Committee on Armed Services (1999-10-28). Library of 
Congress: Y4.AR5/3:S.HRG.106-840.  
11 Interview Lake 2007.  
12 NSS 1995: iii.  
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leadership abroad remains as strong as ever.”13 American leadership was seen as conducive to 
make the U.S. “safer and more prosperous – by deterring aggression, fostering the resolution 
of conflicts, opening foreign markets, strengthening democracies, and tackling global 
problems. Without our leadership and engagement, threats would multiply and our 
opportunities would narrow.”14 
The Clinton administration also recognized the primary global position of the U.S. in 
the post-Cold War era, and wanted to uphold that position.  With the Cold War definitely 
over, the administration from the onset asserted that “[w]e stand as the world’s preeminent 
power”.15 Later, it declared that the U.S. “must always retain our diplomatic, technological, 
industrial and military capabilities” to defend its global interests.16 Accordingly, the 
administration saw a general interest in upholding a unipolar, or unrivalled, position. Included 
in such an appraisal was the assessment of the diplomatic, economic and military power of the 
United States.17  
More indirectly, the administration saw an interest in preventing the escalation of 
internal conflicts. With regard to the conflict in the Balkans, Clinton in 1994 stated that:  
We have an interest in showing that NATO, history's greatest military alliance, remains a credible force 
for peace in post-Cold War Europe. We have an interest in stemming the destabilizing flows of refugees 
that this horrible conflict is creating.  And we clearly have a humanitarian interest in helping prevent the 
strangulation of Sarajevo and the continuing slaughter of innocents in Bosnia. These interests do not 
justify unilateral American intervention in the crisis, but they do justify the involvement of America and 
exercise of our leadership.18  
 
This meant that an internal conflict in itself did not necessarily directly involve the interests of 
the U.S., which would make unilateral action seem necessary to the administration. But as 
such a conflict had implications for the stability of regions important to the U.S.; the NATO 
alliance; and the credibility of the position and leadership of the U.S., U.S. interests were 
indirectly involved. In this way, the overall U.S. interest in a leadership position implied that 
it was an indirect interest of the U.S. to handle internal conflicts that were seen as having a 
substantial affect on such a position. 
In sum, the administration saw an interest in including broader parts of the world into 
democratic and market economic systems, especially with regard to Central and Eastern 
Europe. The administration intended to maintain the primary American position and 
                                                 
13 NSS 1995: iii.  
14 NSS 1997: 5. Here, engagement refers to the rejection of isolationism. 
15 NSS 1994: 1.  
16 NSS 1997: 5.  
17 NSS 1995: ii.  
18 Bill Clinton, “Responding to the Sarajevo Marketplace Shelling: U.S. Leadership and NATO Resolve”, 
statement by the President (1994-02-09), U.S. Department of State Dispatch (vol. 5, no. 4, 1994). Available at: 
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dispatch/1994/html/Dispatchv5no08.html [online 2008-04-07].  
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leadership in both transatlantic and world affairs. Based on the interests in maintaining the 
U.S. position and leadership, preventing the escalation of internal conflicts became an indirect 
interest of the Clinton administrations. Together, these interests indicated an overall interest in 
staying engaged in international relations, and formed a foundation for gradually 
implementing a strategy of restrained engagement.   
 
Perception of Threats 
In terms of threat perceptions, the administration saw no monolithic or existential threat. The 
Russian threat was no longer considered urgent.  A new and more diverse, fragmented threat 
perspective manifested itself on the U.S. security agenda, related to the more complex 
strategic environment of the post-Cold War world. Such threats included internal conflicts 
around the globe, but also more transnational threats, such as the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction and international terrorism. Also, so-called rogue states posed potential 
threats to the U.S. But neither these, nor any great power, were in the position to rival the 
dominant position of the United States.  
The first Bush administration had observed the changing nature of the former 
superpower and did to some extent cooperate with its former adversary, while skepticism 
remained. As the Clinton administration took office a little more than a year after the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, both the time and attitudes in the administration facilitated a 
changed perception of the Russian threat. As stated in the introduction, intentions and 
capabilities combined represent what is considered a threat to a country’s national interests. 
With Russia, the capabilities to pose a threat were available to a degree. The concerns about 
Russia’s capabilities dealt both with the size of the Russian nuclear arsenal, its ability to 
control the nuclear material, and some conventional military power.19 But more importantly, 
the administration did not view Russian intentions as inherently hostile to the interests of the 
U.S. and its allies.20 The ideological underpinnings that had seemed to make Russian 
capabilities an existential threat to the West, was perceived as gone.21 The changed perception 
of Russian intentions also caused the administration to state that “[t]he threat of a war among 
great powers and the specter of nuclear annihilation both have receded dramatically”.22 As 
long as the political and economical liberalization processes set in motion would continue, 
                                                 
19 Interview Flournoy 2007.  
20 Interview Rosner 2007.  
21 For instance expressed in NSS 1995: i.  
22 NSS 1994: 1.  
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Russia was no longer perceived a threat.23 The national security strategies of the United States 
thus perceived Russia as an arena where democractic and economic transition was seen as 
favorable.24 Cooperation and integration into Western institutions would thus be one way of 
making sure that Russian intentions would not once again turn hostile to the U.S. and its 
allies. For NATO, the disappearance of its main raison d’être would of course have great 
implications, leading towards an entirely post-Cold War founded role, to be discussed fully in 
this chapter’s section on strategic thinking and implementation. 
In a new security perspective, the Clinton NSSs recognized ethnic conflicts as a first 
new challenge that confronted the U.S. as the Cold War threat was gone.25 Internal conflicts 
in the former Yugoslavia, first with regard to Bosnia and later Kosovo, as well as the crises in 
Somalia and Rwanda, represented post-Cold War challenges to the administration. Generally, 
such conflicts were perceived as indirect threats, as they produced fears of greater 
destabilization of regions, especially when involving areas important to the U.S., and more 
widely, the possibly perceived reduced leadership role of the United States. Accordingly, 
“[u]nchecked regional or civil conflicts risk escalation with broadening consequences; 
threaten the credibility of the United States, its allies, and major international instances as 
guarantors of world order; and confront decision[-]makers with horrendous and morally 
intolerable humanitarian abuses”.26 The ethnic and humanitarian crises in Africa, where the 
U.S. had fewer obligations, were perceived as less threatening to U.S. interests. In terms of 
NATO threat perceptions, internal conflicts within Europe appeared gradually threatening to 
the alliance. By the completion of the 1999 ASC, instability in and around the Euro-Atlantic 
area, including possible regional crises at the periphery of the alliance, were seen as central 
risks.27  
As part of the more fragmented post-Cold War security picture, also transnational 
threats became more visible to the U.S. Bush had mentioned such threats, but throughout the 
1990s and with Clinton, such threats became more prominent. Still, they were not the only 
threats the administrations perceived, and thus constituted just part of the fragmented threat 
perceptions relevant to the formation of national security strategies. These types of threats 
were diverse in themselves, and included the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
                                                 
23 Interview Flournoy 2007.  
24 For instance in NSS 1994: 23.  
25 See for instance NSS 1994: i.  
26 R. Craig Nation, ”Regional Studies in a Global Age”, in  J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr. (ed.), U.S. Army War 
College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy (2006 [second edition] ): 65. Available at 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB708.pdf [online 2008-01-08]. 
27 ASC 1999: paragraph 20.  
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environmental degradation, terrorism, international crime and drug trafficking.28 WMD 
proliferation and increasing levels of international terrorism were the most significant of these 
threats during the Clinton presidency.   
The proliferation of WMDs was a fundamental concern of the administration. 
Proliferation had been perceived as threatening to the U.S. ever since the U.S. itself gained 
such capabilities. But in the post-Cold War world, WMDs became part of the more 
fragmented threat perceptions of the U.S. This contrasted with the threat’s assumed nature 
during the Cold War. During the period of East-West rivalry, the WMD threat had been part 
of the monolithically perceived Cold War threat perspective. Now, the threat transcended into 
a more transnational threat, fragmented by the different types of actors possibly possessing or 
acquiring WMD capability.  
Linked to the former East-West conflict was the administration’s fear that other former 
Soviet Republics than Russia would possess nuclear weapons. Accordingly, the 
administration was interested in “denuclearizing” these republics, most notably Ukraine. In 
addition, and linked to a clear-cut post-Cold War security agenda, proliferation was a 
potential threat seen as represented by the possible acquisition of WMDs by new and more 
unstable actors. This included the fear both of terrorists acquiring WMDs and the so-called 
rogue states.29  In such a way, the WMD threat had become more fragmented, linked to the 
more unbalanced or unpredictable state of international relations in the post-Cold War world. 
In terms of NATO, the administration briefly initiated a review of NATO’s role concerning 
the WMD threat at the 1994 NATO Summit.30 But for the transatlantic community, the WMD 
threat was here primarily part of the alliance relationship with Russia and Eastern Europe.31 
By the end of the Clinton presidency, a somewhat broadened and more global perception of 
                                                 
28 NSS 1996: 1.  
29 The U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence in 1994 explicitly related such potential threats to North Korea, Iran and 
Iraq.  Office of Naval Intelligence, “Director of Naval Intelligence Posture Statement” (1994): 2-3. Non-
classified. Available at DNSA: http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/nsa/documents/EP/00336/all.pdf [online 2008-
03-11]. In the NSS of 2000, the administration also underlined Russia’s possible role in such rogue state WMD 
acquisition, wanting to control the possible leakage of Soviet WMD material and expertise to these states. NSS 
2000: 7.  
30 Stephen A. Oxman [Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs], “The NATO Summit 
and the Future of European Security”, statement before the Subcommittee on Coalition Defense and Reinforcing 
Forces of the Senate Armed Service Committee and Subcommittee of European Affairs of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee (1994-02-01), U.S. Department of State Dispatch (vol. 5., no. 7, 1994). Available at: 
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dispatch/1994/html/Dispatchv5no07.html [online 2008-04-07]. 
31 See Warren Christopher [U.S. Department of State], “Reinforcing NATO’s Strength in the West and 
Deepening Cooperation with the East”, intervention at the North Atlantic Council meeting (1995-05-30), U.S. 
Department of State Dispatch (vol. 6, no. 23, 1995). Available at: 
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the WMD threat had tentatively been adopted by NATO on U.S. initiative.32 The NATO ASC 
of 1999 in this way stated that “the proliferation of NBC [nuclear, biological and chemical] 
weapons and their means of delivery remains a matter of serious concern”, and explicitly 
confined these threats to states in the NATO periphery and in other regions, as well as the 
potential acquisition of non-state actors.33 
Both as linked to the fear of WMD proliferation and in itself, international terrorism 
was included in the American security agenda during the Clinton years. There had been 
limited terrorist attacks on U.S. interests before. The Bush administration had recognized 
terrorism as a threat,34 but no clear and prioritized assessment of such a threat seemed to 
exist.35 During the Clinton presidency, limited terrorist attacks did hit U.S. targets, as the 
World Trade Center was the scene of a bomb attack in 1993, U.S. military facilities in Saudi 
Arabia were hit by bombs in 1995 and 1996, U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were 
targeted in 1998, and the destroyer USS Cole was attacked in 2000. The administration did 
review such instances, made political assessments of the terrorist threat,36 and was 
increasingly alarmed by the phenomenon as these occurrences took place. But as the U.S. did 
not see such threats as existential, and dealt with such challenges primarily through law 
enforcement,37 international terrorism did not evolve as a central threat concern to U.S. 
security during the Clinton years. Overall, NATO was not part of U.S. counter-terrorism 
procedures. Terrorism was in the 1999 ASC listed as a risk that could affect the interests of 
the alliance,38 but was not seen as a great threat to allied security.  
Rogue states represented another threat to the U.S. as the administration perceived it. 
Earlier, the term had been applied to regimes that committed crimes against their own citizens 
under the protection of their national sovereignty. In the 1990s, the expression was rather 
linked to the external behavior of states, especially related to potential pursuits of WMD 
                                                 
32 Slocombe in Congress 1999-10-28; Marc Grossman [Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs], in 
“The U.S. National Security Implications of the 1999 NATO Strategic Concept”, hearing before the Committee 
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33 ASC 1999: paragraph 22. See also the last section on strategic thinking and implementation.  
34 See NSS 1990: 28; NSS 1993: 18. 
35 Rivhard Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror (London: Simon & Schuster 2004): 73-
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2004: 92.  
37 See for instance Thomas J. Badey, “US Counter-Terrorism: Change in Approach, Continuity in Policy”, 
Contemporary Security Policy (vol. 27, no. 2, 2006): 308.  
38 ASC 1999: paragraph 24.  
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capability and use of terrorism as an instrument.39 Consequently, these threats were still state-
to-state threats to the U.S., but at the same time related to transnational and unconventional 
threats, such as the spread of weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism. 
Especially, Iraq, Iran and North Korea were considered within this category of threats.40 
Military planning was dominated by such threat perceptions.41 Consequently, the threat was 
perceived as a central and direct threat to the U.S. The administration feared the possibility 
for regional aggression as a result of external action on the part of these states.42 Although 
rhetorically the term rogue states may have resembled Cold War discourses of an “evil Soviet 
empire”, both the small size and capabilities of these countries prevented them from posing 
major existential threats to the U.S., equivalent to the former Soviet Union. The 1999 ASC 
did not apply the term rogue states, but more vaguely talked about the risks of “regional crises 
at the periphery of the Alliance”, and that “some states, including on NATO’s periphery and 
in other regions, sell or acquire or try to acquire NBC weapons and their means of 
deliver
hat “we 
have an unprecedented opportunity to make our nation safer and more prosperous”.46 
                                                
y”.43  
While both the administration and the alliance monitored possible changes in great 
power threats, such traditional state-to-state-threats were not as evident. As the Clinton 
administration asserted that it saw its present unrivalled position and global leadership as 
preferable, it would see other great powers emerging as threatening to U.S. interests, just as 
parts of the preceding Bush administration had been more explicit about it. There were fears 
in the House of Representatives that China soon would emerge as a major military power.44 
And the economic growth of Japan caused several to argue that Japan would develop into a 
new dominant power.45 But during its presidency, the administration asserted that it possessed 
an unrivalled position. As stated in the introductory quote of this chapter, and based on its 
military capabilities and economic possibilities, the administration thus perceived t
 
39 Litwak 2000: 52. The definition according to external behavior took root in the 1980s. The described internal 
behavior was now mostly discussed as ethnic conflicts, humanitarian disasters, i.e. internal conflicts.  
40 For instance, CIA estimates on Iraq in 1993 assumed that Saddam Hussein’s foreign policy goals included 
WMD programs. Director of Central Intelligence, “Prospects for Iraq: Saddam and Beyond” (1993-12-00), 
secret, declassified 2005-04-00. Available at CIA FOIA Reading Room [online 2008-04-05].  
41 Interview Litwak 2007. Military planning will be further discussed in the section on strategic thinking and 
implementation.  
42 NSS 2000: 7.  
43 ASC 1999: paragraphs 20 and 22.  
44 Floyd D. Spence [Chairman of House National Security Committee], “Press Release: Administration China 
Export Policy Jeopardized U.S. National Security Strategy” (1996-11-21): 3. Available at DNSA: 
http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/nsa/documents/CH/01970/all.pdf [online 2007-05-29].  
45 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House 1987) was a point of 
departure.  
46 NSS 1997: 1.  
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The fact that the U.S. was in such a dominant position, without any superpower rival, 
contributed to make security issues seem less urgent. At the same time, the administration had 
to deal with the more limited threats that did arise. As such, key dangers were thought 
represented by “those posed by weapons of mass destruction, regional aggression and threats 
to the stability of states”.47 Compared with the Cold War, these threats were fragmented, and 
largely indirect and potential, different from the monolithic and existential threat the Soviet 
Union had been perceived as. The main challenges the Clinton administration had to deal with 
were the ethnic tensions in the Balkans, the crises in Somalia and Rwanda, rogue states, the 
proliferation of mass destruction and international terrorism. The strategy of the Clinton 
administration was formed as it responded to these threats, as will be discussed below, and 
was based upon its overall interests in ensuring its secure and leading position in the world.  
 
Strategic Areas, Allies and Partners 
Accordingly, the Clinton administration to a greater extent than its predecessor faced the 
broader complexity in approaching security issues in the post-Cold War world. The Clinton 
team made central policy formulations concerning Europe, particularly when it came to 
enlarging and transforming the role of NATO. The above section has outlined the broad threat 
perceptions of the administration, including new types of threats fragmented from the 
transatlantic dimension. NATO was still central to the U.S. within the broader transatlantic 
area. But the Clinton administration’s focus on separate issues caused partial fragmentation 
with the transatlantic aspect, with regard to U.S. strategy in other regions than Europe. The 
section discusses the administration’s general view on international cooperation, as well as 
the perceived relevance and cooperative aspects of different areas in the world.  
Although at first inwardly focused on the domestic economy, the administration was 
also determined to stay engaged and take the lead in international affairs. In this approach 
cooperation and multilateralism were key components. The Clinton team broadened the 
transatlantic alliance, both in terms of member states, and the geographical outreach of the 
organization. It also formalized the interaction with other regions, especially when it came to 
economic cooperation, for instance through the North American Free Trade Agreement, and 
the participation in establishing the World Trade Organization. Regarding security issues in a 
global framework, the U.S. under Clinton’s leadership contributed in missions under UN 
                                                 
47 NSS 1994: 10. 
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mandate, as in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia.48 International cooperation on issues of interest to 
the United States was thus seen as important. At the same time the administration asserted 
that while it acted multilaterally if possible, it would act unilaterally if seen necessary.49 
Accordingly, the administration stated that: “[We must] be willing to act unilaterally when 
our direct national interests are most at stake; in alliance and partnership when our interests 
are shared by others; and multilaterally when our interests are more general and the problems 
are best addressed by the international community”.50 Implicitly, the administration perceived 
cooperation as beneficiary to the U.S. in order to share responsibilities and burdens, while at 
the same time it was desirable to retain control over which interests were to be acted upon. 
Such an approach to multilateralism made NATO interesting to the U.S., as responsibilities 
and burdens could be shared between allies, at the same time that the Americans had great 
influence on the formation of policies and missions within the alliance.51 According to IR 
scholar Robert Litwak, acting through NATO was among other things a fiscal necessity in 
conflicts that did not threaten direct American interests.52 Seen together, cooperation 
represented a way of promoting U.S. interests, as American interests and values could be 
generalized to express widely shared interests and values. More specifically, cooperation 
would make it less costly, both in political and economic terms, to counter threats against 
such interests.  
Cooperation was then linked to the continued U.S. commitment to the transatlantic 
alliance and Europe. The administration in one NSS stated that its first strategic priority was 
to “foster a peaceful, undivided, democratic Europe. When Europe is stable and at peace, 
America is more secure. When Europe prospers, so does America.”53  As such, the Cold War 
and G. H. W. Bush’s focus on European relations continued under Clinton’s leadership. The 
administrations’ national security team had mainly been brought up during the Cold War, and 
appreciated the interconnected relationship between the U.S. and Europe, and the relevance of 
NATO.54 In the 1960s, a young Bill Clinton had participated in and organized a Conference 
on the Atlantic Community, and he acknowledged the importance of NATO to European 
                                                 
48 It is also interesting to point out that the Haiti engagement was mandated by the UN, even though the U.S. 
generally claims its undisputed influence in the region, referring the Monroe Doctrine. 
49 For instance in NSS 1996: 14 and 17.  
50 NSS 1996: 14.  
51 Concerning the Bosnia engagement, engaging through the UN (and by 1995 principally NATO) was seen 
adequate as the crisis was not perceived as immediately threatening to the security of the U.S. Bill Clinton, 
“Renewing the Momentum toward Peace in Bosnia”, opening statement at a news conference (1994-04-20), U.S. 
Department of State Dispatch (vol. 5, no. 17, 1994). Available at: 
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dispatch/1994/html/Dispatchv5no17.html [online 2008-04-07].   
52 Litwak 2000: 32. 
53 NSS 1997: 2.  
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security in the Cold War.55 For the administration, NATO was considered an instrument that 
would provide for continued American leadership and involvement in European affairs. The 
integrated military structure of NATO was seen as an asset, and the U.S. wanted to stay 
engaged in Europe.56  
The U.S. engagement in Europe also represented an interest in Central and Eastern 
Europe. The administration commented on U.S. interests here as “[a]reas of greatest strategic 
interest, as in the former Soviet Union”.57 The Iron Curtain had fallen during the first year of 
the Bush administration, and Bush had from 1991/1992 in a limited manner cooperated with 
former adversaries, in actual policies by agreeing on the Gulf War, but also through 
consultations in the NACC. One year into the Clinton presidency, the administration started to 
approach Central and Eastern Europe with a more formal intent of turning them westwards. 
The Partnership for Peace and the decision to enlarge NATO mainly stemmed from U.S. 
initiatives at the January 1994 NATO summit.58 While NATO also had enlarged during the 
Cold War, the administration recognized that the 1999 enlargement would “cross the line it 
was created to defend and overcome”.59 With such a change in East-West cooperative 
structures, cooperation with Russia was seen strategically important, as the administration 
also had included the former adversary of the U.S. into the Partnership for Peace program. 
Russia was also included in the G-7 cooperation between central Western powers, which in 
1997 became the G-8. The less threatening view of Russia, presented earlier on, opened up to 
increased cooperation. Expansion of the alliance and broader partnership were seen 
opportune, making cooperation within the whole of Europe strategically important to the U.S.  
 Secondly, besides focusing policies on cooperation in the broader area of Europe, Asia 
was also important during the Clinton presidency. The national security strategies underlined 
the importance of enhancing relations “across the Pacific as well as across the Atlantic”.60 
                                                 
55 Bill Clinton, My Life (London: Hutchinson 2004): 112.  
56 Interview Hunter 2007. Underlining the relevance of Europe, the European Bureau of the Department of State 
produced more than half of the policy documents in the Department, and Albright and Clinton spent half their 
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With Clinton’s economic focus, relations with Asia were seen particularly important.61 
Although security issues became more diverse, and might include economic relations in the 
post-Cold War world, such issues were still not as urgent as those of war and peace, and not 
as relevant to understanding the decisions on national strategy. But when it came to more 
clear-cut security relations, other regional partners than Europe were also considered 
important to the Clinton administration. According to Michèle Flournoy, serving at the 
Department of Defense, the administration pursued multiple areas simultaneously. In addition 
to NATO, the Clinton administration maintained non-European alliance relationships with 
Japan, South Korea and South East Asia, and bilateral relationships in the Middle East.62 Also 
ad hoc partnerships supplemented such cooperative structures. For example, the NSS of 1996 
underlined the importance of regional allies in countering possible Iraqi threats of aggression 
towards Kuwait in 1994.63 Combined, the administration stated that “many of our security 
objectives are best achieved – or can only be achieved – through our alliances and other 
formal security structures, or as a leader of an ad hoc coalition formed around a specific 
objective”.64  In this way, such ad hoc coalitions were seen as a supplement to the alliance 
structure, and not as an alternative, as the later Bush administration would come to do.65 
As outlined in the sections on threats, threat perceptions in rogue states, WMD 
proliferation and international terrorism also made for a strategic focus on Asia. The military 
planning for major regional wars were primarily perceived to rely on directly affected 
regional partners.66 Still, Secretary of State Albright in 1998 argued that weapons of mass 
destruction potentially could be a “unifying threat” in terms of NATO.67 But the WMD and 
terrorist threats were only vaguely included in allied threat perceptions in 1999, and the U.S. 
implemented policies on such issues outside of NATO. In this way, the administration largely 
focused on other strategic relationships than NATO when concerned with issues located 
outside of Europe. This had also been the primary case with Bush’s Gulf War, then with 
partial participation of European allies. By maintaining allies and partners in Asia, the Clinton 
administration continued to underline cooperation in central areas, but as threats here were 
largely fragmented from the transatlantic dimension, these relationships were not interlinked 
with other allies in the same way as during the Cold War. 
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In addition to the critically perceived regions of Europe and Asia, the administration 
did engage more globally. This was for instance evident with regard to the involvement in 
Somalia. But actual policy implementation indicated that such areas were not as strategically 
important to the U.S., as the administration withdrew from Somalia and stayed out of 
Rwanda. The administration’s appraisal of Africa also had in mind that it was not part of any 
alliance or partner structure.68 Consequently, the administration had to review whether a 
certain situation was interesting on a more ad hoc basis. As commented upon in the previous 
chapter, the disappearance of East-West rivalry then implied that conflicts here did not seem 
to affect U.S. interests in the same way as if threatened by communism. Also, in Somalia, the 
U.S. acted through the UN. While acting under UN leadership showed a general multilateral 
approach of the administration, at least up until it withdrew, it also indicated that the conflict 
in the region was not directly important or vital to the US. In such cases, the U.S. was inclined 
to have greater control of missions than what was possible through a UN mission.69  
To sum up, the first National Security Advisor to the Clinton administration, Anthony 
Lake highlighted that “in an increasingly complex world, it was not possible or desirable to 
have only one strategic focus”.70 Barely seen during the Bush administration, new patterns of 
cooperation more determinedly appeared during the Clinton presidency. Russia formally 
evolved as a partner through the Partnership for Peace, and NATO enlarged to include three 
new member states. Broader cooperation in other areas was also evident, especially in Asia. 
But fragmented threat perceptions meant that the framework for understanding strategic areas, 
allies and partners was different from the Cold War. The administration’s post-Cold War 
outlook meant that Europe and NATO were still interesting to the U.S., but more as a region 
in itself, and not automatically part of strategic considerations in other parts of the world. At 
the same time, relations in Europe remained critical to the U.S., in addition to U.S. relations in 
Asia. Other areas were included in U.S. strategic conceptions, but the administration’s 
outlook centered on what was seen as the geopolitically crucial Eurasian continent. Such an 
approach indicated continuity regarding which areas were seen the most strategically 
important, and where formal cooperation in terms of alliances and partnerships was seen most 
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relevant. The difference was that the strategic outlook now was largely fragmented, as 
opposed to the more inherently integral nature of U.S. Cold War strategies.  
 
Strategic Thinking and Implementation  
According to previous sections, Clinton’s strategy was based on a general interest in 
broadening the influence of American values, and ensuring the power and leadership position 
of the U.S. in the world. The two administrations were confronted with internal conflicts, and 
dealt with more potential threats posed by rogue states, nuclear proliferation and limited 
instances of international terrorism. The administration had a global, while fragmented 
outlook, particularly concerned with Europe and Asia. In such a situation, the Clinton 
presidency formed its national security strategies and NATO policies.  
Frequently, the administration was accused of lacking a national security strategy or 
grand strategy. Critics stated that it did not have a clearly defined security concept as in the 
Cold War. As seen in the introductory historiographical account, this is for instance the 
approach taken by Halberstam and Gaddis. Political scientist Christopher Layne argues that 
the end of the Cold War rightfully made room for broader foreign policy concerns than those 
of grand national security strategy, as the United States faced no imminent threat.71 On the 
other hand, while an articulated concept equivalent to containment and deterrence was not 
present, the strategic foundation of the administrations can nonetheless be identified in the 
strategic thinking and responses implemented in the diverse and fragmented security situation. 
In such a way, the general ideas formulated and the policies formed reflect what can be named 
the Clinton administrations’ strategy. Returning to Gaddis’ initial understanding of strategy, 
this is confirmed, as strategies are seen to mirror the assumptions of interests, threats and 
feasible responses.72 Referring Goldgeier, the administration initially concentrated on 
domestic affairs, was uncomfortable with the use of force, was lacking policies on Bosnia, 
and had little knowledge of or interest in NATO.73 But general strategic schemes were 
gradually formed. Combined with responses to international events, the strategic thinking the 
administration outlined can together be interpreted as its strategy of restrained engagements.  
Focusing on military aspects, engagement strategies were formed and implemented 
towards internal ethnic conflicts. Planning and scenarios of military engagement towards 
rogue states and their possible WMD proliferation also existed in parallel. In political terms, 
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the integration of former adversaries in Europe represented a type of political engagement 
replacing former containment in Eastern Europe.  
The first Clinton administration’s conception of American engagement was vaguely 
introduced by National Security Advisor Anthony Lake in a 1993 address, but developed into 
a National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement published in 1994, 1995 and 
1996.74 Here, the administration asserted that its outlook was based on U.S. leadership, 
enlargement and the broader role of NATO in the post-Cold War world. Implicitly, the 
administration referred to engagement in its broadest sense, rejecting American 
isolationism.75 Engagement was seen as a general interest of the U.S., working through the 
enlargement of ideas and influence. In this way, the formulation “strategy of enlargement” 
was applied as an initial term for the Clinton presidency’s national security strategy, as its 
alternative to Cold War containment strategies.76 Later, the administration produced strategic 
documents based on the same content under the headings of A National Security Strategy for 
a New Century in 1997, 1998 and 1999, and For a Global Age in 2000.77 Even though the 
approach to strategy was fundamentally the same, the title was changed. According to 
political scientist Robert H. Dorff, the change was primarily made to avoid connotations of a 
neo-imperialist approach.78 In the reports of the second administration, engagement is 
underlined more explicitly. In 1997, 1998 and 1999 engagement as a strategy is stated. In the 
2000 document, the term strategy of engagement is used specifically. Here engagement is 
summarized as:  
The elements of engagement – adapting alliances; encouraging the reorientation of other states, 
including former adversaries; encouraging democratization, open markets, free trade, and sustainable 
development; preventing conflict; countering potential regional aggressors; confronting new threats; 
and steering international peace and stability operations – define the Nation’s blueprint for a strategy of 
engagement.79  
 
Accordingly, the administration applied a broad conception of engagement. In responses to 
threats, military aspects are underlined as preventing, countering and confronting threats, and 
in terms of interests in for instance democratization, and alliances, a more political 
understanding of the term is also evident.  
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Then on the non-emergency level, the Clinton administration, in emphasizing its ideas 
of promoting democracy, as well as economic liberalization, politically engaged in Eastern 
Europe. Partnership for Peace, and partial NATO enlargement was the implemented results of 
this process. For NATO this meant that the organization in terms of member states would 
enlarge. Still, this was a gradual process, made in a restrained manner, as only Hungary, 
Poland and the Czech Republic were invited to join the alliance by 1999. By these 
approaches, the U.S. widened the territorial area of the alliance.  
The 1990s was seen as a preferable time to implement NATO enlargement eastwards, 
based on the argument of reinforcing democracy in the region.80  In this way, NATO 
enlargement represented a U.S. political engagement in the region that potentially would be 
favorable to the U.S. if U.S.-Russian relations were to worsen. Interconnected, the 
implementation of Partnership for Peace supported the U.S. interest in ensuring a democratic 
and stable situation also within broader areas formerly hostile to the West. Making Russia a 
partner in the partnership for Peace was intended to ensure the continuation of positive trends 
in Russian politics.81 The Bush administration had upheld elements of the containment 
strategies with regard to Russia, and only in a fledgling manner cooperated with the former 
adversary. President Clinton declared that: “The threat to us now is not of advancing armies 
so much as of creeping instability.  The best strategy against this threat is to integrate the 
former communist states into our fabric of liberal democracy, economic prosperity, and 
military cooperation”.82 Consequently, enlargement and partnership would ensure a 
broadened influence of values seen favorable to the U.S., which removed the need for 
containing Russia. As political engagement with former adversaries in the East meant that 
U.S. and NATO confrontation with former adversaries would be less plausible, it formed a 
foundation for the U.S. in taking on a new strategy, implementing engagement in more 
military terms, and NATO to form a new role engaging “out of area”.   
Such a strategy was based on diverse elements. Engagements were made in 
accordance with U.S. interests; an attitude of hesitant interventionism, especially related to 
so-called “humanitarian” interventions, and implied a role for NATO acting “out of area”. 
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Also, the strategy reflected a use of military power relying on the use of air force, as well as a 
perceived need of being able to fight at least two major regional wars simultaneously, which 
was related to limited military engagements towards rogue states.  
Accordingly, the Clinton administration’s approach to military engagement 
emphasized that the administration needed to prioritize when to engage. One NSS commented 
on this as: “[w]e must be selective in the use of our capabilities, and the choices we make 
always must be guided by advancing our objectives of a more secure, prosperous and free 
America”.83 Engagements were made first and foremost when “vital or survival interests” 
were at stake, and secondly selected on the basis of areas that affect U.S. national interests, 
such as “areas where we have a sizable economic stake or commitments to allies, and areas 
where there is a potential to generate substantial refugee flows into our nation or our allies”.84 
The administration saw its strategy as global, for instance in promoting democracy and 
economic liberalization, and had a fragmented perspective on threats, meaning that policies 
still could not be pinned in just one direction. On the other hand, the administration’s 
reluctance to make full engagements and its hesitant approach to international events caused 
the implemented engagement strategy to be more restrained. Indicatively, U.S. engagement 
strategies were centered on the more strategically defined Eurasian continent. For instance, 
the ethnic conflict in Rwanda was not perceived as a threat the U.S. should counter.85 The 
administration engaged when seen necessary and preferable, in accordance with U.S. 
interests, and indirectly, those of its allies. 
The Bosnia and Kosovo engagements implemented such a strategy towards the 
indirect threats of internal conflicts. The description of Clinton’s engagement strategies as 
restrained is also here fitting, as engagements were made after initial hesitation. The 
preceding Bush administration had avoided military engagement in the Balkans, and Clinton 
initially continued along the lines of his predecessor.86 The Clinton team had campaigned 
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arguing that Bush’s policies in the former Yugoslavia were too weak. When in office, the 
Clinton administration took a step back on this issue, and a consistent strategy was not 
implemented.87 According to National Security Advisor Lake, the administration was 
evaluating how the U.S. should respond to the conflict.88 Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher in 1993 said that the U.S. was prepared to join the UN and NATO to enforce a 
solution in Bosnia, if necessary with U.S. military participation, and that the Bosnia conflict 
provided a test for the U.S. post-Cold War role in Europe and the world.89 Still, the UN track 
remained. By 1994-1995, events had escalated, and the administration got a firmer grip of 
what policies to pursue. But by 1995, the administration engaged in Bosnia, thus forming the 
contours of a restrained strategy of engagement. When it came to Kosovo, the 
administration’s implementation followed much from the previous conflict. Although here, 
the UN track was not followed at first, and engaging through NATO then became 
implemented after a shorter process than what had been the case with regard to Bosnia. 
As regards the U.S. strategy towards threats from rogue states and potential WMD 
proliferation planning for restrained engagement was evident. International terrorism, on the 
other hand, was not as dominant in the formation of the Clinton administration’s strategies, as 
the threat was not perceived as central at the time. Returning to rogue states and their possible 
WMD proliferation, these perceived threats influenced the strategic planning of the 
administration, especially in military terms. Central to such preparation was the perception of 
the need to be able to fight two major regional wars at the same time.90 Such planning was 
evident from the administration’s onset in 1993, where the Department of Defense 
characterized its approach towards both these threats and internal conflicts as a strategy of 
engagement, partnership and prevention.91 As the presidency moved on, such an approach 
became underpinned by experiences with rogue states and what was perceived as the 
possibility of two simultaneous conflicts with North Korea and Iraq in 1994.92 The 
administration perceived the possibility of military conflict with such countries, which 
                                                                                                                                                        
possibility that the Europeans would handle the conflict produced an alibi for the U.S. not to engage. Interview 
Shea 2008.  
87 Interview Rosner 2007.  
88 Interview Lake 2007.  
89 Warren Christopher, ”New Steps towards Conflict Resolution in the Former Yugoslavia”, opening statement 
at a news conference (1993-02-10), U.S. Department of State Dispatch (vol. 4, no. 7, 1993). Available at: 
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dispatch/1993/html/Dispatchv4no07.html [online 2008-04-05].  
90 Interview Litwak 2007. 
91 See Department of Defense 1993-10-00, DNSA.  
92 NSS 1996: 17-18.  
82 
indicated that the threat was perceived as direct and necessary to deter and defeat should 
aggression occur.93  
In this way it is possible to point out how this indicated contours of an engagement 
strategy towards such threats. By planning for, and seeing the possibility of military 
engagement as the response to possible rogue state threats, this meant that the administration 
had an implicitly broader strategy of engagement than if only seen with regard to internal 
conflicts. Accordingly, its strategic response of military engagement could potentially also 
apply to the rogue state threat. In terms of implementation, such military responses were seen 
with regard to several intermittent instances of the use of air force power towards Iraq.94 
According to Robert Litwak, the U.S. primarily perceived rogue states within a containment 
framework.95 He asserts that future U.S. strategy towards such states potentially could 
comprise an engagement component, in terms of diplomatic or political engagement.96 He is 
right to point out that the U.S. contained the position of these states in international relations. 
But as there does not exist an empirical understanding of engagement strategies in military 
terms, planning and limited implementation of military engagements are not articulated within 
his appraisal of the possible engagement component. In this way, the contours of military 
engagement strategies seen during the Clinton administration can supplement Litwak’s 
analysis, and also provide an understanding of responses to such threats that were reinforced 
by the more offensive military engagement by the younger Bush administration. In addition, it 
accentuates that such military engagement was not only confined to internal conflicts as in the 
Balkans.  
Purely humanitarian operations and peacekeeping missions were perceived less 
attractive to engage in. Such strategic appraisals were built on the administration experiences 
in Somalia. While first being engaged in Somalia, the administration withdrew as the 
intervention had escalated from merely food support under Bush to a clearer military 
operation resulting in American losses during Clinton’s first year.  The Presidential Decision 
Directive 25 outlined the administration’s views on the use of force in such conflicts, and also 
pointed to more general implications for the administration’s views on the use of force, its 
criteria for engagement.97 It was particularly important that the administration declared its 
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refusal to relinquish command of American troops to foreign control.98 The Somalia 
engagement had been carried out under UN leadership, and the administration ended up 
skeptical to relinquishing control.  
At the same time, the administration declared that it wanted to avoid long term 
commitments in crises that the U.S. intervened in. Referring to the Somalia and Rwanda 
conflicts, Clinton stated in the preface of the NSS 1995 that:  
[O]ver the longer run, our interests were served by turning these operations over to multilateral 
peacekeeping forces once the immediate humanitarian crisis was addressed. No outside force can create 
a stable and legitimate domestic order for another society – that work can only be accomplished by the 
society itself.99 
 
In other words, the administration saw no U.S. or global interest in staying engaged. The 
quote shows both reluctance to commit in the long run based on practical U.S. interests as 
well as a more general argument that devastated countries need to build their futures on their 
own, supported by multilateral institutions, and not through occupation. This means that the 
Clinton engagement strategy was restrained; that the administration would thoroughly 
consider any future engagement before actually engaging, and that the administration would 
deal with threats, but preferably not be part of a long term stability or peacekeeping mission.  
 The administration’s perspective on the use of military force further illustrates the 
restrained feature of its engagement strategy. “We therefore will send troops abroad only 
when our interests and values are sufficiently at stake. When we do so, it will be with clear 
objectives to which we are firmly committed and which – when combat is likely – we have 
the means to achieve decisively”.100 This indicates that the U.S., although developing 
engagement strategies, continued to be influenced by elements of the Powell Doctrine.101  
Influenced by the Somalia engagement, air, and not ground, force was the preferred military 
means of engagement.102 This was seen in Bosnia and Kosovo, and in the limited retaliations 
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against Iraq. To a large extent, the use of air power indicated that as the threats countered 
were largely indirect and potential, they did not justify large troop deployments. 
Accordingly, the administration feared American casualties as a result of military 
engagement. The existence of modern live mass communication, sometimes referred to as the 
CNN factor, exacerbated such fears.103  The broadcasting of the U.S. losses in Somalia had 
built restraint in the administration. For example, the decision not to deploy U.S. ground 
forces in Kosovo was influenced by the Somalia experience.104 In light of that, the 
administration saw it particularly important that it had domestic support, with Congress and 
the public, before applying military force.105 But also the perceived lack of urgency in the 
post-Cold War strategic environment caused the administration to have a restrained approach 
to its engagement strategy. Still, the administration did use military force in multiple instances 
and in broader missions than its predecessor. But this deployment of force was seen as a last 
resort and restrained engagements became the strategy implemented.  
 Generally, the strategic environment of the Clinton presidency was quite different 
from that of Cold War. The unrivalled strategic position offered the U.S. an enormous 
freedom of action.106 This is characteristic of the entire period at study, but became fully 
apparent and completely relevant to the position of the U.S. during the Clinton presidency. At 
the same time, the absence of a monolithic threat or rival made for a fragmented feature of 
strategy, indicated in the engagement strategies formed towards internal conflicts and those 
formed towards especially rogue states. 
Bacevich characterizes Clinton’s strategy as a one of openness; McCrisken 
emphasizes the administration’s own term a policy of enlargement; and Haley interprets 
Clinton’s policies as non-interventionist, relying on democratization through globalization.107  
While the broadened political engagement of the U.S. and its values can be described within 
such terms, the military aspects of a Clinton’s security policies do not fit into such categories. 
The term strategies of engagement on the other hand, can account for such political features 
as the administration’s political (or economic) engagement, while at the same time integrating 
an understanding of Clinton’s use of military force. Antony Lake stated that the Balkan 
engagements were not specifically linked to expansion, but were conceptually linked.108 
Strategies of engagement can accordingly be seen as accounting for the full spectrum of the 
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administration’s policies. But the assessment has emphasized the military responses to post-
Cold War threats, in order to form an understanding of what has merely been analyzed and 
perceived on an ad hoc basis.  
For NATO to fit into such an American strategy of engagements, it turned from the 
basic territorial defense of its member countries to engage in conflict resolution “out of area” 
in the Balkans. In line with such an evolution, the administration stated that it did not see 
NATO within the concept of containment.109 NATO military engagements were confined to 
the broader Euro-Atlantic area, and consequently, U.S. engagement strategy towards rogue 
states and WMD proliferation stayed fundamentally fragmented from the transatlantic 
dimension.  
The “out of area” debate was initiated from the American side, famously coined by 
Republican Senator Richard Lugar’s term “out of area or out of business”, presented in an 
August 1993 remark at the Department of State.110 On the part of the administration’s side, 
the early and mid 1990s were seen as a transition period for NATO. As the security situation 
in Europe was changing, the U.S. was interested in forming a new role of the alliance.111 
National Security Advisor Anthony Lake in September 1993 vaguely called on the NATO 
member states to update the post-Cold War role of NATO.112 The decision was made to 
continue American investments in NATO, built on the assessment that NATO had been 
successful in the Cold War past, and that it was a multilateral organization that was led by the 
U.S.113 Accordingly, the first Clinton NSS of 1994 supported limited NATO operations “out 
of area”.114 The administration remarked after the 1994 NATO summit that the allies had 
decided it needed adapt its military capacities to be able to “carry out new missions and 
conduct what used to be called out-of-area operations”.115  
In practical terms, such an “out of area” role developed parallel to the gradually 
escalating crisis in the Balkans. The Clinton administration recognized that the Bush 
administration had perceived the Europeans and the UN as responsible for handling the 
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conflict.116 At its initial onset, the new administration continued to emphasize that the 
Europeans should play the leading role.117 At that point, NATO was involved in the United 
Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) missions in the former Yugoslavia. The NATO 
UNPROFOR operations were very limited in scope, both in terms of troop numbers and the 
nature of the involvement, “reflect[ing] those of a peacekeeping mission, even though there 
was no peace to keep”.118  
According to Goldgeier, there did not exist an initial plan of how NATO’s role would 
be, but events in the Balkans made the administration act as circumstances evolved.119 At the 
same time, the above has shown that a more general American debate on the future role 
existed in parallel to, or was accelerated by, the practical evolution of NATO’s role. As the 
U.S. decided that it would engage more determinedly in the crisis, NATO was seen the proper 
instrument, especially as the U.S. would have more control in a NATO operation, than in a 
UN engagement.120 The result was that NATO gradually moved from its Cold War 
territorially defensive character into its post-Cold War transformation to engage in missions 
“out of area”, implemented through the 1995 NATO engagement. The Clinton team saw 
Bosnia as a situation that could “confirm NATO’s central role in post-Cold War Europe”.121 
According to a central NATO staffer, the debate on what to do about the break up of 
Yugoslavia since 1992 had laid out the foundation for NATO’s future role, in terms of 
political consultation and its different practical capabilities.122 Bush had seen conflict 
resolution as a possible, but not ensured, way ahead for NATO. But with the escalation of the 
Balkan conflict, the closely related American deliberations on NATO’s role, and the U.S. 
decision to engage militarily, NATO became transformed to act in “out of area” engagements. 
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As the Russians were partners in the Bosnia engagement, implying that as political 
engagement integrated former adversaries, military engagement could evolve as a new 
strategy to both the U.S. and NATO. In the late 1990s, the Kosovo intervention could be built 
upon the experiences gained and the role developed in the Bosnia engagement.123 The “out of 
area” engagement role could also here be applied, even outside the UN framework and with 
initial opposition by Russia.  
At the same time, the American reluctance to make long term commitments, outlined 
above, in the form of stability or peacekeeping missions, had implications for the role of the 
alliance in such missions. Initially, the U.S. had seen the UN primarily relevant to perform 
such missions. At the same time, parallel to the Bosnia crisis, the administration came to see it 
more relevant for NATO to perform missions of crisis management and peacekeeping.124  In 
this way allied burden sharing would ease the need for the U.S. committing troops and 
resources itself, relevant to the Balkans engagements.  
Firstly, NATO from 1993 supported UN peace engagement in Bosnia.125 The same 
year, the administration in a general approach, but still somewhat vaguely, suggested that it 
might be necessary for the alliance to assume a European peacekeeping role in the post-Cold 
War reality.126 After the 1995 American brokered Dayton Peace Agreement, NATO became 
responsible for the Implementation Force (IFOR).127 From December 1996 NATO led the 
international stabilization force (SFOR) to maintain a peaceful environment in Bosnia. After 
the initial Kosovo engagement, NATO was given responsibility for the peacekeeping Kosovo 
force (KFOR) from March 1999. In this way, NATO, and primarily European troop 
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contigents,128 facilitated for peacekeeping and stability after the initial intervention. This 
implied that while the Americans were central in the decision to engage, and in the principal 
military implementation, the Europeans within NATO had relatively larger responsibility for 
post-conflict peacekeeping engagement. Such an implementation was consistent with 
Clinton’s disinclination to long-term U.S. commitment after initial military engagement, as 
well as general U.S. insistence on allied burden-sharing.  
The beginning of a more global outlook and role for NATO also appeared during the 
Clinton presidency. But compared with the initial engagements in Bosnia and Kosovo, it was 
not as crisis-driven. More globally, the U.S. had been concerned with threats primarily 
located in Asia, separate from the transatlantic dimension, in what has been described as 
fragmentation in the above section on strategic areas, allies and partners. The second term of 
the Clinton presidency also commenced with an understanding of NATO as the anchor of 
U.S. engagement in Europe, while at the same time outlining that more global threats, such as 
rogue states and terrorism, were common dangers for the alliance.129 U.S. initiatives within 
these areas to some extent spilled over into the agenda of the alliance. Still, this was more 
vaguely implemented in the 1999 ASC, but nonetheless was perceived by the Clinton 
administration as at least a partial adaptation of U.S. strategic concerns.  
Towards the end of the presidency, it was underlined that rogue states with WMD 
capabilities was as much a threat to the allies as was the threat of military invasion in the Cold 
War.130 In the alliance strategic concept (ASC) of 1999, the allies saw WMD proliferation 
and terrorism as concerns and risks, while not stating them as explicit threats. Such an 
inclusion partially expanded NATO’s perceptions of threats, towards including more 
fragmented and global types of threats. This was commented on by the administration as: 
“The strategic concept adopted this year was evolutionary, not revolutionary. […] we updated 
our assessment of threat, and adapted our philosophy of the capabilities and strategies needed 
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to meet them.”131 NATO stated that the alliance had to take account of the global context, and 
recognized the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons as a serious 
concern.132 
On the other hand, such threats were not articulated in a specifically global manner, 
and remained as more potential concerns of the alliance. President Clinton reported to 
Congress on the 1999 ASC, pointing out that the proliferation of WMDs represented a real 
threat to allied populations, territory and military forces.133 More particularly, he linked these 
threats to developments in South Asia, Northeast Asia and the Persian Gulf, and consequently 
well beyond the transatlantic area. Clinton also applied the term rogue states. But the allies 
had not applied the rogue states term, and particular countries threatening the alliance had not 
been recognized by NATO. In this way, the allies had not applied as specific an outlook as 
had the U.S. The heading of Clinton’s reports also characterized such threats to NATO as 
potential. Concerning terrorism, the equivalent was observable.134  
This implied that while thinking of global concerns, the alliance did not obtain a role 
outside the broader Euro-Atlantic area during the Clinton presidency, and in countering such 
broader potential threats.135 The administration had asserted before the completion of the 
ASC, that it did not intend to make a “global NATO”.136 James Dobbins in retrospect 
commented in this manner on the outreach of NATO in terms of rogue states during the 
Clinton administration:  
Clinton’s approach to rogue states did not see NATO as a likely instrument in a short time frame. Of 
course there was Serbia, if it was to be considered a rogue state. If Libya had been a problem the 
administration needed to deal with, NATO might have been relevant, but not on Iran, North Korea, 
etc.137 
 
Dobbins among other positions served as Assistant Secretary of State for Europe, Special 
Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State on the Balkans, and was the 
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administration’s special envoy to Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo, and later the special 
envoy of the G. W. Bush administration to Afghanistan. According to his statement, the 
Clinton administration’s strategy did not include NATO in more global engagements outside 
the broader Euro-Atlantic area, within the short time frame at least. He speculated that Libya 
might have become a case for NATO. But as that was not an issue, and Libya could have been 
seen as closer to the Euro-Atlantic zone, NATO still did not engage outside its broader area. 
In such a perspective, NATO recognized new and broader threats to the alliance, but it did not 
obtain a role in countering them. The U.S. ambassador to NATO up to 1998, commented in 
1999 that: “At least for the near future, agreement between the allies to act in the Middle East 
will almost certainly be limited to so-called coalitions of the willing”.138 And as the conflict 
in the Balkans was seen as an internal conflict, and the definition of a rogue state derived 
from its international affairs, NATO did not militarily engage towards broader threats than 
internal conflicts during the Clinton presidency. The administration stated that it saw NATO 
as a possible institution to deal with for instance WMD proliferation.139 But deliberations on a 
broader role did not manifest itself into actual strategic implementation. 
Statements by the administration vaguely opened for broader concerns of the alliance. 
NATO documents gained an increasingly global focus, but actual engagement was limited to 
“out of area” engagements in the extended Euro-Atlantic area. A participant assessment of 
NATO perceived the alliance as crisis driven.140 In other words, the alliance in practical terms 
acted reactively, engaged against actual crises in the Balkans, but did not in fact counter what 
was considered merely potential threats. Nonetheless, such a broadening of security concerns, 
as well as the actual engagements in the Balkans, came to form a background to build on for 
the more globally implemented strategies seen in Clinton’s aftermath.141 Accordingly, similar 
to the state of affairs at the end of the Bush presidency, broader thinking of the alliance’s role 
in the post-Cold War world existed, but would only be implemented by the administration’s 
successor. Within the Clinton presidency then, the alliance’s role transformed in line with the 
restrained evolution of U.S. engagement strategies in the Balkans, implementing a role 
engaging “out of area” in the broader transatlantic area. But more globally, while indications 
of broadened NATO threat perceptions, U.S. engagement strategy was fundamentally formed 
fragmented from the transatlantic dimension.  
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Conclusions  
The Clinton administration’s strategy of engagement represented a fully fledged new strategy 
of the administration, although policies were formed in relation to specific events, and within 
a diverse and complex strategic environment. Compared with the previous Bush 
administration, the new Clinton administration initially continued along some of the lines of 
its predecessors, especially as the administration did not seriously respond to the internal 
conflict in Bosnia until 1995. But the elements of an engagement strategy seen in the Bush 
Gulf War became more prominent in the Clinton presidency. With an escalation of the 
Somalia engagement, and the engagements in Bosnia and Kosovo, a military engagement 
strategy was implemented. Such engagements deepened into internal affairs, as opposed to the 
more specifically state-to-state regional outlook of Bush. Still, engagements were made with 
restraints, and did not include the Rwanda conflict. In response to the threat of rogue states 
and to some extent WMD proliferation, military engagement was indicated and planned for, 
but implemented only to a limited degree. Nonetheless it marked a departure from previous 
containment and deterrence strategies. The political engagement with former objects of Cold 
War containment also underlined the new approach of the administration, and implicitly 
contributed to the freedom of action underpinning the implementation of forward military 
engagement.  
While strategies of engagement became implemented in the U.S. strategic approach, 
NATO formed a new role, from being a territorially defensive organization to engaging “out 
of area”. Such a role was firstly implemented in the Bosnia operation, and the Kosovo 
engagement was later added. More global threat concerns, of rogue states, WMD proliferation 
and international terrorism became evident to the alliance by the end of the Clinton 
presidency. But in terms of actual strategy, U.S. engagements in these cases were primarily 
seen fragmented from the transatlantic alliance. In this way, the NATO role “out of area” was 
confined to the broader transatlantic area. NATO in reality did not obtain a global role.  
CHAPTER V  
 
TOWARDS A STRATEGY OF OFFENSIVE ENGAGEMENT  
 
THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIES OF THE UNITED STATES  
DURING THE PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE W. BUSH  
AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ROLE OF NATO 
 
 
“It has taken almost a decade for us to comprehend the true nature of this new threat. Given 
the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer solely rely on a 
reactive posture as we have in the past.”1 
 
Introduction 
During the presidency of George Walker Bush, the September 11, 2001, attacks by the 
terrorist network Al Qaeda on the World Trade Center and Pentagon were the most influential 
events forming American policies. As the quote indicates, it manifested a pro-active and 
offensive U.S. policy towards new threats. The NATO allies for the first time in history 
invoked Article 5 of the Atlantic treaty, a statement that the attack represented an aggression 
against them all. The Bush administration engaged in a new War on Terrorism, militarily 
fought in Afghanistan. In 2003, the U.S. went to war in Iraq, and NATO got responsibility for 
the Afghanistan engagement. The alliance continued the enlargement process set in motion 
during the previous presidential period, formally implemented through the 2004 inclusion of 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.2 
The following chapter analyzes the national security strategies of the U.S. and their 
implications for NATO during the presidency of G. W. Bush, from the inauguration in 
January 2001 to 2003. The chapter argues that the appointment of the new administration 
made U.S. strategy turn more U.S. focused. In terms of U.S. strategic assessments, this meant 
that the administration contended that American strategy should be made in line with direct 
U.S. interests. Bush’s initial claim of the U.S. as a “humble nation” rhetorically illustrated 
such an approach. After the September 11 attacks, the administration engaged in a massive 
                                                 
1 NSS 2002: 15.  
2 The NATO enlargement process is commented on in the section of strategic areas, allies and partners, but will 
not be discussed in the section on strategic thinking and implementation, as U.S. strategies in the War on 
Terrorism are emphasized, and enlargement was formally implemented in 2004, outside the period at study.   
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War on Terrorism. The Iraqi War introduced preventive strike as an instrument in Bush’s 
strategy.3 In this way, the administration moved towards a U.S. focused strategy of offensive 
engagement. In such a way, the strategic response, military engagement, represented a 
continuum from previous post-Cold War administrations. But under Bush, such a strategic 
approach was changed from a reactive nature, responding to conflicts, to pro-actively counter 
a perceived threat such as Iraq. By centering on threats in the Middle East, and performing 
more unilaterally than its predecessors, NATO initially appeared less strategically important 
to the administration. As U.S. threat perceptions became more focused after the 9/11 attacks, 
it did not provide an equally cohesive foundation for NATO’s role as the Cold War threat. 
NATO gradually broadened its role outside Europe through the global “out of area” operation 
in Afghanistan, but did not support the war in Iraq.  
In line with previous chapters, U.S. interests and objectives; perception of threats; 
strategic areas allies and partners; and strategic thinking and implementation will be discussed 
in this chapter on the G. W. Bush administration. In this way, it completes the analysis of U.S. 
post-Cold War strategies of engagement, and the evolution of the role of NATO within them.  
   
Interests and Objectives  
The Bush administration’s perceptions of U.S. interests and objectives were in line with its 
broader, more U.S. focused policies and strategy. Interests centered on homeland security. 
The administration, as previous ones, identified the promotion of democracy as an objective 
favorable to the security of the U.S., especially determinedly expressed in the post-9/11 state 
of affairs. Related to such an objective, the administration also saw an interest in reducing the 
influence of Islamic extremism. Finally, U.S. global primacy was perceived as an underlying 
propitious premise.  
First of all, both before and increasingly after September 11, 2001, the administration 
defined U.S. security interests more directly than its predecessor did, ultimately expressed in a 
preoccupation with homeland security. Generally, this meant that ensuring the security of the 
U.S. state and its citizens was the administration’s number one objective. Naturally, such vital 
interests would be prioritized by any administration. But the new Bush administration 
declared a reduced interest in more indirect interests, as it argued that the Clinton 
administration had pursued too broad an agenda, and that the new Republican administration 
                                                 
3 The administration applied the term “pre-emptive strike”, but as such a strike was implemented without the 
presence of a direct, immediate and specific threat, there is general understanding that the term “preventive 
strike” describes the means applied by the administration. See for instance Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., War and 
the American Presidency (New York: Norton & Company 2005): 23. For the administration’s perception, see 
NSS 2002: 15.  
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would refocus U.S. national interests and pursue key priorities.4 After September 11, 2001, 
direct homeland security was underlined as the central interest of the administration.5 Having 
experienced an attack on the U.S, the 2002 NSS stated that: “Defending our Nation against its 
enemies it’s the first and fundamental commitment of the Federal Government”.6 Such 
perceptions illustrated more directly perceived U.S. focused interests and objectives.  
But that did not mean that the administration was isolationist, and that it did not place 
U.S. interests and objectives within a more global realm. The interest in homeland security 
was seen as connected with other U.S. interests in a global context.  
Accordingly, also the Bush administration saw American interests in promoting 
democracy in the international sphere. “American values are universal”,7 the to-become 
national security advisor of the president, Condoleezza Rice, argued during the 2000 
presidential election campaign. President Bush in January 2001 stated that: “America remains 
engaged in the world by history and by choice, shaping a balance of power that favors 
freedom”.8 The 2002 NSS underlined such values under the slogan of “champion aspirations 
for human dignity”.9 U.S. interests in open economies were also discussed in the 2002 NSS.10 
Through the War on Terrorism and Iraq, the interest in democratic regime change seemed 
more at focus than the economical aspects of promoting American values. In addition, by 
applying military means to promote such change, the interest in democracy appeared more 
central to the administration than it did to its predecessors, by making it part of decisions on 
war and peace.  At the same time, such a determined promotion of American values was 
connected with other U.S. interests as well. Accordingly, and similar to previous U.S. 
administrations, the Bush administration also cooperated with many undemocratic countries. 
As Rice put it, “it is simply not possible to ignore and isolate other powerful states that do not 
                                                 
4 See for instance Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), “Presidential Debate [Gore-Bush]” (2000-10-12). 
Available at: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/politics/july-dec00/for-policy_10-12.html [online 2008-01-10]; 
and Condoleezza Rice, “Campaign 2000: Promoting the National Interest”, Foreign Affairs (vol. 79, 2000).  
5 This was for instance expressed in the administration' proposal to launch a new department, the Department of 
Homeland Security. In the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the primary mission of the Department was stated 
as: “a) prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; b) reduce the vulnerability of the United States to 
terrorism; [and] c) minimize the damage, and assist in the recovery, from terrorist attacks that do occur within 
the United States […]”.Congress, ”Public Law 107-296: An Act to Establish the Department of Homeland 
Security, and for other purposes” (2002): 8.  Available at: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hr_5005_enr.pdf 
[online 2008-01-18]. See also NSS 2002: 6. 
6 NSS 2002: iv.  
7 Rice 2000: 49. 
8 Bush, ”Inaugural Address” (2001-01-20), in John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters (eds.), The American 
Presidency Project (Santa Barbara, California: University of California). Available at: 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25853 [online 2008-04-12].   
9 NSS 2002: 3-4.  
10 See NSS 2002: 17-20.  
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share these values”.11 In this way, while the instruments applied in promoting democratic 
regimes became more powerful or extreme with Bush, the administration did not engage in an 
unconditional crusade towards promoting worldwide democratic systems of government.  
Subsequently, the administration’s objective of reducing or eliminating the influence 
of Islamic extremism represented the flip side of its interest in promoting democracy. The 
interest in diminishing rivaling attitudes had been visible before the 9/11 attacks.12 But 
similar to the U.S. interest in promoting democratic values, such an interest was perceived 
immensely more central in the War on Terrorism. Bush stated that: “We fight, as we always 
fight, for a just peace – a peace that favors liberty. We will defend the peace against the threat 
from terrorists and tyrants”.13 The administration consequently saw an interest in countering 
the influence of radical movements and regimes connected to the stable U.S. interest in 
promoting democratic values.    
Beneath the directly perceived interest in the security of the U.S., in promoting of 
democratic systems of government, and implicitly reducing the influence of Islamic 
extremism, the administration favored an American position of global primacy. Ideologically, 
the stable promotion of American values underlined the interest in ensuring the American 
position. More concretely, President Bush stated that: “[w]e will build our defenses beyond 
challenge, lest weakness invite challenge”.14 The NSS 2002 declared that: “The United States 
possesses unprecedented – and unequaled – strength and influence in the world”; and that 
“[o]ur forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing military 
build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States”.15 In this way, 
the administration saw the unrivalled and dominant U.S. position in the world as an overall 
interest of the U.S. Also, the quotes underlined the quite military or physical perception of 
such favorable U.S. primacy. 
                                                 
11 Rice 2000: 49. 
12 For instance, the CIA had informed that “Islamic militancy is expanding, and the worldwide pool of potential 
recruits for terrorist networks is growing. In central Asia, the Middle East, and South Asia, Islamic terrorist 
organizations are trying to attract new recruits, including under the banner of anti-Americanism.” George J. 
Tenet, “DCI’s Worldwide Threat 2001: National Security in a Changing World”, statement by Director of 
Central Intelligence before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (2001-02-07). Available at: 
https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2001/UNCLASWWT_02072001.html [online 2007-
12-10].  The terrorist threat is discussed explicitly in the following section on threat perceptions. 
13 Bush quoted in NSS 2002: 1. Later (after the end of the period scrutinized in this study), such an explicit link 
was made from the objective of ending “tyranny” and promoting democracy to the direct security interests of the 
U.S. in George W. Bush, “Inaugural Address” (2005-01-20), in John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters (eds.), The 
American Presidency Project (Santa Barbara, California: University of California). Available at: 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=58745&st=&st1= [online 2008-04-22].   
14 Bush 2001-01-20, The American Presidency Project.   
15 NSS 2002: 1 and 30.  
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With regard to the transatlantic dimension, the administration perceived an “interest in 
shaping the European defense identity – welcoming a greater European military capability as 
long as it is within the context of NATO”.16 The administration accordingly was skeptical of 
single-European initiatives in the security field, as previous administrations had been before 
it. Consequently, the administration maintained the American interest in NATO as a favorable 
structure for Europe. U.S. influence was institutionalized through the alliance, and ensured the 
primary position of the U.S. in the region. At the same time, while interested in keeping 
European security and defense policies within an American consensus, the administration did 
not necessarily view such cooperation as central to the implementation of U.S. strategy, as 
will be elaborated on in the section on strategic areas, allies and partners.   
Related to such an interest in the unrivalled position of the U.S. and the American 
influence in Europe, Bush’s predecessors had articulated an interest in U.S. international 
leadership. The G. W. Bush administration stated that it would lead in the international 
mission to ensure “freedom’s triumph” against its enemies.17  It also stated that it would use 
the “full influence of the United States, and work closely with allies and friends, to make clear 
that all acts of terrorism are illegitimate”.18 In this way, the Bush administration also 
underlined that it would take the lead in its War on Terrorism. But implicitly, the quotes 
focused on the “influence” of the U.S., “that it would make clear” in the world, and that it was 
the mission, as the administration defined it, that it would lead. Accordingly, the position of 
the U.S., which provided such influence, seemed to be articulated more determinedly than the 
predecessors’, at least rhetorical, focus on international leadership. The Bush administration’s 
interest in global primacy tended to be more an interest in dominating, less than leading, 
international relations.  
Summing up, the Bush administration’s interests and objectives focused on the more 
directly articulated security interests of the U.S. or its homeland security. In addition, the 
promotion of democratic values, and subsequent the reduction of the influence of Islamic 
extremism, was an objective of the administration. Overall, the U.S. interest in its primary 
position in the world and transatlantic relations was underlined. These interests and objectives 
would seem more urgently threatened in the wake of the September 11 attacks, and thus were 
to provide a foundation for a more pro-active, or offensive, strategic outlook. 
 
                                                 
16 Rice 2000: 54. See also NSS 2002: 26.  
17 NSS 2002: vi.  
18 NSS 2002: 6. 
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Perception of Threats 
In view of that, the intensity felt in U.S. threat perceptions increased severely by the 9/11 
events, as international terrorism became the overall dominant threat as perceived by the 
administration. In addition, the threat of the proliferation of WMDs and rogue states was seen 
as more acute than potential. These threats had been previously identified, but with the attack 
on American ground, the vulnerability felt deepened such threat perceptions. In addition, the 
fear of possibly emerging major powers was a continuous feature in U.S. threat perceptions, 
even tough less visible on the post-9/11 U.S. agenda.   
With the Al Qaeda attacks, international terrorism came to forefront of U.S. threat 
perceptions. While post-Cold War threats had not been perceived as so urgent and directly 
threatening as the Cold War Soviet threat, the administration now countered a possibly new 
and equivalent threat. The remarkable swiftness of the attack and it being the first attack on 
U.S. territory since Pearl Harbor, and this time within two of the major cities of the U.S. 
mainland, the threat was seen as extraordinary. The terrorist attack produced a new dominant 
threat perception posed by a non-state extremist movement. Although the administration 
perceived it as a new dominant threat, there were apparent differences from the Cold War 
threat. It was an asymmetrical threat, as Al Qaeda was not a state actor the U.S. could retaliate 
against. At the same time, the threat became coupled with state threats, as failed or rogue 
states sponsoring or hiding terrorists were seen as jointly responsible, The lack of economic 
development and functioning political institutions were seen as a foundation for having 
terrorists harboring within their borders, for instance as the administration came to see it in 
Afghanistan.19 The possibility of a terrorist or rogue state acquisition of WMDs was also 
underlined.20  
In terms of the terrorist threat being existential or not, the 2002 NSS did not refer to 
such a term. On occasion the term was nonetheless applied by representatives of the 
administration.21  From an objective stance, seeing existential threats as threats being able to 
overthrow the complete existence a nation, as in the Cold War age of adversary nuclear 
capabilities, the attacks did not pose such a threat. But in line with the administration’s 
perceptions, arguing that terrorism, rogues states and WMD capability were interrelated, 
threat perceptions, to the later observer, coalesced in the American perceptions of the War on 
Terrorism.  
                                                 
19 NSS 2002: v.  
20 The threat of rogue states and the proliferation of WMDs will be elaborated on below.  
21 See example in Condoleezza Rice [National Security Advisor], “Dr. Rice Discusses President’s National 
Security Strategy” (2002-10-02). Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021001-
6.html [online 2008-04-22].  
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Even though international terrorism became the single most important perceived threat 
in the post September 11, 2001 world, international terrorism was recognized as a pending 
threat to the U.S. also before the attacks. In a February 7, 2001, statement by the Director of 
Central Intelligence George Tenet, transnational threats, and the threat of international 
terrorism was seen as a first priority, as “[f]or me, the highest priority must invariably be on 
those things that threaten the lives of Americans or the physical security of the United States”. 
Hereunder, Osama bin Laden and the global Al Qaeda network were seen as “the most 
immediate and serious threat”.22 Such a threat perception was in line with the administration’s 
more U.S. focused and home centered interest perceptions also visible before the September 
11 attacks. Also in the pre 9/11-history of the U.S., had rogue states been perceived as a threat 
related to its interconnection with WMD acquisition and possibly terrorism. But differently, 
with the 9/11 attack, such threat scenarios were perceived more acute than solely potential.  
 In this way, the threat of rogue states was seen as partially interlinked with the terrorist 
threat, at the same time that it represented an individual and to some degree continuous 
feature of U.S. threat perceptions. While Clinton had been concerned with rogue states, the 
Bush administration now saw such countries as even more threatening, and threatening in a 
way that demanded more pro-active action. The administration contained members who 
viewed rogue states as intolerable from early on, while others reached such a position in the 
wake of 9/11. Iraq was then the most important rogue state threat. From an early stage, such a 
threat perception, specified to Iraq, was evident in a letter sent to then President Clinton in 
1998. The letter was signed by among others Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz, who 
were to become Secretary of Defense and Assistant Secretary of Defense in the first term 
Bush presidency, and called for U.S. military intervention to remove Saddam Hussein from 
power.23 Such a threat perception then posed the question of the intensions of the Iraqi regime 
vis-à-vis U.S. and what capabilities it would be able to mount. The administration post 9/11 
tried to indicate a connection between the terrorist threat and Iraq, stating that Saddam 
Hussein and Al Qaeda cooperated.24 By that, the administration feared that the regime had 
intentions of collaborating with terrorists to pursue plans hostile to the U.S. 
                                                 
22 Tenet 2001, Congress.   
23 Project for the New American Century, ”Letter to President Clinton on Iraq” (1998-01-26). Available at: 
http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm [online 2008-01-21]. 
24 See for example Anders G. Romarheim, “Definitions of Strategic Political Communication”, paper 689 by the 
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2005: 19. See also NSS 2002: 14 in terms of rogue states perceived 
as sponsoring terrorism.  
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The diffusion of the term War on Terrorism and the War in Iraq also underlines such a 
rhetorical interconnection, while in reality it was a “separate war in Iraq”.25 The Bush 
administration also referred to the rogue states threat as the “axis of evil”, linking North 
Korea and Iran to the Iraqi threat. The rhetoric on rogue states in this way had hardened as 
compared to that of the administration’s predecessors. Rogue states were among other things 
classified as states that “hate the United States and everything for which it stands”.26 Broadly, 
the rhetoric of the perspective of the threat of terrorism and rogue states bore a resemblance to 
Cold War views of the “evil Soviet empire” in a post-9/11 security environment that was 
perceived more directly threatening than the preceding post-Cold War period. Accordingly, 
Bush would “rid the world of evil”.27 In this perspective, a more offensive strategy was seen 
to be applicable.  
Next, the U.S. administration continued fear the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, which was seen both related to the rogue state and terrorist threat, as well as to 
the proliferation engineered by other powers. The threat of WMD acquisition by nations 
hostile to the U.S. was visible before the September 11 attacks. President Bush stated that: 
[w]e will confront weapons of mass destruction, so that a new century is spared new 
horrors”.28 While such a perspective had been present also during the Clinton presidency, the 
urgency and interconnectedness between threats in the post 9/11 situation made such a threat 
appear more acute to the administration. The 2002 NSS compared the threat of rogue states 
and terrorism to the Cold War Soviet threat, underlining that the greater likelihood that they 
would use WMDs made the present security situation more complex and dangerous than in 
the Cold War balance of terror.29 Also the controversial Colin Powell presentation to the UN 
Security Council before the War on Iraq, claiming that Saddam Hussein was capable of 
acquiring WMD capability underlined the perceived urgency concerning these threats.  
Followed by such U.S. threat perceptions of international terrorism, rogue states and 
the proliferation of WMDs, NATO threat perceptions were to some degree altered. WMD 
proliferation, international terrorism and states that potentially could produce regional crises 
had been vaguely included into NATO threat perceptions at the end of the Clinton presidency. 
                                                 
25 Richard A. Clarke “The Wrong Debate on Terrorism”, New York Times (2004-04-25). Available at: 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A07E5D8153AF936A15757C0A9629C8B63&sec=&spon=&p
agewanted=all [online 2008-01-29]. See also Romarheim 2005: 19; Schlesinger, Jr., 2005: 31. At the same time 
the American occupation of Iraq attracted terrorists later on, so that the Iraqi war in practice increasingly became 
part of the War on Terrorism for the Bush administration. 
26 NSS 2002: 14.  
27 Bush quoted in NSS 2002: 5.  
28 Bush 2001-01-20, The American Presidency Project.  
29 NSS 2002: 13.  
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The September 11, 2001 attacks and the following activation of Article 5 of the Atlantic 
Treaty, then caused NATO threat perceptions to broaden beyond the more limited “out of 
area” approach pursued during the Clinton presidency. But while terrorism and the 
proliferation of WMDs gradually came into the center of allied threat perceptions,30 the 
NATO allies did not agree on the Iraqi threat before the 2003 U.S. intervention. As such, 
allied threat perceptions did not follow American perspectives fully. As was the case of 
terrorism and the proliferation of WMDs, allied perceptions were lagging behind American 
initiatives, and were not fully as determined and offensive as those of the U.S.  
At the same time that relatively new and more transnational threats became 
increasingly dominant on the U.S. agenda, and eventually also to some degree to NATO 
allies, more traditional threat concerns were also visible. As the administration saw an interest 
in American global primacy, the possibilities of the emergence of other great powers was a 
continuous concern of the administration. According to Rice it was necessary to build 
American power, and especially military power, and focus on U.S. relations with other 
powerful states.31 Also the previous post-Cold War administrations had seen new emerging 
powers as a potential threat to the dominant position of the U.S. Linked to the continuity in 
the people holding positions in the administration, such perceptions might echo the DoD draft 
of 1992, discussed in the chapter on the G. H. W. Bush administration.  
The CIA indicated that Russia under President Putin was trying to restore aspects of 
the Soviet past, “status as a great power, strong central authority, and a stable and predictable 
society [… and] may be resurrecting the Soviet-era zero-sum approach to foreign policy”.32 
In the wake of 9/11, the administration asserted that it did not see NATO and Russia as 
adversaries, and rather emphasized the cooperative aspects of the relationship.33 The 2002 
NSS consequently commented that Russia was “in the midst of a hopeful transition, reaching 
for its democratic future and a partner in the war on terror”.34 Thus there were fears that 
Russian relations would become more hostile to the U.S. pre-9/11, but in the War on 
Terrorism, in the short term, cooperation eased possible tensions. Generally, the 
administration, as previous ones, wanted to promote democracy and economic openness in 
both China and Russia as that was seen as “the best foundations for domestic stability and 
                                                 
30 Formally declared in NATO document 2006. NATO 2006-11-29.   
31 Rice 2000.  
32 Tenet 2001, Congress.  
33 Elizabeth Jones [Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs], “U.S. and Europe: The Bush 
Administration and Transatlantic Relations”, hearing before the Subcommittee on Europe on the Committee on 
International Relations (2002-03-13): 13. Available at: 
http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/archives/107/78204.pdf [online 2008-03-08]. See also NSS 2002: 26-27. 
34 NSS 2002: v.  
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international order”.35 Concerning China, CIA asserted in early 2001 that the country’s “drive 
for recognition as a Great Power is one of the toughest challenges we face. Beijing’s goal of 
becoming a key world player and especially more powerful in East Asia has come sharply 
into focus.”36 For the administration, there existed a fear of the emergence of new great 
powers, but it did not see any present-day great power threat to the U.S. or the transatlantic 
alliance, thus looking to resurrect a more traditional foundation of the transatlantic security 
community in great power deterrence. While the Bush administration actively wanted to 
uphold the American dominant position in the world, and wanted to make sure that the 
military power of the U.S. ensured it, at that point emerging great powers were not imminent.  
 In sum, the administration’s more U.S. focused policies and the reactions to the 9/11 
attacks meant that indirect threats were not central on the administration’s agenda. The threat 
perception of international terrorism and rogue states in the War on Terrorism and Iraq 
became dominant. The threat of the proliferation of WMDs was seen interconnected with 
these types of threats. In this way, American threat perceptions seemed to become more 
focused in the post-9/11 world. Threats were now largely located in Asia, or especially the 
Middle East. Threats previously identified as merely potential, were perceived as more acute. 
A new dominant threat perspective was outlined, and central threats were argued to be 
interlinked with one another, mirroring a new focus partly equivalent to Cold War monolithic 
threat perceptions. In addition, the administration’s interest in U.S. primacy meant that 
emerging powers represented a potential threat, outside the agenda set by the 9/11 attacks. 
NATO became influenced by reinforced U.S. threat perceptions, especially in terms of allied 
support to the U.S. in acknowledging the terrorist threat. But the opposition to Iraq also meant 
that many European allies did not perceive this threat as severe that preventive action was 
demanded, as the administration did. In light of that, NATO threat perceptions did not 
necessarily perceive threats as interlinked with one another as the Bush administration largely 
argued.  
 
Strategic Areas, Allies and Partners 
The strengthened threat perceptions of terrorism, rogue states and WMDs meant that the Bush 
administration’s strategic focus in the War on Terrorism was primarily on the Middle East. 
By forming strategies largely on its own, supported by ad hoc coalitions of the willing in the 
initial Afghanistan and the Iraq engagements, the Cold War founded system of alliances was 
                                                 
35 NSS 2002: v.  
36 Tenet 2001, Congress.  
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not an integral part of the new strategic focus of the U.S. Cooperation through NATO was 
affirmed by the administration, and NATO continued the enlargement processes in Eastern 
Europe, although the practical importance of the alliance in overall U.S. strategy seemed to 
depend on an evolution of a global, flexible role.  
This means that the administration’s more directly perceived interests and threats 
produced an inclination towards unilateralism, and that policies were only pragmatically 
multilateral, if possible to combine with more unrestrained American interests. The 2002 NSS 
stated that the administration would “implement its strategies by organizing coalitions – as 
broad as possible – of states able and willing”.37 In such a way the administration said it 
would cooperate with willing and able states. But with the limitation of such cooperation to 
implementation, deliberations on what strategic responses to make was indicatively seen as 
confined to the Americans themselves, implying that consultation was not an integral part of 
the administration’s view of international cooperation.38 According to an NSC staffer, also 
concerning missile defense, the Bush administration did not consult allies, it informed.39 
When criticized for lack of consultation with NATO allies concerning perceived threats, the 
administration asserted that it did spend much time talking with the Europeans. But in doing 
so, it also said that it was explaining to the Europeans what the administration’s policies 
were.40 Consequently, and as seen in the post 9/11 situation, if NATO or other organizations 
would be capable of doing what the U.S. wanted, and had instruments to do so, such 
cooperative structures might be relevant to the administration. Referring to the introductory 
definition of multilateralism as interrelated with consultation, the administration’s strategic 
approach then seemed more unilateral than its predecessors.41 
Such a pragmatic approach to international cooperation gave room for the so-called 
coalitions of the willing, ad hoc coalitions to support what the U.S. more or less planned on its 
own. The administration stated that it was committed to lasting institutions and alliances, but 
admitted that it saw coalitions of the willing as an augmentation of these permanent 
relationships.42 In practice, such coalitions became not an augmentation, but rather an 
alternative to allied contributions and UN mandate, when it came to the implementation of the 
                                                 
37 NSS 2002: 25.  
38 Indicatively, the administration if not acting “alone”, would “strive to enlist the support of the international 
community”[Italics put by author]. NSS 2002: 6.  
39 Interview Harrison 2007.  
40 Jones 2002-03-13: 17, Congress. 
41 At the same time, the strategic climate in Washington after 9/11 might have contributed to such unilateralism 
among other administrations too. A U.S. representative stated that a Democratic administration would perhaps 
also have acted unilaterally after the September 11 attacks. Interview Dobbins 2007.  
42 NSS 2002: vi.  
103 
invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively. Compared with the first Bush administration’s 
Gulf War, and the perceptions within the DoD at that time, the perceived applicability of ad 
hoc coalitions were similar. At the same time, the Gulf War had been fought under UN 
mandate, and consultation through for instance NATO had been underlined. Consequently, 
while ad hoc coalitions of the willing had been present earlier on, the administration’s 
military engagements after 9/11 was fundamentally based on ad hoc support to initial U.S. 
planning. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s assertion that “the mission will define the 
coalition – not the other way around”,43 thus indicated that permanent institutions and 
alliances, committed multilateralism, were not emphasized or integral in the administration’s 
global War on Terrorism.  
In terms of strategic areas, strengthened perceptions of threats located in the Middle 
East meant that the administration’s focus on this region became highlighted. This means that 
with the inauguration of George W. Bush, Europe implicitly came to decline on the American 
agenda, relative to the Middle East. Especially the neo-conservatives in U.S. politics were 
disinterested in Europe before 9/11. According to neo-conservative views, present among 
representatives of the administration,44 NATO could no longer be seen as an unambiguously 
useful asset of the United States. After the September 11 attacks, with dominating threats 
located outside Europe, and what was seen as a European unwillingness and inability to build 
military capacities, Europe seemed less interesting in this view.45  Possible allied cooperation 
in the initial war against Afghanistan accordingly seemed more constraining than enabling to 
the administration. With Rumsfeld’s emphasis on willing coalitions, the U.S. should act 
according to its case, with whoever supported what the administration decided. Also emphasis 
put on the assistance of regional allies indicated that the permanent Western alliance did not 
necessarily seem fruitful to the administration’s implementation of the War on Terrorism.46 
The basic consultative feature of NATO’s role was also less relevant as the administration 
formed strategic responses on its own.  
                                                 
43 Rumsfeld quoted in Robert E. Hunter, The European Security and Defense Policy: NATO’s Companion or 
Competitor? (Arlington, Virginia: RAND 2002): 178.  
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On the other hand, the administration, as previous ones, recognized NATO as a central 
defense organization. The NSS stated that NATO was one of the “strongest and most able 
international institutions in the world”, which “has, since its inception, been the fulcrum of 
transatlantic and inter-European security”.47 But as the Bush administration was relatively 
less interested in international organizations and multilateralism, such an interest was to some 
extent less firm than with Bush’s predecessors. In such a way, the administration went on to 
announce that “[t]he alliance must be able to act wherever our interests are threatened, 
creating coalitions under NATO’s own mandate, as well as contributing to mission-based 
coalitions”.48 In this way, the practical importance of NATO was linked to it being flexible 
within U.S. strategies in the War on Terrorism, and that it needed to be able to act in a global 
sphere. In 2003, the alliance obtained the responsibility for the Afghan stability mission. 
The administration supported continued eastward NATO enlargement, thus following 
up on the political engagement of the Clinton administration in the region.49 As for the Iraqi 
war, where “old” allies in Western Europe had opposed the U.S.,50 Eastern European allies 
were substantially more positive. Also the support of Russia in the War on Terrorism 
indicated cooperative features in the east of Europe. Referring to the chapter on the Clinton 
period, the preoccupation with Europe existed parallel with other foci, as part of a more 
fragmented security environment. The continuation of NATO enlargement meant that the 
alliance remained central within U.S. strategy in Europe, as it had been with Clinton. But with 
the Bush administration’s highlighted focus on the Middle East, in stead of more equally 
centering on different regions at the same time, such a political development within Europe 
was not as essential to overall U.S. strategy as before. Rather, the allies’ ability to assure 
flexible and global support in another region seemed to be the foundation of which NATO 
might continue to be relevant to the U.S. 
Beyond the increased focus on the Middle East, and the decreased centrality of 
Europe, other areas were of interest to the administration. The administration continued to 
perceive other areas in Asia as important to U.S. interests. Principally this meant that the 
administration upheld bilateral relationships in Asia, and that the administration maintained 
an eye on the developments in China.51 Elsewhere, for instance in Africa, the administration 
saw fewer direct interests of the United States. Here, the administration stated that: “Africa’s 
size and diversity requires a security strategy that focuses on bilateral engagement and builds 
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48 NSS 2002: 25.  
49 See NATO 2002-11-21: paragraph 2.   
50 With some exceptions, most notably the United Kingdom.  
51 Interview Flournoy 2007.  
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coalitions of the willing”.52 Even if previous U.S. administrations had not centered on 
building permanent partnerships in Africa, the statement indicated that the administration saw 
ad hoc cooperation as most fitting also in this less strategically important continent.  
Compared with the Cold War, where the transatlantic alliance had been an integral 
part of the complete U.S. strategic picture, the new and formative War on Terrorism did not 
include NATO or Europe as self-evidently central players. Within Europe, enlargement 
indicated that NATO was still perceived as a relevant organization. But the overall focus of 
the administration was to counter threats in the Middle East, which were perceived reinforced 
in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. In doing so, the U.S. made decisions by itself, and only more 
pragmatically cooperated through ad hoc coalitions of the willing. In this way, NATO needed 
to be flexible and global to become part of overall U.S. strategies. As the NATO allies would 
partly broaden its role in countering non-European threats, the fragmentation between 
NATO’s role and global U.S. strategies seen after the Cold War was in some ways reduced as 
NATO engaged outside the broader Euro-Atlantic area. But the U.S. inclination to 
unilateralism, and European opposition to the War in Iraq, meant that allied coherence on 
these completely “out of area” engagements was not integral; that the new U.S. focus in the 
War on Terrorism did not make post-Cold War fragmentation gone.   
 
Strategic Thinking and Implementation 
When turning towards the strategic thinking and implementation of the administration, the 
task is then to understand how the direct and U.S. centered interests of the administration; the 
preoccupation with threats in the Middle East; and the more pragmatic and less consultative 
view on cooperation, became part of a strategy ultimately leading towards offensive 
engagement in the post-9/11 environment.  
An appraisal of U.S. security strategy before the September 11 attacks must largely be 
based in the administration’s strategic thinking and planning, and not actual strategic 
implementation. The reason is that the administration did not substantially engage in these 
eight months, at least when applying a military understanding of the term. Accordingly, in 
addition to the administration’s wordings, the appraisal must try to take hold of what the 
absence of engagements may indicate, beyond the state of international affairs at the time. 
The administration argued that it should not apply American force unless clear U.S. interests 
were at stake, criticizing the Clinton administration for having had too broad an agenda.53 
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Indicatively, the administration’s strategy appeared more focused on the U.S., with a 
declining interest in so-called humanitarian interventions, and emphasis put on attaining a 
national missile defense. This implied that engagements were not ruled out, but just that they 
would be made more selectively, when seen to be in the direct interest of the U.S. The change 
produced by the September 11 attacks underlined such an interpretation, as a clear threat to 
U.S. security then made the administration call for offensive engagement in the new War on 
Terrorism.  
But to return to the pre-9/11 situation; Bush had campaigned arguing that the U.S. 
should be a “humble nation”. In his outline of such a term, the principle for engagement and 
the possible use of American force would be guided by a question of “what's in the best 
interest of the United States? What's in the best interest of our people? When it comes to 
foreign policy, that will be my guiding question. Is it in our nation's interests?”54 By saying 
that clearer U.S. interests would be the guide to decisions on engagement, the administration 
formed more selectively U.S. focused policies. In this way, an evaluation of U.S. interests in 
different scenarios, conflicts and wars would form the basis for a strategy of engagement.  As 
discussed in the section on interests and objectives, other administrations would of course also 
refer to U.S. national interests before engaging. But Bush wanted to distinguish himself from 
previous approaches, by emphasizing that he would only engage according to more narrowly 
defined interests, and implicitly only if confronted with more direct threats to the U.S. 
As engagements would be selected according to more directly perceived U.S. interests, 
peacekeeping missions were not regarded as the appropriate use of American force. 
Accordingly, the administration’s approach has been characterized as an attitude implying 
that: “Any so-called humanitarian interventions would be driven by security concerns, not 
humanitarian impulses.”55 Simultaneously, Bush agreed that the Clinton administration’s 
decision to intervene in the Balkans was right, but preferred that the Europeans would handle 
the continued need for peacekeeping.56 Bush stated that: “I hope our European friends 
become the peacekeepers in Bosnia and in the Balkans. I hope that they put the troops on the 
ground, so that we can withdraw our troops and focus our military on fighting and winning 
war”.57 In this way, if U.S. security interests were directly threatened, the U.S. would engage, 
while broader missions did not seem interesting to the administration.  
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107 
The administration’s pre-9/11 concern with acquiring a national missile defense also 
underlined this evolution a more U.S. focused strategy. According to a participant in the 
transition from Clinton to Bush, the Bush administration’s preoccupation with missile defense 
represented the immediately greatest divergence from Clinton’s security interests.58 For the 
Bush administration, the interest in obtaining a national missile defense, and leaving the Anti-
Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, underlined the more direct or narrower perspective to national 
security than was the case with its predecessor,59 in the administration’s pre-9/11 history. It 
also implied that rogue states and the possible proliferation of WMDs were seen as potential 
threats to the U.S. At the same time, missile defense had been discussed during the 1960s, 
1980s and briefly during the Clinton presidency.60 But the new Bush administration was 
substantially more enthusiastic about it.61 The Clinton administration had decided in 1999 to 
defer such a deployment.62 In terms of transatlantic relations, European skepticism of a U.S. 
national missile defense, and the lack of consultation with the NATO allies,63 highlighted 
more unilateral U.S. policies, as the Bush administration pursued and wanted to obtain a 
missile defense regardless of support. Also, the possible existence of a missile shield would 
give the administration increased freedom of action, as threats would become less relevant.64 
Consequently, such a defensive measure could implicitly and potentially also have offensive 
implications, as it could make it possible to prepare for offensive strategies without fearing 
retaliation.  
The administration pre-9/11 implicitly asserted that it saw military engagement as 
central to its strategy. More as an afterthought to the use of military force, Rice stated that 
“[s]ometimes though, competent diplomacy in the beginning can prevent the need for military 
force later”.65 At the inaugural ceremony, Bush stated that “we will meet aggression and bad 
faith with resolve and strength”.66 In this way, the administration even if not engaging 
anywhere before the September 11 attacks, nonetheless articulated a strategic reliance on 
military engagement.  
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Such initial strategic thinking, emphasizing that engagements should be made when 
U.S. interests were directly threatened, was put into practice by the 9/11 attacks. The impact 
of the attack on the U.S. meant that the administration’s threat perceptions were deeply 
reinforced. The administration was confronted by a new dominant threat that it perceived 
necessary to confront determinedly. Accordingly, the 2002 NSS stated that: “In the new world 
we have entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of action.”67 The report 
outlined that “The U.S. national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American 
internationalism that reflects our national interests”.68 Compared with the Clinton NSSs, such 
a statement did not refer to engagement explicitly. Still, as internationalism was underlined as 
the basis of strategy, it meant that isolationism was rejected, as its predecessors had done. In 
addition, the previously stated path of action meant that a more specific engagement strategy 
was to be offensively and pro-actively pursued. Also, while G. H. W. Bush and Clinton had 
emphasized the international features of such a strategy, the specific reference to 
“internationalism that reflects our national interests” underlined the U.S. focused nature of the 
G. W. Bush strategy of offensive engagement.  
The new nature of U.S. engagement strategy can also be identified through the explicit 
rejection of Cold War strategies of containment and deterrence. With the newly perceived 
threats, the administration concluded that such strategies were inapplicable.69 The 2002 NSS 
stated that: 
Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are 
wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents; whose so-called soldiers seek martyrdom in death 
and whose most potent protection is statelessness. The overlap between states that sponsor terror and 
those that pursue WMD compels us to action. […] To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our 
adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.70  
 
In this way, military engagement against Afghanistan, the state where the Al Qaeda 
network and Osama bin Laden had been given refuge, was seen as the proper response to the 
stateless terrorist threat. In terms of the argued interconnectedness between terrorism and 
rogue states, as well as what was perceived as the probable WMD capability of such states, 
more offensive engagement strategies were seen to be the only applicable response, and 
preventive action was implemented to defeat the Iraqi threat.71   
One participant in drafting the 2002 NSS, Philip Zelikow, stated that:   
                                                 
67 NSS 2002: v.  
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71 See footnote three of this chapter for the discussion of pre-emptive versus preventive strike.  
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The possibility of attacking Iraq was never discussed, at least in my presence, in connection with that 
document.  The discussion of preemptive action was instead dominated by reflections on the 9/11 
experience and lessons learned about the failure to deal adequately with the problem of al Qaeda and 
Afghanistan before the United States was attacked.  Also some of the participants in drafting 
remembered the precedent of the Iraq war in 1991, where there was great concern about preventing the 
completion of Iraq's nuclear weapons program, a program the UN later discovered to be much more 
elaborate than the United States had realized before that war began.  In other words, the context for this 
aspect of the 2002 NSS was reflection on past experience, not consideration of any specific future 
enemy.72  
 
In this way, Zelikow argues that the inclusion of preventive strike into the 2002 
document was not a result of a prior decision to intervene in Iraq. But key members of the 
administration, before gaining office, and while in it, had a more offensive strategic approach. 
Ideas presented in the DoD draft from 1992, as discussed in the chapter on the first Bush 
administration, indicated a need for actively preventing the emergence of rivals, implying a 
more pro-active attitude. During the 1990s, some of the same people had called for action, 
including military measures, to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq.73 The people 
representing such possible continuity from the DoD draft of 1992 and the younger Bush 
administration were most importantly Paul Wolfowitz and “Scooter” Libby. From among 
signatories of the 1998 letter and as members of the new administration both Wolfowitz and 
Donald Rumsfeld are found. Also, the top DoD 1992 draft responsible and the 2002 vice 
president was Richard Cheney. According to a close observer, some representatives of the G. 
W. Bush administration, such as Wolfowitz, may have had an agenda to have the U.S. use 
massive military force against Iraq before the September 11 attacks. Cheney, on the other 
hand, did not call for more offensive policies until after 9/11.74 Then, Iraq was argued and 
intended as part of the War on Terrorism. The shock produced by the terrorist attacks helped 
Wolfowitz and his agenda.75  
Countering Iraq had also been part of Clinton’s rogue state policies, although the 
administration largely treated the rogue state and WMD threat as potential, and did not 
perceive it an imminent threat it needed to strike preventively. According to a participant in 
drafting a 2001 Quadrennial Defense Report, the Bush administration had also been interested 
in pre-emption even before September 11, 2001, but it was then focused on proliferation, and 
not terrorism and regime change.76 While it is possible that the entire administration did not 
have a fully offensive agenda to remove Saddam Hussein from power before the 2002 NSS; 
at least some members of the G. W. Bush administration favored more massive and offensive 
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deployments, even before the September 11 attacks and the following War on Terrorism.  
And the document itself, opening for preventive strike, laid grounds for its implementation. 
Accordingly, while engagement strategies had been planned and to a limited degree 
been deployed against rogue states and possible proliferation during the 1990s, after 9/11 
determined engagement strategies were implemented against international terrorism and these 
threats. Threats were now seen more imminent than potential. This was especially evident 
when it came to international terrorism, as the Afghan engagement was implemented as a 
direct result of the September 11 attacks. With regard to Iraq, the urgency of security issues in 
the War on Terrorism also spilled over on to the administration’s perceptions of the Iraq 
threat. According to James Dobbins, the administration’s envoy to Afghanistan after 9/11, the 
initial easy military success in Afghanistan gave rise to confidence and optimism towards 
what was achievable when it came to Iraq. The toppling of Saddam Hussein thus seemed 
feasible, and more so than in 1991, even though the U.S. then had a larger army deployed and 
was supported by a larger coalition. Accordingly, the war on Iraq thus seemed worthwhile 
after 9/11.77 According to Robert Litwak, the vulnerability produced by 9/11 paved the way 
for using preventive means.78 
The implementation of strategies in the War on Terrorism and Iraq also meant that 
engagements were implemented as regime change.79 While the Gulf War had left Saddam 
Hussein in power, both the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the Iraqi regime were 
overthrown through the U.S. interventions. Clinton had planned for military engagement 
should threats in the Middle East become real rather than potential, for instance in the form of 
a regional crisis. But still, this did not indicate that the administration would militarily 
intervene to ensure regime change. In terms of internal conflicts, the Clinton administration’s 
engagement in the Balkans had removed Milosevic from power. At the same time, this kind 
of regime change was implemented in a conflict where the administration engaged to stop an 
internal ethnic conflict, and the administration had asserted that the U.S. itself could not 
create a stable and legitimate domestic order for any society. In the cases of Afghanistan and 
Iraq, regime change through military engagement was applied as the administration’s 
response to what initially were the transnational threat of terrorism and the perceived WMD 
capability of Iraq. The presumption that Iraq possessed WMD capability was later judged 
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incorrect. Instead of confronting the threat of terrorism and possible WMD capability, the 
toppling of the regime itself was the goal, and not simply conflict resolution as in the Gulf 
War. Such regime change had not been part of previous post-Cold War administration’s 
approach to these threats, and it meant that the Bush administration’s engagements were made 
more deeply.  
In line with the evolution of a more U.S. focused and offensive engagement strategy 
during the Bush presidency, operational strategy changed accordingly. The Rumsfeld 
Doctrine, named after Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, outlined the military plans for 
being able to make small interventions “everywhere”. The Afghanistan engagement was, 
according to an observer, “supposed to be an example of Rumsfeld’s theories that small 
amounts of special forces and airpower could combine to do what large Army units had been 
called on to do in the past”.80 This fundamentally contrasted with the Powell Doctrine of the 
late Cold War, influencing G. H. W. Bush and to some degree Clinton. According to such a 
doctrine, U.S. military operations would only be made after thorough consideration, and if 
implemented, was to be made with large troop deployments. The Rumsfeld doctrine then 
underlined the expeditionary nature of engagements as seen by the G. W. Bush 
administration. By underlining the efficiency of which engagements could be made, pro-
active action might have seemed more applicable. More similar to its predecessors, such an 
operational approach was also supported by an initial reluctance to perform in long term 
stability missions. In terms of using the U.S. military to stabilization and peacekeeping 
engagements, there was a common disinclination to have the U.S. commit to these types of 
mission during the early Bush presidency. Such an assessment was shared among Rumsfeld, 
the Pentagon and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice.81  
Also noteworthy, the U.S. focused and offensive engagement strategy was not 
perceived as restrained by international norms and law, as the administration interfered in 
internal affairs. During the 2000 presidential campaigning, it was argued that “[it is not] 
isolationist to suggest that the United States has a special role in the world and should not 
adhere to every international convention and agreement that someone thinks to propose”.82 
Even as this referred to international treaties and agreements, underlining U.S. unilateralism, 
the later Iraqi engagement was also made without UN consent. While also the Clinton and 
NATO Kosovo engagement was made outside the decisions of the UN Security Council, this 
engagement was tacitly approved after the operation. But the engagement promoting regime 
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change in Iraq rather meant that the U.S. intervened in Iraqi internal affairs without a threat to 
international peace and stability being recognized by the international community.  
As a consequence of gradually deepening military engagement strategies, the U.S. 
became more concerned about internal problems. But by doing so, long term engagements 
became a post-intervention feature of U.S. engagements. While the Rumsfeld Doctrine 
indicated that minor engagements could be made everywhere according to U.S. interests, the 
strategy implemented inevitably led to the U.S. and its partners ending up in a more long-tem 
engagement to stabilize and keep the peace after the initial combat engagement.83 This 
correlated with the gradually increasing interference in internal affairs, as the target of Bush’s 
engagements was the regime itself. Contrastively, the Gulf War, majorly based on the Powell 
doctrine, was deemed over as soon as the violation of international borders, the Iraqi 
occupation of Kuwait, was over.  
Historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., in assessing the historical record of the Bush 
administration asserts that Bush made a revolutionary change in U.S. strategy.84 But 
Schlesinger’s point of reference does not take the evolution within U.S. strategic responses in 
the 1990s thoroughly into account, and he thus sees Bush as swiftly overturning the long 
established strategy of containment and deterrence. But as the thesis has shown in the 
chapters on previous post-Cold War administrations, the post-Cold War strategic responses of 
the U.S. were increasingly marked by military engagements rather than containment and 
deterrence. This implies that there was continuity in the basic strategic response of the U.S., 
even with Bush’s implementation of strategy. But the difference from its predecessors was 
that Bush’s strategic thinking and implementation was made more unilaterally and pro-
actively, to even include preventive strike as part of such an engagement strategy, rather than 
responding to appearing conflicts. With new fragmented threat concerns in the post-Cold War 
period, deterrence strategies had been considered gradually less applicable. With suicide 
bombers and so-called rogue regimes, the state-to-state deterrence of Cold War vintage was 
declared unusable. The gradually appearing post-Cold War strategy of the United States was 
offensively implemented in Bush’s War on Terrorism.  
The reinforced threat perceptions and offensive application of engagement strategy 
had great implications for the role and outreach of NATO during the Bush presidency. The 
geographically limited out of area role of NATO during the Clinton presidency turned more 
global. The alliance came to broaden its perception of threats, particularly as a consequence of 
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the 9/11 attacks and the U.S. War on Terrorism. But U.S. unilateralism and coalitions of the 
willing also undermined such a role for NATO immediately after the September 11 attacks. 
Divergence on Iraq meant that NATO did not obtain a role here, and consequently indicated 
that allied coherence on the new engagements strategies of the U.S. were not equal to the 
agreed containment role of the Cold War.  
The ASC of 1999 had stated that terrorism and WMD proliferation concerned the 
alliance. Still, NATO’s role remained within the broader Euro-Atlantic area. With the 
September 11, attacks on the U.S., such threat perceptions were asserted more determinedly 
by the NATO allies, parallel with the reinforced U.S. threat perceptions. This was evident in 
the 2001 Article 5 implementation, and the decision to have the alliance take over the 
responsibility of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) engagement in 
Afghanistan in 2003. The decision to invoke article 5 was taken jointly by the allies, after a 
Canadian initiative.85 In this way, the broadened outlook of the organization did not stem 
from distinct American pleas. Still, the U.S. during the Clinton presidency had also 
emphasized to NATO that threats outside Europe were looming, making a foundation for the 
article 5 implementation, beyond the fact that the U.S. had been hit by terrorists. But the 
terrorist attacks strengthened U.S. threat perceptions, and made responses that implemented 
shifts in the role and outreach of NATO. The Bush administration underlined that the alliance 
post-9/11 needed to prepare for “a full range of threats”, including terrorism and WMD.86   
From a fundamentally defensive stance in the Cold War, through restrained 
engagements “out of area” during the Clinton presidency, NATO developed a more global 
approach, and with the implementation of the Afghanistan engagement, acted in a complete 
new region, far outside its transatlantic base. To keep NATO relevant, the allies of the U.S. 
saw it necessary to get involved in the War on Terrorism.87 The post-9/11 support to the U.S. 
manifested its more global strategic outreach:  
The present outreach of NATO has been a significant extension of NATO’s outreach, which would 
have been hard to imagine before 9/11, and is still controversial, especially among Europeans. Another 
shift has also taken place, in the levels of violence and its intensity.88  
 
At the same time, NATO’s engagement role during the 1990s provided a foundation that 
more global engagements could be based upon. In such a way, the Balkans engagement was a 
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pre-condition for the application of a wider engagement role after September 11, 2001.89 The 
deployment of NATO in Afghanistan then implied that the alliance had broadened its role into 
the global realm, engaging fully “out of area”. 
But while the alliance broadened its role in the wake of 9/11, unilateral 
implementation, and only pragmatic cooperation with willing states, had caused traditional 
alliances and partnerships to reduce in practical relevance.90 Even with the NATO 
engagement in Afghanistan, it has been pointed out that NATO largely plays a supportive role 
in the War on Terrorism, and that its role in Afghanistan has been secondary to that of the 
U.S.91  Also, the U.S. was skeptical of European caveats within the operation, which implied 
that the administration did not see NATO as efficient and flexible enough.92 In terms of an 
implementation of a new role in countering WMDs and rogue states, the alliance did not 
engage in the American War on Iraq, and consequently did not agree with the U.S. strategic 
response of preventive strike. The NATO allies agreed that both terrorism and WMDs posed 
threats to the alliance. They did not agree, however, on how to respond, thus their ideas on the 
implementation of strategy, were not always consistent. In addition, as some allies to a larger 
extent than the U.S. continued to view these threats as potential rather than imminent,93 the 
alliance did not agree to fully implement common strategies towards such threats. 
But the Afghanistan mission nonetheless implemented a more global role for the 
alliance. By taking over the ISAF mission, NATO lead the forces trying to achieve stability in 
Afghanistan. According to a former U.S. Ambassador to NATO, the NATO engagement in 
Afghanistan was made to ensure that NATO stayed relevant and to compensate for the lack of 
support on Iraq.94 By doing so, a new role for NATO in post-combat operations within U.S. 
engagement strategies had broadened. The peacekeeping and stability role of the alliance had 
been seen in the Balkans during the Clinton presidency. But with Afghanistan, NATO 
obtained formal responsibility for such a stability engagement in a global context and in a 
mission with higher intensity, as stated in the above quote.  
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Different from the peacekeeping role of NATO in the Balkans, the alliance took over 
responsibility for the long term stability mission of an engagement made by the U.S. and not 
NATO itself. But somewhat similar to the stability engagement in the Balkans, this meant that 
the European allies became more central in the engagement after the U.S. had led the initial 
combat engagement. This implied that the stability role of the alliance continued to support 
the post-conflict needs of initial U.S. engagements. But different from the Balkans 
engagement, the U.S. continued to lead the campaign against terrorism in Afghanistan, while 
NATO initially focused more on peacekeeping.95 According to Jamie Shea, serving as NATO 
Director of Information and Press and subsequently as Deputy Assistant Secretary General for 
External Relations during the early Bush presidency, there was a tendency among some 
Americans to think that NATO could do what the U.S. did not want to do itself.96 This 
reflected the U.S. reluctance to involve itself in such stability missions at the time, although 
that attitude changed later after the 9/11 attacks.  
The NSS 2002 asserted that if NATO would succeed in transforming the alliance 
within the frames of U.S. strategies, “the reward will be a partnership as central to the security 
and interests of its member states as was the case during the Cold War”.97 NATO did 
recognize broader threats to its security, and obtained a more global role by engaging in 
Afghanistan. But the initial U.S. engagement did not rely on alliance structures in its 
implementation, and the Iraqi engagement was not supported by NATO. Consequently, 
NATO’s role was not as fully flexible as to completely fit within Bush’s engagement 
strategies. In such a way, while U.S. strategies coalesced in the wake of the September 11 
attacks, and NATO performed on a different continent, the alliance did not seem to have an 
equally central position within global U.S. strategies as it had during the Cold War.  
 
Conclusions 
A strategy of offensive engagement became the strategic approach of the Bush administration. 
In this way, the administration continued to see engagements as the post-Cold War strategic 
response of the U.S. The new variety of such a strategy was firstly seen in the U.S. centered 
focus of the administration, and consequently, in the disregard for broader engagements, 
although restraints were also visible during the Clinton presidency. With the reinforced threat 
perceptions formed by the September 11, 2001, attacks on the U.S., Bush’s engagement 
strategy obtained a more offensive, or pro-active feature, as the administration included 
                                                 
95 Interview Shea 2008.  
96 Interview Shea 2008.  
97 NSS 2002: 26.  
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preventive strike as a means of strategy. The administration engaged in Afghanistan and in 
Iraq. The new focus within the administration’s War on Terrorism meant that the threat 
perceptions and global strategies of the U.S. were no longer implemented in the same 
perceptibly fragmented security environment. But the unilateral formation of engagement 
strategies, and the application of so-called coalitions of the willing, meant that such a new 
focus did not inherently rely on structures of alliances, as had been the case in the Cold War. 
In sum, military engagement remained the strategic response of the U.S. in countering threats, 
but Bush’s variation of such a strategy was more unilateral, offensive, and centered on direct 
threats seen as located in the Middle East.  
Parallel to such an evolution post-9/11, also NATO’s role developed. By the 
implementation of Article 5 after the 9/11 attacks, NATO’s more global threat perceptions 
were fully confirmed. And the NATO responsibility for the Afghanistan engagement from 
2003 onwards implemented a practical engagement role of the alliance outside the alliance’s 
Euro-Atlantic area. This marked an extension from the more limited “out of area” role 
pursued during the Clinton presidency, into a more global realm. But central NATO members 
opposed the U.S. Iraqi engagement, and the administration did not perceive NATO as flexible 
enough to fit into U.S. strategic implementation. Accordingly, Bush’s formative frame in the 
War on Terrorism did not produce allied coherence in the same way Cold War strategies of 
containment and deterrence did.  
CHAPTER VI  
 
STRATEGIES OF ENGAGEMENT  
 
A CONCLUDING SYNTHESIS 
 
 
“The full story will require us to transcend the parts and concentrate on the whole; this will 
require unprecedented linguistic ability, insight and imagination. It is a formidable 
challenge.”1  
 
Adding Parts into a Whole – Seeing Order in Diversity 
After characterizing the three post-Cold War presidencies’ national security strategies, and the 
evolution of NATO’s role within these, the concluding chapter aims to synthesize arguments 
into a coherent understanding. U.S. historian Melvyn Leffler requests such a holistic approach 
in the above quote, related to making a Cold War synthesis. To add up parts into a larger 
whole is now as relevant to post-Cold War interpretations. 
By summing up the thesis through the conceptual framework used, it is possible to 
identify the key interests and objectives; perception of threats; assessment of strategic areas, 
allies and partners; and strategic thinking and implementation of the administrations. Such an 
overview of periods and components of strategies is possible to present in a simplified table, 
as seen on the following page. For comparison, the outlined overview includes U.S. Cold War 
strategies. When read vertically, the table gives a basic account of the different periods’ 
assessment of each of the components of strategy, as treated in each chapter. When read 
horizontally, the table gives an overview of each of the conceptual components of U.S. 
strategies throughout the periods covered. In this way, by applying the same conceptual 
framework used in each chapter, the conclusion will integrate the three administrations’ 
policies into a combined account. When also seen next to U.S. Cold War strategies, a 
synthesis of the period at study is possible to identify through an idea of U.S. strategies of 
engagement. In this way, parts are brought together in a synthesized whole.  
 
 
                                                 
1 Leffler 2000: 58. The quote indicates that a historical synthesis, while being based on the empirical parts of 
history, also needs to be constructed through abstract understanding and creativity. 
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Table 1: Overview of Periods and Components of Strategies 
 Cold War G.H.W. Bush Clinton G.W. Bush 
 Interests and 
Objectives 
- Containing Soviet 
Union/communism 
- General interest in 
promoting democracy/ 
economic liberalism  
- American Western 
leadership  
- Gain position vis-à-
vis the Soviet Union  
- Containing the Soviet 
Union/Russia 
- Promoting  
democracy/economic 
liberalism 
- American 
transatlantic and global 
leadership 
- Unrivalled U.S. 
position 
- Promoting 
democracy/economic 
liberalism.  
- American 
transatlantic and global 
leadership 
- Unrivalled U.S. 
position 
- Prevent escalation of 
internal conflicts  
 
- Direct U.S. interests/ 
homeland security 
-Promoting 
democracy/ economic 
liberalism 
- Diminishing the 
influence of Islamic 
extremism 
- Unrivalled U.S. 
position 
Perception of Threats  - Soviet Union  
(- China) 
- Communists  
-Soviet Union(/Russia) 
- Possibly evolving 
major powers 
- Iraq 
- Regional (and 
internal) conflicts  
- Internal conflicts 
- Rogue states  
- Proliferation of 
WMDs  
- International 
terrorism 
- International 
terrorism 
- Proliferation of 
WMDs 
- Rogue states, 
especially Iraq 
 
Strategic Areas, Allies, 
Partners 
 
- Critical interest in 
Western Europe and 
Asia, military 
interventions in the 
Third World 
- NATO and other 
regional defense 
arrangements. Inherent 
multilateralism  
- Limited disagreement 
among allies  
- Europe still 
important, but 
events/conflicts outside 
Europe fragmented 
from transatlantic 
framework. Eastern 
Europe without Soviet 
domination 
- NATO continue and 
transform 
- “new world order”, 
multilateral coalitions 
(i.e. ad hoc coalition of 
the Gulf war) 
- Interest in Europe 
largely fragmented 
from other regions 
perceived interesting. 
- NATO enlargement 
and partnership 
processes in Central 
and Eastern Europe.  
- UN engagements to a 
limited extent 
 
- Primary focus on the 
Middle East; reduced 
interest in Europe 
- ‘Coalition of the 
willing’, general 
disinterest in allies 
- NATO enlargement, 
cooperation in 
Afghanistan, 2003- 
- Support by Eastern 
European states, while 
central Western 
European allies 
opposing U.S. policies. 
 
Strategic Thinking and 
Implementation  
- Strategy of 
containment and 
deterrence.  
- NATO as territorially 
defensive organization.
- From containment 
and deterrence to a 
fledgling strategy of 
engagement.  
- The Powell doctrine.  
- NATO as territorially 
defensive organization 
with ideas for new 
broader role. 
- A restrained strategy 
of engagement.  
- Hesitant use of 
military power and  
“two major regional 
wars” concept. 
- NATO engaging “out 
of area” in the broader 
transatlantic area. 
- Towards a strategy of 
offensive engagement. 
Decline of deterrence. 
- The Rumsfeld 
doctrine and preventive 
strike. 
- NATO engaging 
globally. 
 
 
The conclusion argues that the interpretation of strategies of engagement contain the 
central aspects of U.S. strategies during the period of this study. Contrastive to the Cold War 
strategies of containment and deterrence, the post-Cold War strategic environment made the 
question of when and how to engage internationally the key feature of strategy. Interests in 
engaging largely stemmed from U.S. interests and objectives in sustaining its new supreme 
and leading position. New post-Cold War threats were largely indirect or potential which 
made the previous strategies less applicable, and the question of when and how to engage 
more relevant. Concerning the third component or part of strategy, the U.S. framework of 
interpreting security strategies within changed from the global Cold War framework where 
multilateralism was integral, to a more fragmented strategic outlook. By engaging out of area, 
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NATO transformed to account for new threats in an extended transatlantic area. In parallel, 
broader U.S. threat perceptions made NATO fragmented from U.S. engagement strategy 
beyond Europe during the 1990s. In the War on Terrorism, U.S. engagements again became 
more focused. While NATO broadened its engagements into non-European continents in 
support of U.S. strategy, the new strategic focus of the U.S. was not as cohesive as the one of 
the Cold War.  
 
Interests and Objectives 
With different variations, the above table indicates that there existed stable U.S. interests in 
being an undisputed power in the world, and nuances in objectives of performing global 
leadership. Consequently, U.S. strategic interests and objectives in international leadership 
and position embedded ideas of American primacy. The primacy term has been extensively 
pursued by scholars, as seen in the introductory historiography. According to such views, the 
U.S. strategy was one of primacy. In reviewing the post-Cold War U.S. presidencies, also this 
thesis has pointed out that the U.S. saw an interest in upholding its unipolar position and 
providing international leadership in doing so. But as different from other approaches, the 
thesis has treated such a position as an objective of the U.S. strategy, but not one that 
describes the actual strategic decisions made.2 Consequently, as the Soviet Union 
disintegrated, the U.S. administrations saw an interest in upholding the new position of the 
U.S. In doing so, both G. H. W. Bush and Clinton emphasized the interest in providing 
leadership. With G. W. Bush, American objectives of leadership were somewhat 
overshadowed by a more physical or military understanding of U.S. primacy. Contrastive to 
the Cold War, in the post-Cold War era, the primary position of the U.S. could be pursued 
without the restraints posed by the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc, and thus through new 
strategies of engagement. 
Such an interest in the unrivalled position of the U.S. also meant that the post-Cold 
War administrations continued to promote American values abroad. Nonetheless, such 
promotion was promoted with varying means, from political (and economical) engagement, to 
military engagement during the G. W. Bush presidency. In the Cold War, the promotion of 
American values had been an ideological dimension of the superpower rivalry. In the post-
Cold War period, such values could be promoted without consideration of the Soviet Union, 
and accordingly the U.S. could engage in doing so.  
                                                 
2 See also the historiography presented in chapter 1.  
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Likewise, stated objectives of minimizing the influence of threats supported the 
general interest in having a superior and leading position. In addition, minimizing threats, and 
upholding a superior position, were seen to secure the basic and straightforward interest in 
protecting U.S. territory and citizens. As is demonstrated by the table, interest in containing 
the Soviet Union during the Cold War; continuing such interests towards the Soviet Union 
and Russia and possibly emerging powers during the G. H. W. Bush presidency; interest in 
preventing the escalation of internal crises during the Clinton presidency; as well as the 
interest in diminishing the influence of Islamic extremism during the G. W. Bush presidency, 
all supported the general security of the U.S.  
Lastly, the table identifies that the alliance continued to institutionalize American 
power in Europe. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the G. H. W. Bush administration saw 
continuous interest in the transatlantic relationship. Clinton also expanded the relationship 
eastwards. The G. W. Bush administration was relatively less interested in permanent 
institutions, but the administration saw an interest in making the transatlantic relationship 
more flexible, and further enlarged into Eastern Europe. In this way, the U.S., as in the Cold 
War, recognized a strategic interest in having a leading position in transatlantic affairs. 
Combined, U.S. interests in the period reflected an intention to engage in international affairs.  
 
Perception of Threats 
Consistent with table 1, threats were seen to change more than interests as the Cold War 
ended.3 Seen together, there was a change from the monolithic perception of communism and 
the Soviet Union, to new, fragmented threats, until threats again were seen as focused in the 
War on Terrorism. The new nature of threats contributed to new strategic responses, as 
strategies of containment and deterrence became seen as inapplicable to counter these threats. 
At the height of the Cold War and in its immediate aftermath, threat perceptions were 
concentrated on the Soviet Union. By being monolithic, the whole strategic outlook of the 
administration and the foundation of the transatlantic alliance centered on this threat. In 
addition to the ideological and geopolitical fear of the Soviet Union, the nuclear capabilities 
of the adversary superpower made it represent an existential threat to the U.S. and NATO. 
Also China was with varying degrees of intensity seen as an interrelated threat. The first Bush 
administration continued to focus on the possibly hostile intentions of the Soviet Union and 
Russia, and maintained a fear of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. Fears of other possibly emerging 
                                                 
3 Such an observation of relative stability in interest perceptions is also consistent with the theoretical assessment 
of national security interests, as presented in chapter I.  
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powers, especially fears within the DoD, was interrelated with the existing threat perspective. 
At the same time, it was also related to new elements of engagement strategies. As these 
threats were potential, engagement was possible, as there were no direct balancing of the 
U.S., as seen in the Cold War.  Rather, engagement could support the long term interest in 
sustaining the interests in a U.S. primary position, and thus indirectly minimize potential 
emerging powers’ possible influence.  
Rather than being monolithic, new threat perceptions were fragmented from one 
another, and can be placed within two broad categories of threat perceptions that gradually 
appeared to the U.S. administrations: the indirect threat of regional and internal conflicts, and 
the potential threat of so-called rogue states, the proliferation of WMD capability and initial 
fears of international terrorism.  
The first new category of threat perceptions, internal and regional conflicts, appeared 
in a state-to-state manner during the first Bush presidency, with the Gulf War. With Clinton, 
internal crises were included as indirect threats to the U.S., particularly in the Balkan cases.  
These crises affected the broader interests of the U.S. in international leadership, and as such, 
its preponderant position in the world, as well as transatlantic affairs. As this category of 
threats was of such a kind that it could not be contained or deterred, the central question of 
threat handling appeared to be the question of when and how to engage.  
The second category of threats also contributed to the formation of engagement 
strategies by the respective U.S. administrations. In these cases, the concerns evolved more 
gradually than the more crisis-driven policies towards regional and internal conflicts. This 
largely came from the threats’ principal nature of being potential, rather than immediately 
present, during the intermediate period. As table 1 states, rogue states, the proliferation of 
WMDs and international terrorism appeared as perceivably central threats during the Clinton 
presidency, and became more so in the G. W. Bush era.4 In the new, broader, threat 
perspective of the post-Cold War, the threat of WMD proliferation had more fragmented and 
transnational characteristics – particularly related to so-called rogue states and possibly also, 
international terrorism – than being interrelated with the monolithic communist threat. In 
terms of NATO, this second category of U.S. threat perceptions was fragmented from the 
transatlantic dimension in the intermediate phase. 
                                                 
4 Still, the Gulf War had shown that the Iraqi regime had intentions of creating a nuclear program, and in this 
way such threat perceptions also existed earlier on, as Iraq also is listed as a threat during the first Bush period in 
the table. But as the Bush administration perceived the crisis as an issue of state-to-state aggression, engagement 
policies were here formed on the crisis’s basis as a regional conflict, namely fitting in the first category of 
threats. Accordingly, threat perceptions of Iraq as a rogue state and possible nuclear power were not the 
foundation of G. H. W. Bush engagement. Rather, rogue states and a fragmented fear of WMD proliferation 
became more openly expressed in the late 1990s. 
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This second category of post-Cold War threats became more central and imminent, 
rather than potential, to the U.S. during the first year of the G. W. Bush presidency. With the 
9/11 attacks, international terrorism came to be perceived as a new direct threat to the U.S, 
and rogue states and their WMD capability were articulated as interrelated threats. U.S. threat 
perceptions to a greater extent converged and centered on these types of threats, in a new 
focus perceived equivalent to the Cold War. But in stead of containment, military engagement 
was the strategy pursued to minimize threats. Deterrence strategies were seen inapplicable to 
counter non-state actors and rogue regimes.  
 
Strategic areas, allies and partners 
As table 1 states, the U.S. Cold War approach centered on regional defense arrangements, in 
which NATO had a special position. The existence of the Iron Curtain demonstrated that 
Europe was central within the strategic picture of the Cold War. Parallel military operations in 
the Third World were part of the same framework of bloc thinking. Hence, U.S. Cold War 
strategies were broadly framed within the same structure that NATO was founded on. As the 
Cold War ended, a gradual fragmentation of U.S. strategic outlook coincided with the 
preservation and transformation of NATO in the broader transatlantic area.  
Firstly, the G. H. W. Bush administration still saw Europe and NATO as central to 
U.S. strategy. But limited engagement in conflicts beyond Europe anticipated fledgling 
fragmentation in U.S. security outlook, where NATO did not have a function. The overall 
Cold War framework of analyzing strategic areas, allies and partners within started falling 
apart. At the same time, traditional U.S. interests vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and Russia 
showed elements of continuity, also with regard to Europe and NATO. But with Clinton, the 
more fragmented outlook became manifest. As such, Europe represented one central arena for 
U.S. strategy, while other regions were approached separately from the transatlantic 
dimension. For instance, U.S. policies towards rogue states were outside NATO’s strategic 
perspective. In parallel, the Clinton administration broadened and transformed its European 
relations. U.S. strategic influence moved eastwards, through NATO enlargement and the 
Partnership for Peace. NATO engagements in the Balkans also broadened the transatlantic 
outlook. But NATO was not concerned with more global challenges, at least not in terms of 
practical engagement during the Clinton presidency. Compared with U.S. Cold War 
operations in the Third world, broader post-Cold War engagements by the U.S. did not stem 
from the same strategic framework that NATO belonged to. 
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With G. W. Bush, and especially the War on Terrorism, the administration moved 
towards a new U.S. framework in terms of strategic areas, allies and partners. An increasing 
disinterest in Europe, and preoccupation with the Middle East underlined divergence, unless 
the NATO strategic outlook changed in accordance with U.S. priorities. As the September 11 
attacks did lead NATO to deal with more global threat concerns, transatlantic security outlook 
looked potentially convergent. But with U.S. unilateral engagement, with local partners and 
coalitions of the willing as supplement, NATO initially did not have a central position within 
the new strategic framework bring formed. But the organization adopted U.S. strategic 
perceptions, and in terms of engagements, eventually became deployed in Afghanistan. 
NATO in this way partly converged with U.S. engagement strategies in a more global sphere. 
At the same time, the U.S. questioned the enthusiasm and substance of NATO support in the 
Afghan mission. Disagreement between traditional European allies and the U.S. concerning 
Iraq, further highlighted that the new strategic outlook of the U.S. was not as unifying as the 
one of the Cold War.  
With reference to trends of multilateralism and unilateralism, there was an evolution 
aligned with the development of a new strategic outlook. In the Cold War, multilateralism in 
the form of allies and partners within the Western camp was inherent in the framework of 
containment and deterrence. Even though there existed disagreement among allies, there was 
fundamental cohesion on their common strategy of containing the Soviet Union. In post-Cold 
War policies and engagements, the same stable picture was not present. With a fragmented 
strategic environment, U.S. policies were not as stable in terms of international cooperation, 
allies and partners. And with the War on Terrorism, initial cooperation was formed 
unilaterally or with coalitions of the willing. In this way, diverse types of engagements 
produced fragmentation in terms of international cooperation as well. From the inherent 
multilateralism in the Cold War, global policies were not as fixed as before with regard to 
cooperation. In stead of having a stable Western bloc, U.S. cooperation in the post-Cold War 
world relied on varying institutions. In the War on Terrorism, U.S. focused policies, and 
unilateral implementation, meant institutionalized multilateralism dropped on the U.S. 
agenda.   
In terms of strategic areas, and hereunder present allies and partners, there was a 
continued focus on the Eurasian landmass from the Cold War to its aftermath. But while 
Europe and NATO remained central to the U.S. within a transatlantic dimension, other more 
global security issues separate from a NATO perspective formed a fragmented U.S. security 
outlook. Eventually, U.S. engagement in the War on Terrorism, particularly centered in the 
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Middle East, produced a new strategic framework for the G. W. Bush administration. Within 
this security outlook, NATO and Europe were not as inherently relevant to the U.S. as in the 
Cold War perspective, or in the more limited out of area engagements of the 1990s, even as 
NATO adopted policies in line with new U.S. strategies. 
 
Strategic Thinking and Implementation 
Compared with the Cold War, where Kennan outlined a strategic thinking of containment that 
would be adapted and applied in different variations throughout the period, the post-Cold War 
period did not have an equivalently articulated foundation of strategy within the U.S. 
executive. It has been pointed out that such a lack of overall strategic concept was perhaps 
desirable in an implicitly intermediate period.5 As the National Security Advisor to the first 
Bush administration put it, “it did not seem important to develop a new strategic concept 
when the administration did not counter any new direct threats”.6 As the period from the end 
of the Cold War to the War on Terrorism appeared unfocused to the administrations, they had 
to deal with the conflicts, crises and threats as they occurred. With such a strategic 
environment, the lack of an overall defined concept guiding U.S. strategy meant that policies 
could be pursued flexibly according to each situation the administrations encountered.  
Nonetheless, the administrations were determined to remain engaged; to ensure its 
position, and counter the fragmented threats that did arise. The thesis has accordingly 
attempted to form an understanding of the imperatives of the actual strategic responses made, 
the strategic decisions taken, from the “lumper’”s perspective and with some time’s distance. 
The study has taken in, supplemented and amended previous literature into its integrated 
study. Combined, a synthesis of U.S. strategies has been presented. In doing so, an extensive 
set of primary sources has been investigated, to form as valid conclusions as possible  without 
the full access of internal classified U.S. material.  
The table presented above states that Cold War strategies were characterized by 
containment and deterrence. This meant that the foremost strategic approach of the U.S. was 
related to containing the position of communism and the Soviet Union in the world, and 
deterring possible aggression or hostility towards the Western bloc. As the Berlin Wall fell in 
1989 and the Soviet Union itself disintegrated in 1991, containing and deterring the former 
superpower became more and more obsolete. New strategic responses started to evolve. With 
the U.S. military engagement in the Gulf, a fledgling new strategic outlook, different from 
                                                 
5 See for instance McCrisken 2003: 159-160.  
6 Interview Scowcroft 2007.  
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previous Cold War strategies, was implemented. With the Clinton administration, even as 
strategic decisions were made in a restrained manner, and often as responses to crises 
appearing, the policies made came to represent different variations of strategies of 
engagement. With regard to the former Cold War adversary, the administration politically 
engaged with Russia and Eastern Europe through the Partnership for Peace and partial NATO 
enlargement. In this way, former rivals were integrated, rather than contained. But returning 
to the more military aspects of U.S. engagement strategies, the Clinton administration 
engaged in internal conflicts, and planned and to a limited degree implemented such strategic 
responses with regard to the rogue state threat. G. W. Bush initially criticized the 
development of broad U.S. engagements during the 1990s. But with the 9/11 attacks, also 
Bush implemented military engagement as the response to post-Cold War threats. In the War 
on Terrorism, such engagement was implemented against the terrorist threat located to 
Afghanistan. In 2003, the administration’s strategy was implemented more offensively, as the 
U.S. preventively went to war in Iraq. 
Through these post-Cold War responses, the engagement strategy widened in its 
application. Engagements gradually became an all-inclusive strategic response, moving from 
a more traditional type of conflict, to internal conflicts, to end up confronting more 
transnational and unconventional threats.7 
While engagements widened in terms of appliance, they also deepened in terms of 
substance. Firstly, G. H. W. Bush’s Gulf War engagement merely confronted Iraqi aggression 
in a state-to-state conflict. With Clinton’s engagement in the Balkans, the administration’s 
engagement strategy confronted the internal situation in the former Yugoslavia, which 
resulted in the fall of Milosevic’s regime. With Bush’s engagements, regime change became 
the focus of engagement, as engagements were made to remove the Taliban and Saddam 
Hussein from power. Consequently, also international rules of non-intervention were 
challenged by the deepening application of U.S. engagements.8  
                                                 
7 Without stating that policies pursued by former administrations directly caused later evolution in strategy, it is 
possible to identify widening application of such a strategy, while at the same time acknowledging the 
particularities present within each administration and each decision to engage. Particularities made for different 
approaches, but former engagements generally formed a foundation and experiences that later policies could rely 
on. A distinct exception is the Somalia engagement which caused profound psychological restraints and fears of 
future engagement, especially in terms of areas distant to the U.S. and possible “mission creep”. 
8 The concerned legal debate concerns the basic nature of state sovereignty and non-interference in internal 
affairs, versus the right to (collective) self defense and the UN Security Council’s mandate to identify threats to 
international peace and security, and proper responses, as defined in the UN Charter. A discussion of the 
implications for the  international norm of non-intervention of the Clinton and G. W. Bush military engagements 
is available in Hege Kristin Ulvin, The United States and the Norm of Non-Intervention: US Argumentation for 
the Use of Force from Clinton to Bush, Master Thesis in Political Science (University of Oslo: 2006).  
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The operational strategies the U.S. relied on changed in parallel to the widened 
application of strategies. G. H. W. Bush maintained the Powell Doctrine, which demanded a 
clear foundation for military engagement, and if engaging, operations should be made with 
major deployments. Moving deeper into the 1990s, the Clinton administration’s wider, but 
still restrained engagements indicated a partial movement. The administration still hesitated 
before engaging, looking for a decisive foundation, at the same time that military operations 
multiplied, and were conducted more in terms of technology and efficiency. As new threats 
were largely indirect or potential, the strategy had to take into account the reduced level of 
legitimizing factors for troop commitment. Accordingly, the administration to a large degree 
relied on the use of air force power. During the presidency of G. W. Bush, Secretary of 
Defense Rumsfeld’s doctrine manifested a fulfilled change from the Powell Doctrine. In the 
initial Afghan and Iraq cases, military engagements were made offensively, and on the 
assumption that efficiency and technology was more important than massive troop 
commitment. Seen together, such a development formed a foundation for the widened 
application of strategies of engagement.  
Furthermore, as engagements also deepened, and confronted the internal situations in 
states, interventions became increasingly also long term engagements within the states 
confronted. This was partly contradictory to the evolution in operational doctrines, moving 
towards expeditionary missions, as discussed above. In the Balkans, engagements had 
produced a need for continued peacekeeping and stability operations. The Afghanistan and 
Iraq engagements became more time, money and personnel consuming than the 
administration intended, and consequently also these engagements became long-term 
commitments, with higher levels of intensity and violence than in the Balkans. While 
engagements were ruled by doctrines that relied on being operationally and technically more 
efficient, the deepened application of strategies towards intervening in internal situations 
meant that commitment needed to last even after the initial target of interventions had been 
confronted. 
As commented on in chapter II, the terms containment and deterrence are implicitly 
defensive terms, perceived as responding to the Soviet and communist threat. Contrastively, 
the term engagement implies a more forward strategy, as it is the U.S. who engages in the 
world. Even so, the administrations when militarily engaging did so on the basis of its 
interest, and perceived that they responded to threats confronting them. In such cases, 
engaging to project interests appears more offensive than engaging to respond to threats. 
Bacevich has argued that to “categorize any strategy as either defensive or offensive is to 
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misconstrue the competitive nature of politics”.9 In this way, chapter II pointed out that also 
Cold War strategies were actively pursued. In terms of engagement, the strategy also appeared 
in variations of defensive and offensive character. The Gulf War engagement was for instance 
seen as collectively defending Kuwait. In the other end, G. W. Bush’s Iraq war has been 
characterized as offensive, as the administration applied preventive strike. But as stated, also 
in the Cold War the U.S. intervened in other countries. Nonetheless, interventions in the Cold 
War and in the post-Cold War world were part of two different strategic approaches. In this 
way, even as both strategies relied on the use of U.S. military force, interventions in the Cold 
War were made as part of the overall strategy in containing the Soviet Union and 
communism. Contrastively, in the post-Cold War world, interventions were part of 
engagement strategies, as the new U.S. strategic response to new, fragmented threats.  
Lastly, the implementation of post-Cold War U.S. strategies indicated selectivity in 
engagement. In the Cold War, the use of military force was of course made in accordance 
with the overall U.S. strategic approach. But as the U.S. was confronted with a monolithic 
superpower threat, there was a tendency to refer to all gains of communism as threats to the 
U.S. Accordingly, strategies seemed less selective. With no overall threat in the post-Cold 
War period, the U.S. strategy needed to depend on the specific interests of the U.S. as it was 
confronted with minor, fragmented threats. In other words, the strategies of engagement 
meant that the U.S. had to select when and where to engage. The criteria of selectivity, of 
when and how to engage, was to a large extend founded on the administrations’ assessment of 
the strategic components.10 This meant nuances between the administrations in assessing 
what engagements were possible or desirable to make, including a review of what areas were 
strategically important to engage in; appraisals of what implications the situation in question 
had for allies or partners; what seriousness of threat the situation represented; possible 
consequences for the U.S. objective of holding a primary and leadership position in the world; 
as well as the more clear-cut, direct U.S. interest in homeland security.  
                                                 
9 Bacevich 2002: 87.  
10 In this way, the first Bush administration’s engagements were shaped by its traditional state-to-state outlook. 
An example of non-intervention is thus represented by the conflict arising when Yugoslavia broke up. The 
Clinton team implemented engagement strategies in a restrained, but still broader base. But the Rwanda case 
indicates selectivity. For the last Bush administration, engagement came to rely on a U.S. centered approach, 
selecting engagements on their more direct importance to the United States. Of course, as all administrations 
decided on where and how to engage along the lines of its interests, threat perceptions and assessment of 
strategic areas, allies and partners, selectivity represented a fully American perspective. In this way, all strategies 
of engagements were U.S. focused. But as G. W. Bush saw U.S. interests in overall stability, selecting 
engagements were made on more international grounds. And with the Clinton administration, the recognition of 
broader, more fragmented and indirect, threats contributed to a wider base of its engagement strategy, than was 
the case with the more internally based focus of the G. W. Bush administration. 
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Concerning NATO, the evolution of U.S. strategies of engagement was followed by a 
gradual formation of NATO’s role. During the G. H. W. Bush period NATO did not 
transform substantially. Remains of Cold War strategies of containment and deterrence 
produced allied coherence on its traditionally territorially defensive foundation. Fledgling 
U.S. engagement approaches were made outside the transatlantic dimension. Nonetheless, the 
presidency embedded deliberations on what the future role of the alliance would be, outlining 
possible courses for the future. During the Clinton presidency, NATO gradually transformed 
to fit into post-Cold War engagement strategies. Through the two Balkan engagements, 
NATO implemented a fully new engagement role. As parallel U.S. planning and limited 
implementation towards other threats remained outside the transatlantic dimension, NATO 
was separated from other theaters of U.S. engagements. At the same time, both the 
administration, and to some extent NATO, opened up for broader threat assessments that 
would influence NATO’s role in the future.  With G. W. Bush, strategies of engagement came 
to particularly center on the Middle East. As a response to the 9/11 attacks on the U.S., global 
threat perceptions became more concrete to NATO. From acting limited out of area in the 
Balkans, the alliance from 2003 onwards became deployed in Afghanistan. Still, the Bush 
administration had not seen NATO as relevant in the initial phase of engagement, and the 
consensus driven organization was inapplicable in the U.S. Iraqi engagement. Accordingly, 
NATO’s engagement role was not equally integral to the new U.S. outlook, as its Cold War 
role that by origin was part of the global U.S. strategy to contain the Soviet Union.    
Combined with the long term aspects of engagements, NATO’s role also adopted post-
engagement needs, as these escalated. U.S. post-Cold War security strategies step by step 
made ground for a process of turning NATO more flexible and deployable, as seen fitted to 
deal with the diverse, complex and more distant threats of the post-Soviet era. As the U.S. 
strategic framework broadened, NATO engagement outside its own region became a result, as 
the alliance adopted a new more global engagement role to remain central in a new era.  
 
Final Remarks 
The thesis has covered the period from the end of the Cold War to the War on Terrorism and 
Iraq; but what about the potential future presence of U.S. engagement strategies? As 
investigated, U.S. responses to post-Cold War threats were largely made as military 
engagements. With the inclusion of preventive strike, the engagement strategy seems to be at 
its most intense. Nonetheless, strategies of engagement appear to have a foundation for being 
maintained by succeeding American administrations, as the U.S. continues to hold a primary 
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position in the world, and accordingly faces threats that do not equal its power. Contrary, in a 
long term perspective, the potential re-emergence of great power rivals to the U.S. would 
imply that strategies of containment and deterrence could be rejuvenated. But as the basic 
underpinnings of the engagement strategy seem to be present at least in the short to middle 
term future, elements of an engagement strategy seem likely to remain. As the Afghanistan 
and Iraq engagements have become difficult, costly and long-term operations, future 
engagements will presumably be planned and made more cautiously and restrained.  
In terms of NATO’s role, its engagement role principally depends on the outcome of 
the Afghanistan engagement and ultimately allied coherence in such a new and broad role of 
the alliance globally “out of area”. If an elongation of post-Cold war trends were to become 
manifest, NATO seems to move towards a truly global, expeditionary feature in U.S. 
strategies of engagements, unless the U.S. reverses its strategies, or the transatlantic allies 
were to reject such a substantial change of the alliance’s original approach.  
While the thesis has provided a description of the evolution of U.S. strategies and 
NATO’s role within these, there are other, some more specific and explanatory, research 
approaches that may be investigated within the same strategic understanding. While 
emphasizing the evolution of military engagement strategies, the thesis has pointed out that 
the U.S., particularly the Clinton administration, also politically engaged with former 
adversaries. In light of this description, further research can accentuate and explain the 
potential correlation between the U.S.-Russian relationship and broader U.S. strategies.11 
Also the economic aspects of U.S. engagement strategies can be addressed, as a possible new 
approach to U.S. policies within a period of economic globalization. And in terms of NATO, 
a clear account of U.S. intentions of forming a new role may be a future subject at research, 
meaning not the implications of strategies as has here been covered, but rather the motivation 
behind U.S. ideas for NATO’s gradually widened role in the post-Cold War world. How 
much was premeditated and how much was crisis-driven? As the descriptive features 
addressed in this thesis are more easily accessed through public sources, more explanatory 
studies would clearly benefit from accessed internal material. Nonetheless, the thesis has 
outlined a general description of U.S. post-Cold War strategies that can be scrutinized within 
other or more specific realms than what has been possible to address within this project.   
 
11 Michael McFaul sees ”realistic engagement” as a preferable U.S. strategy for the future in terms of U.S.-
Russian relations, but what is here indicated, is an empirical investigation of the political aspects of the U.S.-
Russian relationship within the strategic outlook here identified as strategies of engagement. McFaul 2001.  
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